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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers on open economy macroeconomics.
The ﬁrst paper investigates the welfare implications of a ﬁscal transfer rule between
members of a monetary union. I build a two-country model where banks are ex-
posed to sovereign risk. I show that the costs of expansionary ﬁscal policy can
outweigh the beneﬁts due to the added pressure on sovereign spreads. This is
magniﬁed when the ﬁscal stance is weak. On the contrary, inter-governmental
transfers mitigate the ﬁscal strain and provide stimulus to the economy. Yet,
I ﬁnd that sound ﬁscal stances are crucial both for governments to countervail
shocks on their own, and also to grant support for the implementation of the
transfer scheme.
The second paper lays out an empirical model to compare the propagation of
exogenous shocks in a small open economy subject to structural change. As the
identiﬁcation of shocks is time invariant, I am able to investigate the diﬀerences
that pertain only to structural change. I estimate the model to Australia and ﬁnd
a regime transition occurring in 1990. The responses of domestic variables to the
shocks are less exacerbated and adjust quicker after the transition. I ﬁnd that
increases in commodity prices are only inﬂationary after 1990 and as a reaction
to world demand shocks, whereas commodity-market shocks are recessionary.
In the last paper, I study the implications of relative wage rigidities for monetary
policy in a small commodity-exporting economy. I present a model where wages in
the non-commodity sector are indexed to wages in the commodity sector, generat-
ing relative wage rigidities. For a high degree of indexation, I ﬁnd some inﬂation is
desirable. As wages are set in nominal terms, inﬂation partially oﬀsets the eﬀects
of indexation on real wages. Nevertheless, as indexation is itself inﬂationary, the
response of monetary policy to inﬂation still needs to be stronger. I show that
policy misspeciﬁcation is more problematic for higher degrees of indexation.
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Summary
This thesis consists of three autonomous research papers on open economy mac-
roeconomics. In common, they study the policy responses of ﬁscal and monetary
authorities in small open economies exposed to exogenous shocks. Yet, the par-
ticular questions addressed and the methodology used diﬀer substantially. The
thesis is the result of individual research mostly carried out while I was at the
European University Institute, in Florence. It also greatly beneﬁted from my
visits to the Central Bank of Colombia, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the
University of New South Wales.1
Chapter 1:
Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Sovereign Risk
In this paper, I study the welfare implications of a ﬁscal transfer rule between
member states of a monetary union. In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis
in Europe, I provide a contribution to the ongoing debate on how to reform the in-
stitutional framework of the Euro Area and make it more resilient to idiosyncratic
shocks.
I build a two-country model where banks serve as ﬁnancial intermediaries between
depositors, on the one hand, and ﬁrms and the government, on the other. Because
banks hold government bonds in their portfolios, they are exposed to sovereign
credit risk. As such, an increase in sovereign spreads aﬀects banks' leverage and
leads to a disruption in the quantity and price of credit to ﬁrms. At the same time,
the increase in interest payments forces the government to consolidate, amplifying
the negative pressures on the economy.
I introduce an inter-governmental transfer scheme and show that, for welfare to
improve in both countries, national ﬁscal proﬁles and population sizes need to be
1This thesis does not necessarily reﬂect the views of the Central Bank of Colombia or of the
Reserve Bank of Australia or their staﬀ.
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nearly symmetric. Small diﬀerences between countries aﬀect the distribution of
welfare gains and deplete the support to implement the scheme. For instance,
because transfers are raised per capita, smaller countries secure larger welfare
gains, whereas big countries lose from the scheme.
I then propose a scheme under which the losses incurred by big countries are a
minor fraction of the beneﬁts they derive from trade integration due to the com-
mon currency. Under such scheme, small countries can reap substantial welfare
gains, with the transfers eﬀectively reducing the pass-through of sovereign spread
shocks to the economy.
This paper shows that the costs of expansionary policy can outweigh the beneﬁts
from providing stimulus to the economy. Although counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy
can sustain demand during a downturn, it adds pressure on sovereign spreads
which feeds back to higher borrowing costs to ﬁrms. The negative eﬀects are
magniﬁed when the ﬁscal stance is weak. In particular, when public debt is high
and sovereign spreads are more sensitive to a deterioration of the public budget,
consolidation becomes crucial to attenuate the pass-through of sovereign spread
shocks.
On the contrary, inter-governmental transfers are an eﬃcient mechanism to ad-
dress idiosyncratic shocks. They mitigate the ﬁscal strain caused by higher interest
payments and provide a stimulus to the economy. Yet, policy makers need to en-
force ﬁscal discipline at the country level. I ﬁnd that when one country conduces
looser ﬁscal policy, it skews the welfare gains away from countries with stronger
ﬁscal conditions. Hence, sound ﬁscal stances are crucial not only to add scope
for governments to countervail sovereign spread shocks on their own, but also to
grant wider support for the implementation of the ﬁscal transfer scheme.
Chapter 2:
Exogenous Shocks and Endogenous States
This paper lays out an empirical model to compare the propagation of exogenous
shocks in a small open economy subject to structural change. The model allows me
to disentangle the variation in the propagation of shocks that is due to exogenous
factors from that due to endogenous structural change.
The econometric framework has three main features: First, the model is composed
of two blocks, with one block begin exogenous with respect to the other. Second,
the endogenous block is assumed to follow a Markov-switching process evolving
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according to a latent variable dictating structural changes. Third, the structural
shocks are identiﬁed through sign-restrictions on the responses of the exogenous
block. As the identiﬁcation of structural shocks is time invariant, I am able to
single out speciﬁc shocks and compare their transmission between diﬀerent dates.
Importantly, in doing so I am able to investigate the diﬀerences that pertain only
to structural change.
As an illustration, I estimate the model to Australia. A small commodity-exporting
economy, Australia is highly exposed to commodity prices. I therefore identify
three distinct commodity price shocks based on their underlying eﬀects on the
country's terms of trade: a world demand shock, a commodity-market shock, and
a globalization shock. With regards to structural change, I ﬁnd a once-and-for-all
regime transition occurring in 1990. The transition appears to match relatively
well the consequences of major institutional reforms in Australia, such as the ﬂoat
of the exchange rate, the decentralisation of the wage-setting system, and inﬂation
targeting.
Comparing the impulse responses of real GDP growth, inﬂation, and changes to
the nominal exchange rate, I ﬁnd that structural change alters the way the shocks
propagate. The responses of these variables to the three shocks are less exacer-
bated and adjust quicker after the transition. This is generally in line with the
economic predictions associated with the interpretation of the two regimes. Not-
ably, the changes in the responses of real GDP growth and inﬂation are consistent
with the implementation of labour market reforms and with the move to inﬂation
targeting.
I ﬁnd that increases in commodity prices are only inﬂationary after 1990 and as
a reaction to world demand shocks. However, as these shocks are not always
associated with increases in the terms of trade, monetary policy may have been
failing to address them properly. In fact, and as world demand shocks represent
the largest share of terms-of-trade shocks to the Australian economy, these results
show that the terms of trade are not a suﬃcient statistic for foreign conditions
and therefore are not enough to guide policy.
In regard to commodity-market shocks, there also seems to be scope for improve-
ment in terms of the policy response. Despite improving the terms of trade, I ﬁnd
evidence that these shocks are recessionary, with the negative eﬀects on growth
observed in both regimes. Nevertheless, as commodity-market shocks have no
impact on inﬂation after the structural change, some policy loosening might be
warranted.
3
Chapter 3:
Monetary Policy and Sectoral Relative Wage Rigidity
In the last paper, I study the implications of relative wage rigidities for the conduct
of monetary policy in a small commodity-exporting economy. I propose a two-
sector model of an open economy subject to commodity price shocks. The two
sectors, consisting of a non-commodity and a commodity sector, use labour as
input for production and are exposed to foreign demand. Labour markets are
assumed to be segmented, with every unemployed household member directing
his job-search to a speciﬁc sector. New hires occur according to a matching
function, which depends on the number of job-seekers and of vacancies posted is
each sector. Nominal wages in the non-commodity sector are assumed to be sticky
and can be indexed to the evolution of wages in the commodity sector. This link
creates sectoral relative wage rigidity.
I analyse the propagation of a positive commodity price shock to shed light on the
mechanisms behind relative wage rigidity. The shock causes an appreciation of the
exchange rate and leads to the contraction of the non-commodity sector. In order
to attract workers, commodity ﬁrms raise wages, shifting job-seekers away from
the non-commodity sector. As demand for non-commodity goods is weaker, ﬁrms
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to retain their workers. If relative wages are rigid, non-commodity
output drops further. As non-commodity ﬁrms expect wages to increase following
the expansion of the commodity sector, they reduce vacancies more. As a result,
total output drops, while unemployment and inﬂation increase.
I calibrate the model to Australia and use GMM to match the second moments of
a set of relevant variables to their empirical counterpart. I ﬁnd that strict inﬂation
targeting is detrimental to welfare compared to a simple feedback rule, with the
relative welfare losses being larger the higher the degree of indexation. However,
I also ﬁnd that optimal monetary policy is more responsive to inﬂation the higher
the relative wage rigidity. To unveil this puzzle, I use diﬀerent loss functions
to describe the preferences of the monetary authority. I ﬁnd that, for a higher
degree of indexation, some inﬂation is desirable in order to smooth real wage
volatility. As wages are set in nominal terms, inﬂation partially oﬀsets the eﬀects
of indexation on real wages. Nevertheless, as indexation itself is inﬂationary, the
response of monetary policy to inﬂation needs to be stronger.
I show that policy misspeciﬁcation is more problematic for higher degrees of relat-
4
ive wage rigidity. Additionally, the optimal policy prescription is highly sensitive
to the type of loss function the monetary authority chooses to follow. For instance,
if monetary policy cares about inﬂation and non-commodity output volatilities,
response to inﬂation must be stronger the more rigid relative wages are. If policy
care about inﬂation and unemployment instead, the optimal response to inﬂation
becomes milder for higher degrees of indexation. All things considered, although
monetary policy is found to be an eﬀective macroeconomic policy instrument, its
response needs to be calibrated carefully.
5
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Chapter 1
Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary
Union with Sovereign Risk
Keywords: sovereign risk, banks, monetary union, ﬁscal transfers.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E62, F15, F41, F42, F45.
Firenze, December 2015
1.1 Introduction
The debate over the architecture of a robust monetary union between countries
attracted renewed interest during the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The
asymmetrical nature of sovereign interest rate shocks, coupled with the inherent
constraints they pose on domestic ﬁscal policy, exposed a painful fault in the
design of the European Monetary Union (EMU). This fault concerns the lack
of adequate risk sharing mechanisms to facilitate the economic adjustments of
individual member states facing idiosyncratic shocks. As seen during the crisis,
soaring sovereign spreads forced a number of countries, including Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Italy and Spain, to undertake sudden ﬁscal consolidation while imple-
menting deep structural reforms. For the ﬁrst three cases, the extent of the crisis
required them to resort to institutional rescue programmes put in place by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Institutions. The dramatic
economic toll of the crisis and the dubious response from within the EMU called
into question the reversibility of the common currency.
In this paper I propose a two-country model of a monetary union where sovereign
spreads aﬀect private borrowing costs due to ﬁnancial frictions. My contribution
is twofold. First, I provide a consistent narrative of the events during the sovereign
debt crisis, illustrating how domestic ﬁscal policy is constrained by the respons-
iveness of sovereign spreads to the ﬁscal conditions and by the ratio of public debt
to GDP. Second, I show that a simple ﬁscal transfer scheme between governments
is an eﬃcient buﬀer to sovereign spread shocks and discuss the conditions under
which such a scheme can be implemented.
During the sovereign debt crisis, banks were pivotal in passing the rise in sovereign
spreads to the real economy. The fall in government bond prices and the down-
grading of these assets by credit rating agencies severely weakened banks' balance
sheets. As a consequence of their direct exposure to sovereign credit risk, banks'
ability to raise market-based funding was adversely aﬀected. The increase in
funding costs forced them to strengthen their equity ratios and to sharply reduce
overall credit provision to ﬁrms, which ultimately ignited the recession.
I capture the role of banks during the crisis by introducing a banking sector
similar to that proposed in Gertler and Karadi (2011) into a two-country general
equilibrium model of a monetary union. Banks serve as ﬁnancial intermediaries
between households, from which they take short-term deposits, and ﬁrms, to
which they make long-term loans. Due to agency problems between banks and
their depositors, banks are forced to moderate their leverage in order to attract
deposits from households. I extend the banking sector by assuming that banks also
lend to the government. In good times, the sovereign obtains funds at the risk-free
interest rate. However, a spread can arise on top of the risk-free rate reﬂecting
the credit worthiness of the government. Because banks hold sovereign bonds in
their portfolios, their net worth is exposed to sovereign credit risk. Therefore, a
shock to sovereign spreads deteriorates the equity value of banks and forces them
to contract credit supply and to raise lending rates at the same time as they retain
funds to build up the value of their net worth.
In the model, when the ratio of public debt to GDP is calibrated to 60%, I ﬁnd
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that a 10% increase in sovereign spreads leads to an increase of about 3.5% in the
borrowing costs for ﬁrms. However, when the ratio of public debt to GDP equals
120%, the increase in private spreads is more than three quarters of the initial rise
in sovereign spreads. The drop in the supply of credit to ﬁrms and the increase
in borrowing costs adversely impacts investment and ignites the recession. At the
trough, real GDP falls between 2% and nearly 6%, depending on the size of the
ratio of public debt to GDP. These eﬀects are magniﬁed when sovereign spreads
respond to the ﬁscal outlook. After the initial shock, an increase in the public
deﬁcit feeds back to sovereign spreads and further increases ﬁrms' borrowing rates.
The size of the feedback loop also has implications for ﬁscal policy. For instance,
for a public debt to GDP ratio of 120%, it is impracticable for the government
to engage in counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy as it is forced to consolidate in order
to stabilize public debt and to prevent sovereign spreads from rising further. As
seen in the periphery of the EMU during the crisis, when sovereign spreads are
sensitive to the ﬁscal outlook, there is no leeway for the government to provide a
stimulus to the economy in order to countervail the recession.
The idea that the EMU should be completed with a federal ﬁscal arrangement
is hardly a novelty in policy and academic circles. When its design was being
discussed, it was clear that a system of ﬁscal transfers crafted to countervail
idiosyncratic shocks would be crucial for the success of the single currency.1 The
argument behind a federal-like transfer mechanism drew directly on the literature
of optimal currency areas.2 With the creation of the EMU, member-states would
no longer be able to use monetary policy or the exchange rate to buﬀer country-
speciﬁc shocks. Moreover, to the extent that production factors are immobile
across countries and movements in nominal prices and wages are slow, ﬁscal policy
would become a key instrument to fuel the necessary adjustments. With this in
view, the Maastricht Treaty incorporated limits on budget deﬁcits and public
debts in order to preserve sound domestic ﬁscal stances capable of reacting if
required.
Yet, the political process aimed at endowing the EMU with an area-wide ﬁscal
capacity lay dormant for decades until the sovereign debt crisis when domestic
ﬁscal policies failed to operate the required adjustments. In response the severe
consequences left by the crisis and the inability of the EMU to respond adequately
1See, for instance, the MacDougall report (European Commission, 1977) as well as the Delors
(1989) report.
2See the seminal articles by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969).
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and promptly, the leaders of the European Institutions drew up a road map to
create an area-wide ﬁscal stabilization capacity. The proposed mechanism, to be
implemented before 2025, would be deployed when domestic ﬁscal policy cannot,
on its own, counteract large asymmetric shocks.3 In this paper, I examine the
design and implementation of such a federal ﬁscal capacity. I investigate the extent
to which ﬁscal transfers can eﬀectively smooth the eﬀects of sovereign spread
shocks by considering a mechanism that aﬀects the ﬁscal stance of the country.
Because sovereign spreads constrain domestic ﬁscal policy, foreign transfers can
step in and both support economic activity and mitigate the ﬁscal burden.
I use the model to quantify the eﬀects on welfare of a cross-country ﬁscal transfer
scheme that is actioned in response to a widening in sovereign spreads. I ﬁrst show
that in a monetary union with equal-sized regions, there are unambiguous welfare
gains from implementing the scheme. Because transfers are processed between
governments, they alleviate the ﬁscal burden directly. The scheme proves to be
particularly important in bad times when the public debt to GDP ratio is high
and sovereign spreads are highly responsive to the ﬁscal outlook. However, the
distribution of welfare gains is very sensitive to asymmetries between the two
regions. Notably, I ﬁnd that, in order to obtain positive welfare gains for all
regions, the minimum relative size for the smaller region is still higher than 48%
of the entire union. This is an important challenge for the implementation of the
scheme: if some countries incur welfare costs, they will likely not participate.
In order to provide a relevant and representative case study, I estimate the para-
meters of the model for Portugal and the Eurozone. I limit the set of schemes I
consider to those under which potential welfare costs cannot exceed the welfare
beneﬁts generated by the introduction of the single currency. In other words, the
alternative scenario to the transfers countries can compare to is the status quo pre
EMU. Considering the impact of the scheme in isolation, I show that Portugal
can secure welfare gains in the range of 1.44 − 7.80% of lifetime consumption,
while the Eurozone incurs welfare losses of 0.03 − 0.15%. Because the scheme is
designed in a way in which it excludes net losses from entering the EMU, these
results render strong support for its implementation. Regarding the role of the
transfers in mitigating the real eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks, I show that for a
level of transfers that reduces the pass-through of sovereign spreads in about 1/2
3The 5 Presidents Report (Juncker et al., 2015) is the last high level policy contribution. It
draws on and updates earlier proposals, namely by Van Rompuy et al. (2012). See also IMF
(2013) for discussion.
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percentage points, the trough of the recession is reduced by at least 1%. In bad
times, the eﬀects generated by the ﬁscal transfer scheme are considerably larger
and, therefore, the dimension of the recession can be eﬀectively reduced.
Literature: This paper is related to two strands of the literature. On the one
hand, it relates to a number of papers investigating the implications of sovereign
spreads for economic stability. Schabert and van Wijnbergen (2011) and Bonam
and Lukkezen (2013), for instance, focus on the interactions between ﬁscal, mon-
etary, and exchange rate policies, in an environment where sovereign spreads are
introduced as a preemptive game between the government and speculators. The
parsimonious way they model sovereign spreads is also used in the present paper.
Corsetti et al. (2012), who study how the sovereign risk channel exacerbates cyc-
lical shocks in an environment where monetary policy can be constrained at the
zero-lower bound, analyse the eﬀects of ﬁscal retrenchment in alleviating macroe-
conomic ﬂuctuations. Bocola (2013) and Pancrazi et al. (2014) also investigate
the pass-through of sovereign risk to private borrowing costs and evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of asset purchases by the central bank in stabilizing real activity.
Kollmann et al. (2013) introduce a banking sector with capital requirements into
an open economy model and investigate whether government provision of support
to banks can stabilize the economy. The present paper draws on this literature of
the pass-through of sovereign risk, but diverts from it by focusing on the implic-
ations it has on ﬁscal policy itself and by considering instead cross-country ﬁscal
transfers as a means to smooth shocks.
On the other hand, this paper contributes to the literature on federal ﬁscal ar-
rangements within monetary union. There is a growing literature on optimal
policy and international coordination using domestic ﬁscal instruments for coun-
tries sharing a common currency.4 However, less attention has been given to fed-
eral ﬁscal schemes. Among the exceptions, Farhi and Werning (2012) show that
ﬁscal transfers can improve risk sharing in an environment with complete asset
markets. Costain and de Blas (2012) compare ﬁscal policy rules that stabilize pub-
lic debt through either income taxation or spending on wages and unemployment
beneﬁts and ﬁnd that a policy of pro-cyclical spending on wages and transfers
decided by a federal agency brings the market economy closer to the planner's
solution. Kletzer and von Hagen (2000), Evers (2012) and Kim and Kim (2013)
investigate diﬀerent federal transfers schemes and their potential to achieve wel-
fare gains for members of a monetary union. I expand this literature by focusing
4Evers (2012) and Pappa and Vassilatos (2007) provide references.
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on asymmetric shocks that not only cause real ﬂuctuations, but also constrain
domestic ﬁscal policy. Besides presenting an actual scenario where federal ﬁscal
arrangements can act as a stabilization mechanism, this paper adds to the liter-
ature by quantifying and discussing the welfare trade-oﬀ such policies entail in a
realistic set-up.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section I describe
the model and motivate the main extensions I have introduced. Section 3 discusses
the estimation strategy and the results I obtain. I dedicate section 4 to the policy
analysis. I begin by investigating the dynamic eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks
in a baseline scenario. I then discuss how domestic ﬁscal policy is constrained by
the ﬁscal stance and by the behaviour of sovereign spreads. Finally, I investigate
the welfare consequences of the proposed ﬁscal transfers scheme and discuss its
dynamic impacts during episodes of sudden increases in sovereign spread. The
last section concludes.
1.2 Model
In this section I lay out a general equilibrium model of a monetary union. The
union is composed of two small open economies with habits in consumption, sticky
prices and wages, ﬁnancial frictions, and investment adjustment costs. The model
presented here is an extension of the one used by Lama and Rabanal (2014). The
two countries, which I call home and foreign, are of sizes n and 1−n, respectively.
Households in each country deposit their savings in domestic banks and provide
labour to domestic producer ﬁrms. Households in one country can also trade bonds
with households in the other country, having, however, to account for the real
exchange rate. Banks serve as intermediaries between households and borrowers.
They sell long-term loans to wholesale ﬁrms and to the government. Each country
produces a continuum of tradeable intermediate goods that are aggregated into a
ﬁnal non-tradeable good. The latter is consumed by households, the government,
and used for investment. Governments can raise taxes and issue long-term bonds
to ﬁnance public expenditure, while the area-wide central bank sets the nominal
interest rate according to a feed-back rule targeting aggregate inﬂation and output
growth.
The following subsections describe the home economy in more detail. The descrip-
tion of the foreign economy is omitted for brevity since its structure is analogous
to the home country, except for the government which is assumed to run zero ﬁscal
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deﬁcits every period.5 All variables are in per capita terms, the conventional ?
denotes foreign variables or parameters, and the subscript h (f) denotes goods
produced in the home (foreign) country and respective prices.
1.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households and within each household
there are two types of members: a fraction 1 − f are workers and a fraction f
are bankers. The former supply labour to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and receive wages,
while the latter manage a ﬁnancial intermediary for proﬁts. Household members
switch between the two occupations but keep the relative proportion of each type
constant. Hence, with probability λf a banker remains active in the following
period, which implies that each period a fraction (1− λf ) f bankers retire and
become workers. Conversely, each period the same number of workers randomly
become bankers. Bankers' limited tenure avoids overaccumulation of retained
earnings and ensures the ﬁnancial frictions remain operative, as explained below.
Household members are assumed to pool consumption risk perfectly. Their life-
time utility is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ci,t, li,t) for i ∈ [0, n]
with
u (ci,t, li,t) = log (ci,t − %ct−1)− ζ (li,t)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
and where E0 denotes the rational expectations operator conditional on the in-
formation available up to t = 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) is the household's subjective
discount factor. Households derive utility from consumption, which is subject to
external habit formation % ∈ (0, 1), and disutility from labour, where ϕ > 0 is the
inverse elasticity of labour supply and ζ > 0 its relative weight. The consump-
tion good is an aggregate good composed of domestic and foreign intermediate
goods, as explained below. Households can deposit their savings with domestic
banks and can trade foreign bonds in international ﬁnancial markets. The budget
5Without loss of generality, I impose zero ﬁscal deﬁcits for the foreign economy for simplicity.
When I compare two symmetric regions in section 4, I mean total symmetry, that is, the foreign
government is also allowed to issue debt.
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constraint of home households in real terms is given by
(1 + τ ct ) ci,t + bi,b,t + etrf,t−1bi,f,t−1 ≤ wi,tli,t + rh,t−1bi,b,t−1 + etbi,f,t + Vt − Tt
(1)
where bi,b denotes deposits with domestic banks which pay the real interest rate
rh,t−1, and bi,f denotes bonds traded with households abroad and which pay the
real interest rate rf,t−1. For ease of exposition, the budget constraint is written
such that bi,b > 0 implies positive savings from the households, while bi,f >
0 implies that the household is a net borrower in international markets. As a
consequence of being in a monetary union, the nominal exchange rate between the
two countries is ﬁxed and therefore the real exchange rate, et, is simply equal to the
ratio of consumer prices in both countries. Households receive labour income at
the real wage rate wi,t and real proﬁts from ﬁrms denoted by Vt. Finally, they pay
lump-sum and distortionary taxes, Tt and τ ct ci,t respectively, to the government.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption and for ﬁnancial asset holdings are
ςt =
1
(1 + τ ct )
1
ct − %ct−1 (2)
1 = βΛt,t+1rh,t (3)
1 = βΛt,t+1
et+1
et
rf,t (4)
where Λt,t+1 = ςt+1/ςt is the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption between t
and t+ 1, and ςt is the multiplier on the budget constraint.
I introduce nominal rigidities in wages as in Erceg et al. (2000) by assuming
that households are monopolistic suppliers of diﬀerentiated labour services. As
such, each household has market power to negotiate wages with intermediate good
producers. In turn, intermediate good producers use a composite labour input in
production, lt, which they obtain by aggregating diﬀerentiated labour services
according to
lt =
(ˆ n
0
(li,t)
τw−1
τw di
) τw
τw−1
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The demand curve for labour services from household i is thus given by
li,t =
(
wi,t
wt
)−µw
lt (5)
where wi,t is the real wage household i charges in order to supply li,t , and wt =(´ 1
0
(wi,t)
1−τw di
)1/(1−τw)
is the real price index of the composite labour input. The
elasticity of substitution between labour services supplied by diﬀerent households
is given by µw.
In each period, only a fraction 1− λw of households can re-optimize their posted
nominal wage. When able to adjust its wage, household i solves
Max
wi,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βλw)
s
[
log (ci,t+s − %ct+s−1)− ζ
(
li,t+s|t
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
subject to the respective demand curve for labour services and the budget con-
straint. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the optimal nominal wage w∗t is
given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βλw)
s ςt+sli,t+s|t
[
w∗t
Pt+s
− τw
τw − 1
ζ
(
li,t+s|t
)ϕ
ςt+s
]
= 0 (6)
where ςt is the multiplier on the budget constraint and li,t+s|t == (w∗t /wt+s)
−τw lt+s
is the labour supplied in period t + s for those households that last negotiated
their nominal wage at t.
1.2.2 Banks
As described earlier, every period a fraction f of household members are bankers
who run a domestic ﬁnancial intermediary. I extend the banking sector described
in Gertler and Karadi (2011) by allowing banks to provide funds to the govern-
ment. Hence, banks raise deposits from domestic households and lend to domestic
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and to the government. As in Lama and Rabanal (2014),
bankers do not engage in cross-border deposits or investment activities.6 I also
assume that the domestic banking sector holds the total amount of public debt
issued by the government.
6Dedola et al. (2013) extend the framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011) to allow banks to
take deposits from foreign households and to lend to foreign ﬁrms.
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I motivate these two assumptions with the following stylized facts. In 2011, around
80% of the sovereign debt claims on countries in the periphery of the Eurozone was
held in the balance sheets of national banks. In these same countries, domestic
government bond holdings accounted for 93% of bank's equity. On the other hand,
domestic banks represented roughly 75% of external ﬁnancing to private ﬁrms. As
a result, from 2008 to 2013, the lending volume of newly issued loans fell by more
than 50% in the periphery of the EMU.7
Therefore, each period a continuum of banks indexed by i ∈ [0, f ] obtain deposits
bi,b,t from households and lend funds to wholesale producers and to the govern-
ment, ai,x,t and ai,b,t respectively. Denoting by ni,t the net worth of ﬁnancial
intermediary i and by Wi,t the total value of its assets, the balance sheet of bank
i is then given by
Wi,t = qx,tai,x,t + qb,tai,b,t = ni,t + bi,b,t (7)
where qj,t is the relative price of claims ai,j,t. The cost of deposits is given by the
interest rate rh,t, whereas banks require a return of rx,t on the loans they make
to ﬁrms. The interest rate on government bonds, rb,t, is assumed to equal the
risk-free rate adjusted by a default risk premium δt. Expanding (7) forward, I
obtain the evolution of equity capital as the diﬀerence between earnings on assets
and interest payments on liabilities
ni,t = (rx,t−1 − rh,t−1) qx,t−1ai,x,t−1 + ((1− δt) rb,t−1 − rh,t−1) qb,t−1ai,b,t−1
+rh,t−1ni,t−1 (8)
Growth in equity above the risk-free return rh,t depends on the premium (rx,t − rh,t)
earned on the loans to ﬁrms and on the return on sovereign debt.
The objective of bankers is to maximize their expected terminal net worth
Ni,t = E0
∞∑
s=0
(1− λf )λsfβs+1Λt,t+1+sni,t+1+s (9)
To the extent that the expected discounted returns on his assets are higher than
the risk-free rate, the banker will want to raise deposits and build its net-worth
indeﬁnitely. Gertler and Karadi (2011) introduce a moral hazard problem in
7The ﬁgures were taken from Uhlig (2013), Acharya et al. (2014), and Bocola (2013). A re-
port by the Bank for International Settlements, BIS(2011), provides a comprehensive discussion
on the link between sovereign credit risk and banks funding conditions.
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order to limit overaccumulation of retained earnings by assuming that at any
given period bankers can divert a fraction ι of available assets. Having knowledge
of this, depositors can force the bank into bankruptcy, but can only recover the
remaining 1− ι of funds. Hence, depositors will only supply funds to the bank if
the following incentive-compatibility constraint is satisﬁed
Ni,t ≥ ιWi,t (10)
that is, the value of carrying on doing business must be higher than the value
of diverting funds. Absent ﬁnancial frictions, the risk premium on non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms would be zero. With imperfect capital markets, however, the premium may
be positive due to constraints on the ability of banks to raise external funds.
I solve the banker's problem by deﬁning the leverage ratio of ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, φi,t, as
Wi,t = φi,tni,t (11)
and by making an educated guess over the functional form of bankers' net worth.
In particular, I guess that Ni,t = νtWi,t + ηtni,t, where νt is the marginal value of
expanding assets, holding ni,t constant, and ηt is the marginal value of the bank's
net worth, holding its portfolio Wi,t constant. The expressions for νt and ηt are
given by
ηt = E0Ωt,t+1rh,t (12)
νt = Ωt,t+1
(
(rx,t − rh,t)− (rx,t − rb,t (1− δt+1))αWt
)
(13)
where αWt = qb,tai,b,t/Wi,t is the share of government debt in the bank's portfolio.
Ωt,t+1 is the banker eﬀective discount factor which is given by
Ωt,t+1 = βΛt,t+1 {1 + θ [ηt+1 + νt+1φi,t+1 − 1]} (14)
The eﬀective discount rate of bankers diﬀers from that of the households due to
the ﬁnancial friction.
As Gertler and Karadi (2011) show, when (10) binds the leverage ratio is common
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to all bankers and equal to
φt =
ηt
ι− νt (15)
That is, the amount of funds banks can intermediate is limited by their net worth
due to the borrowing constraint. For positive values of net worth, the constraint
binds only if 0 < νt < ι. With νt > 0, it is proﬁtable to expand Wi,t. However,
if νt > ι, the incentive constraint does not bind since the value from intermedi-
ation exceeds the gain from diverting funds. In the equilibria studied below, the
incentive-compatibility constraint always binds within a neighbourhood of the
steady state.
Finally, aggregate net worth in any given period is the sum of the net worth of
existing banks plus the start-up funds of entering banks. Surviving banks carry
their total net-worth into the next period, whereas new banks receive a fraction
/ (1− λf ) of the assets of exiting banks in order to start business. Aggregate net
worth is then given by
nt = λf
{[
(rx,t−1 − rh,t−1)− (rx,t−1 − rb,t−1 (1− δt))αWt−1
]
φt−1 + rh,t−1
}
nt−1
+ {qx,tax,i,t−1 + qb,tδtab,i,t−1} (16)
In the set up just presented, the share of government bonds in the balance sheets
of banks, αWt , is not an optimizing variable for bankers. I assume instead that
the banking sector provides funds to the government as the latter requires each
period, without entering into optimal portfolio choices.8 The appeal of this ap-
proach is that it gives me the ﬂexibility to introduce sovereign risk in a transparent
and parsimonious way. In particular, because I model sovereign default risk as a
preemptive game between the government and speculators, the pricing of govern-
ment bonds is not pinned down by banks.9 Hence, government bonds are priced
8For some references, Devereux and Sutherland (2007) describe how to implement optimal
portfolio choice in an open economy setting, while Dedola et al. (2013) apply this method to
their model of banks with cross-border linkages. Kollmann et al. (2013) assume that banks
bear real costs on government and private bond holdings in order to pin down their portfolio
composition.
9Bocola (2013) develops a model similar to mine where the government can actually default
on its debt, generating a pass-through of sovereign risk to private borrowing rates. The strategic
default literature is growing rapidly after the seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), and
includes Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), among many
others. Two recent papers that expand this literature by including a banking sector are Gennaioli
et al. (2013) and Sosa Padilla (2014).
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according to
rh,t = Etrb,t (1− δt+1) (17)
that is, the sovereign interest rate is equal to the risk-free rate adjusted by the
default risk premium, which I describe shortly.
1.2.3 Production
Capital producers: At the end of each period, perfectly competitive cap-
ital producers buy undepreciated capital from wholesale ﬁrms and repair it. At
the same time, they also invest in new capital by purchasing and transforming
domestic ﬁnal goods. The repaired and newly created capital is then sold to whole-
salers as an input to production. The discounted real proﬁts of capital producers,
ΠCP, are given by
Max
zt
Et
∞∑
s=0
βt+sΛt,t+s {qx,t+s (kt+s − (1− σ (ut)) kt−1+s)− zt+s}
where qx,t is the value of one unit of new capital, zt denotes the amount of ﬁnal
goods that is invested to generate new capital, and σ (ut) denotes the rate of
capital depreciation, which depends on capital utilization.
Capital producers are assumed to incur adjustment costs when investing in new
capital. The law of motion of capital is thus given by
kt =
[
1− ψ
2
(
zt
zt−1
− 1
)2]
zt + (1− σ (ut)) kt−1 (18)
whit ψ governing investment adjustment costs. Substituting (18) in the objective
function of capital producers, the optimal level of investment is given by
1 = qx,t
(
1− ψ
2
(
zt
zt−1
− 1
)2
− ψ
(
zt
zt−1
− 1
)
zt
zt−1
)
+βΛt,t+1qx,t+1ψ
(
zt+1
zt
− 1
)
z2t+1
z2t
(19)
Wholesale ﬁrms: Perfectly competitive wholesale ﬁrms use the composite
labour input and capital in order to produce a homogeneous good. They purchase
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capital from capital producers at the real price qx,t, and ﬁnance their capital
acquisition by borrowing from domestic banks. Banks thus need to issue claims
ax,t equal to the number of units of capital acquired kt, pricing each claim at the
price of a unit of capital. After production, wholesalers sell their capital to capital
producers and pay the return rx,t over their loans. The homogeneous good is sold
to domestic retailers at the real price px,t.
The production function of wholesale ﬁrms is given by
xt = ξ
s
t (utkt−1)
α (ξut lt)
1−α (20)
where ξst is the total factor productivity at home, ξ
u
t a drifting labour-augmenting
technology common to both countries and α is the weight of capital in production.
Following the discussion in Albonico et al. (2014), I allow wholesalers to vary the
eﬀective rate of capital utilization in production, ut. However, a higher eﬀective
use of capital increases its depreciation rate, as I assume that σ′ (ut) ≥ 0. The
optimal utilization rate of capital satisﬁes
px,tα
xt
ut
= σ′ (ut) kt (21)
whereas the demand curve for composite labour services can be expressed as
wt = px,t (1− α) xt
lt
(22)
Perfect competition imposes zero proﬁts and therefore the ex-post real return paid
to banks is given by
rx,t−1 =
px,tαxt/kt−1 + qx,t (1− σ (ut))
qx,t−1
(23)
Retail ﬁrms: A continuum of retail ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0, n] purchase the
homogeneous good produced by wholesalers at the price px,t and diﬀerentiate it
into a continuum of domestic and foreign retail goods. Retailers follow a type of
local currency pricing, so that prices vary depending on the destination market.
The diﬀerentiated goods they produce are sold to ﬁnal good ﬁrms at home and
abroad at the price pi,h,t and p?i,h,t, respectively. Hence, retailer i faces two demand
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curves
yi,h,t =
(
pi,h,t
ph,t
)−µp
yh,t and y
?
i,h,t =
(
p?i,h,t
p?h,t
)−µ?p
y?h,t (24)
from home and foreign ﬁnal good producers, respectively. Retail ﬁrms are subject
to Calvo price stickiness. Every period, a retailer is able to adjust prices in both
markets with probability 1−λp. When retail ﬁrms do not reoptimize prices, they
simply update them to lagged inﬂation in the destination market. Retail prices
follow
pi,h,t+s =
 p∗i,h,t+sp∗i,h,t (Πsk=1pih,t+k−1)ϑ
with prob. 1− λp
with prob. λp
(25)
p?i,h,t+s =
 p∗?i,h,t+sp∗?i,h,t (Πsk=1pi?h,t+k−1)ϑ
with prob. 1− λp
with prob. λp
where indexation is governed by ϑ ∈ [0, 1], which measures the extent to which
prices fully adjust to past inﬂation. When allowed to adjust prices, retailer i
maximizes the stream of real discounted proﬁts, ΠR (i), given by
Max
pi,h,t p
?
i,h,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βλp)
s Λt,t+s
{[
pi,h,t
pt+s
− px,t+s
pt+s
]
yi,h,t+s +
[
et+sp
?
i,h,t
pt+s
− px,t+s
pt+s
]
y?i,h,t+s
}
subject to (24) and (25). Due to diﬀerences in consumer price inﬂation at home
and abroad, the price of retail goods sold to foreigners needs to be adjusted by
the real exchange rate et. The numeraire pt is the consumer price index. Solving
for the optimal prices retailer i quotes in the two markets yields
p∗i,h,t
ph,t
=
µp
µp − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βλp)
s Λt,t+syh,t+s
px,t+s
pt+s
(
ph,t
ph,t+s
(Πsk=1pih,t+k−1)
ϑ
)−µp
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βλp)
s Λt,t+syh,t+s
ph,t+s
pt+s
(
ph,t
ph,t+s
)1−µp
(Πsk=1pih,t+k−1)
ϑ(1−µp)
(26)
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and
p∗?i,h,t
p∗h,t
=
µ?p
µ?p − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βλp)
s Λt,t+sy
?
h,t+s
px,t+s
pt+s
(
p?h,t
p?h,t+s
(
Πsk=1pi
?
h,t+k−1
)ϑ)−µ?p
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βλp)
s Λt,t+sy?h,t+s
et+sp?h,t+s
pt+s
(
p?h,t
p?h,t+s
)1−µ?p (
Πsk=1pi
?
h,t+k−1
)ϑ(1−µ?p)
(27)
Although the elasticities of substitution between retail goods consumed domest-
ically and exported, µ and µ?, can vary, the parameters reﬂecting the degree of
nominal rigidity λp and ϕ are common to domestic and export inﬂation.
Final good producers: Perfectly competitive ﬁrms produce a non-tradeable
ﬁnal good by aggregating a continuum of domestic and foreign intermediate goods.
The aggregation technology for the ﬁnal good is given by
yt =
[
($)
1
γ (yh,t)
γ−1
γ + (1−$) 1γ (τyf,t)
γ−1
γ
] γ
γ−1
(28)
where τ ≡ (1− n) /n normalizes the amount of imported goods into per capita
terms. In the above CES aggregator, the home-bias parameter $ denotes the
fraction of goods produced at home that is used in the production of the ﬁnal good.
The elasticity of substitution between home-produced and imported intermediate
goods is given by γ.
The two composite goods, yh,t and yf,t, are an ensemble of domestic and foreign
retail goods which are aggregated using a technology given by
yh,t =
(ˆ n
0
(yi,h,t)
µp−1
µp di
) µp
µp−1
and yf,t =
(ˆ 1
n
(yi,f,t)
µp−1
µp di
) µp
µp−1
where µp denotes the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods pro-
duced in each country. These two expressions give rise to the price indices ph,t
and pf,t of the composite goods.
Final good producers maximize proﬁts ptyt−ph,tyh,t−pf,tτyf,t each period, subject
to (28). The resulting optimal demand functions are given by
yh,t = $
(
ph,t
pt
)−γ
yt (29)
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yf,t = (1−$)
(
pf,t
pt
)−γ
n
1− nyt (30)
The consumer price index, pt, is obtained by replacing yh,t and yf,t in (28) with
the respective demand function, which implies
pt =
[
$ (ph,t)
1−γ + (1−$) (pf,t)1−γ
] 1
1−γ (31)
1.2.4 Government
The government levies lump-sum and consumption taxes, Tt and τ ct , and issues
sovereign bonds dg,t to ﬁnance exogenous non-productive government consumption
gt of the domestic ﬁnal good. Government debt is entirely held by domestic
ﬁnancial intermediaries, which are assumed to provide the government with the
amount of funds it requires. Hence, in the aggregate, the number of claims held
by banks must equal the total amount borrowed by the government, ab,t = dg,t.
Government expenditure is given by the following rule
gt = (g¯)
1−ρg (gt−1)
ρg
(
gdpt
gdp
)κg
εgt (32)
where kg governs the response of public expenditures to the cycle. In turn, lump-
sum taxes are set according to
Tt = T
(
dg,t−1/gdpt−1
d˜g
)κτ
(33)
where κτ characterises the government's preferences between tax- and debt-ﬁnanced
expenditures and d˜g is the target level for the stock of debt as a percentage of
GDP. The tax rule embedded in (33) represents the eﬀort the government needs
to make, via taxes, to maintain public debt away from an explosive path. In or-
der to induce a direct cost in terms of welfare derived from raising taxes, I follow
the discussion in Kim and Kim (2013) and let the tax rate on consumption vary
depending on the eﬀort the government makes to control public debt. Hence,
distortionary taxation is deﬁned as
τ ct ct = κcTt (34)
where κc is the share of consumption taxes in the total tax revenue of the govern-
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ment.
I follow Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2013) and Bocola (2014), and assume that the
government issues long-term securities. Each period, government bonds mature
with probability λb, which implies an average duration of bonds of 1/λb periods.
When bonds reach maturity, the government pays back the principal; otherwise
investors receive the coupon µb and retain the right to obtain the principal in the
future. The government's ex post budget constraint is therefore given by
(λb + (1− λb)µb) dg,t−1 + gt = Tt + qb,t (dg,t − (1− λb) dg,t−1) (35)
where qb,t is the price of loans to the government. Conversely, the return on
government bonds is given by
rb,t−1 =
λb + (1− λb) (µb + qb,t)
qb,t−1
(36)
I deﬁne sovereign default in a manner similar to Schabert and Wijnbergen (2011)
and Corsetti et al. (2012) by assuming that the government's decision to default
depends on a ﬁscal limit above which the ﬁscal burden is deemed to be politically
unacceptable.10 Sovereign spreads are generated as the result of a preemptive
game between the government and speculators. Agents know the distribution
f (·) of the ﬁscal limit and form their expectations on that basis. Our modelling
choice is not innocuous however. On the one hand, I abstain from a complete
characterization of strategic default, which is beyond the scope of this paper, and
instead assume that the ﬁscal limit is stochastically determined.11 On the other
hand, I abstract from any distributional consequences of default, including its
eﬀects on the ﬁscal stance. In fact, actual default is neutral, as can be deduced
from expression (35), in the sense that I do not consider de facto asset losses in the
model. Instead, the probability of default is crucial for the dynamics of sovereign
bond prices and, consequently, for the net worth of banks. Hence, the model
attempts to provide a consistent characterization of asset dynamics, but is mute
with regards to the decision of actually declaring default and its consequences.12
10Davig and Leeper (2010) introduced the notion of ﬁscal limit used here.
11Corsetti et al. (2012) provide some motivation for this assumption by appealing to political
considerations surrounding the decision to declare default. A previous note already made useful
references to the literature on strategic default.
12Gertler and Karadi (2011), Dedola et al. (2013) and Lama and Rabanal (2014), just to
name a few recent works, explore the eﬀects of capital shocks that aﬀect the actual quantity of
assets in general equilibrium models with banks. The crucial diﬀerence between shocks to the
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Every period the ﬁscal limit, or the politically bearable maximum level of the tax
burden or of the public debt, is drawn from f (st). The probability of default is
equal to the probability the ﬁscal stance exceeds the ﬁscal limit. Let ∆ (st) be a
default indicator equalling 1 when the ﬁscal stance goes beyond the ﬁscal limit,
and zero otherwise. As shown in Schabert and Wijnbergen (2011) and Bonam
and Lukkezen (2013), I can approximate the expectation over the probability of
default by
δˆt =
(
Θ/δ
)
sˆt + ε
d
t (37)
where  denotes ﬁrst-order log-linear approximations, st is the ﬁscal stance, εdt is
an exogenous shock that captures the market's perception regarding the possibility
of a sovereign default and s is pinned down in the steady state. The parameters Θ
denotes the elasticity of the probability of default with respect to changes in the
ﬁscal stance, that is ∂∆ (st) /∂st. I intentionally left the ﬁscal stance st undeﬁned
in (37) for there are various potential candidates for the most adequate measure.
The expressions ﬁscal stance and ﬁscal outlook, which I use interchangeably in this
paper, refer not only to the present ﬁscal conditions (as measured by the public
deﬁcit, the tax burden or the share of government expenditures to GDP, to name
a few), but also, and probably more importantly, to the future sustainability of
current ﬁscal policy (as measured, for instance, by the ratio of public debt to
GDP). I have experimented with the ratio of public debt to GDP, as in Schabert
and Wijnbergen (2011), and with a measure of the ﬁscal strain, as in Corsetti
et al. (2012). Both produce similar outcomes and here I show the results for
st = dg,t/gdpt.
1.2.5 Central Bank
The single central bank in the monetary union is assumed to follow a Taylor-type
rule where the nominal interest rate responds to the aggregate consumer price
index and to the area-wide real GDP growth according to
i?t =
(
i
?)1−ρi (
i?t−1
)ρi (( p˜it
p¯i
)ρpi ( ˜gdpt
˜gdpt−1
)ρg)1−ρi
εit (38)
stock of capital and shocks to its price lies on the real eﬀects of reducing eﬀective capital in
production.
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where ρi ∈ (0, 1) is the smoothing parameter, ρpi and ρg are the usual response
coeﬃcients. The nominal interest rate is given by the Fisher equation
r?t =
i?t
pi?t+1
I have assumed the foreign nominal interest rate to be the policy instrument given
the small size of the home country I consider in the next sections. The aggregate
variables in the Taylor rule are denoted with a ∼ and are the sum of the respective
country variables weighted by their population size.
1.2.6 Market Clearing
There are two types of markets for goods in each country that must clear in
equilibrium. For intermediate goods, production by the wholesaler ﬁrms equals
demand by retailers
xt = Υh,tyh,t + Υ
?
h,ty
?
h,t (39)
Note that, due to price dispersion, retailers incur real losses during price setting.
On the other hand, the non-tradeable domestic ﬁnal good is sold to households,
the government and to capital producers
yt = ct + zt + gt (40)
From the aggregate budget constraint of households I obtain the following law of
motion for net foreign assets
et (rf,t−1bf,t−1 − bf,t) = etp?h,ty?h,t − pf,t
1− n
n
yf,t (41)
where y?h,t are exports of the home-produced intermediate composite good and yf,t
are imports of the foreign-produced intermediate goods.
Because ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, I follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)
and ensure the model is stationary by setting rf,t equal to the real interest rate
abroad plus a risk premium that is sensitive to the total net foreign asset position
as a percentage of GDP
rf,t = r
?
tΞexp
{
Γ
(
et
bf,t
gdpt
− b˜f
)}
(42)
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and where GDP is deﬁned as
gdpt = ph,tyh,t + etp
?
h,tyh,t (43)
1.3 Bayesian Estimation
In this section I estimate the model for Portugal and the Eurozone. Portugal is
an illustrative example of a country that has been subject to considerable shocks
to its sovereign interest rates. In the spring of 2011, Portugal became the third
EMU member to request external ﬁnance assistance, after Greece and Ireland.
At the time, the Portuguese government was facing a sharp increase in the costs
to ﬁnance public debt, while Portuguese banks, heavily dependent on external
ﬁnancing, were being cut-oﬀ from market-based funding. When the assistance
programme was signed in April, the 10-year yield of Portuguese government bonds
were rapidly approaching the 10% mark, public debt to GDP was around 110%,
and the ﬁscal deﬁcit had reached 11.2% the previous year. With the program,
Portugal received ¿78 billion, or about 43% of GDP, under the conditionality
of implementing measures towards ﬁscal consolidation and pursuing structural
reforms.13
I estimate the model using standard Bayesian techniques. First, the equilibrium
conditions are log-linearised around a deterministic, zero-inﬂation steady state.
As I explain in more detail, I reduce the number of parameters to estimate by
calibrating some that are weakly identiﬁed by data. For the remaining parameters,
I specify the priors for estimation based on previous studies. I then employ the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with two chains of 125.000 draws to obtain the
posterior distributions.14
1.3.1 Calibrated Parameters
The parameters I calibrate can be arranged into four diﬀerent groups. The ﬁrst
group includes those usually calibrated in the literature and for which I pick con-
13Figures and further discussion about the Portuguese adjustment program can be found in
a report by the European Commission of 2014.
14The non-linear equilibrium conditions of the model where coded in Dynare 4.4.2, with the
model's solution, estimation and welfare analysis being performed using Dynare's interface.
Estimation was performed under a ﬁrst-order log-linear approximation, whereas the welfare
analysis was done on a second-order log-linear approximation to the model's equilibrium condi-
tions.
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sensual values. The second group contains the parameters related to the banking
sector, which are not estimated because of the lack of long and reliable data series
I could use to identify them. Regarding these two sets of parameters, I further
impose their values to be equal across countries. The parameters that pin down
steady state ratios constitute the third group and their values are chosen to match
long-run averages in the data. Finally, the parameters at the core of the policy
analysis in section 4 form the forth group.
Table 1 reports the values for the calibrated parameters. Hereafter, the home
country represents Portugal, the Euro Area is the foreign country, and one period
in the model corresponds to one quarter. The values for the ﬁrst set of parameters
are mostly taken from Lama and Rabanal (2014). The exception is the elasticity
of capital depreciation with respect to utilization, for which I use the estimate
obtained by Albonico et al. (2014). The values for the parameters related to
the banking sector are taken from Gertler and Karadi (2011). Lama and Rabanal
(2014) and Bocola (2013) estimate some of these parameters and obtain very close
estimates to the values used here. On the other hand, the spread on the sovereign
interest rate is only meant to be illustrative and therefore I assume a relatively
small value, below the one used by Schabert and Wijnbergen (2011) and more in
line with what the data from before 2009 suggests.
Regarding the third group, I set the share of the population living in Portugal
to 3% of the total of the Eurozone; the ratio of per capita GDP between the
EMU and Portugal to 1.7; and the share of imports to GDP in Portugal, which
corresponds to 1−ω in the model, to 30%. Plugging these ﬁgures into the steady
state version of the demand equations for ﬁnal goods in both countries and using
the aggregate resource constrain, I obtain an extremely high degree of home bias
in the Euro Area (ω? = 0.995). Hence, while Portugal is relatively sensitive
to shocks pertaining to the currency area, the Eurozone is almost immune to
shocks originating in Portugal. Although the degree of openness of the Eurozone
is undoubtedly higher than the one implied by my calibration, I nevertheless
decided to stick to these values to guarantee the consistency of the estimates for
Portugal.15
15Some notes are in order. First, the value for ω? is perfectly consistent with the way I
model the monetary union: Portugal represents indeed a very small share of Eurozone trade.
Second, the mismatch of ω? with the data has two sources. On the one hand, I do not model
countries outside the EMU, despite the large share they represent in terms of trade ﬂows with
the Eurozone. On the other hand, aggregate trade data for the Eurozone includes exports and
imports within member states, magnifying the ﬁnal values of net-exports. Third, because I use
aggregate data for the Eurozone, parameter estimates need to be analysed with caution. There
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For the policy parameters, I decided to be rather conservative and followed the
standard calibration used in the literature. The ratio of public debt to annual
GDP is set equal to the upper limit imposed by the Maastricht Treaty of 60%,
which is close to the sample average for Portugal when I exclude the last half
decade. I assume a standard AR (1) process for government expenditures and set
κg = 0 . For the share of consumption taxes in the total taxation, I set κc equal
to 40% based on Eurostat (2014). I then obtain a steady state eﬀective tax rate of
τ css = 16.58%, which is slightly below the estimates computed in Eurostat (2014),
but in line with the estimate used by Kim and Kim (2013).
1.3.2 Data and Priors
I use a sample of 14 quarterly time series - 7 for each region - spanning between the
ﬁrst quarter of 1995 and the last quarter of 2014. I use nominal GDP, household
consumption, investment, government expenditures, compensation of employees,
the consumer price index and a nominal interest rate I deﬁne shortly. National
accounts data for Portugal is taken from the Eurostat, whereas for the Euro
Area I use the ECB Area Wide Model. Because Portugal accounts for just 3%
of the currency area, it seems unlikely that using aggregate data for the entire
Eurozone, including Portugal, constitutes a signiﬁcant source of estimation bias. I
obtain consumer prices from the ECB (I use the HICP indices). I use the 10-year
government bond yield from the Eurostat for Portugal16 and choose the Euribor 3-
month series from the ECB for the Euro Area. All variables are already seasonally
adjusted from the source except for consumer prices, which are adjusted using the
X-13ARIMA procedure developed by the US Census Bureau.
To be consistent with the model, I convert the national account aggregates into
per capita quantities using quarterly population series from the Eurostat. The
same is done for wages, which I obtain dividing compensation of employees by the
number of employees, also from the Eurostat. The reason behind using nominal
are a number of studies running Bayesian estimation for the Eurozone and using the same data
set, which allows me to compare and evaluate the results I obtain here. On the contrary, given
that previous estimates for Portugal are rare, I decided to use a calibration that is as consistent
as possible with Portuguese time series in order to minimize the chances of obtaining blurred
estimates. Fourth, as I discuss later, I add measurement errors to the net exports of both
countries to minimize the potential bias caused by the calibration and study the robustness of
the estimates I obtain.
16Accordingly, I set λb = 0.025, which implies an average maturity of government bonds of 40
quarters, and calibrate the value of the coupon, µb, such that in the steady state the price of
government bonds equals the price of loans to ﬁrms, qb = qx .
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variables relates to model consistency as well. Given that all aggregates have the
same deﬂator in the model, I ensure the resource constraints in each region are
met by using the consumer price index to convert all nominal quantities into real
variables. Lastly, I take logs and ﬁrst diﬀerences of real quantities and wages
in order to render them stationary. With one exception though: Portuguese
government expenditures remain non-stationary after these transformations. I
therefore use the share of government expenditure to GDP and implement the
corresponding changes in the model. Regarding the nominal variables, I obtain
consumer price inﬂation by taking logs and ﬁrst diﬀerences of the price level series
and divide the nominal interest rates by 400 to convert them to quarterly series.
I use nominal interest rates in levels because they are stationary both in the data
and in the model. Finally, all variables are demeaned before estimation.
Due to the inclusion of a world technology shock with a unit root, real quantities
and wages are also non-stationary in the model. Consequently, I divide these
variables by the level of world technology and match actual variables to their
model counterpart by noting that ∆yot = ∆y˜t + ε
u
t , where ∆y
o
t corresponds to
the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the log of observable real variables, ∆y˜t is the growth of its
counterpart in the model (y˜t denotes the detrended log-deviations from the steady
state), and εut the innovation to the stochastic trend in logs. In total, I match the
following 14 variables: ∆gdpt, ∆gdp∗t , ∆ct, ∆c
∗
t , ∆zt, ∆z
∗
t , ∆gt, ∆g
∗
t ,∆wt, ∆w
∗
t ,
pit, pi∗t , ib,t, and i
∗
t .
I deﬁne the prior distributions based on the literature preforming Bayesian estim-
ation of DSGE models of the Euro Area. In particular, I focus on studies that use
the same dataset for the Eurozone as the one used here. Given that the literature
on Portugal is comparatively less proﬁcuous, I decided to have prior distributions
for Portuguese parameters identical to their Euro Area counterparts. Neverthe-
less, due to the signiﬁcantly higher volatility of Portuguese time-series, I let the
priors for the standard deviations to be generally more diﬀuse than in previous
studies. Prior distributions are shown in Table 2 to Table 4.
I use the gamma distribution for parameters assumed to be positive. Priors for
the habit parameters and for the labour disutility coeﬃcient are taken from Lama
and Rabanal (2014). I let investment adjustment costs to vary across regions
and set its prior mean to 2. For parameters bounded between 0 and 1, I use the
beta distribution. I use the same prior distribution for price and wage lotteries
as Smets and Wouters (2002). They set the prior mean to 0.75, which implies
average contract durations of one year. For the price indexation coeﬃcient, I
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set prior means of 0.20, which is in line with the estimates found in previous
studies. The prior for the inﬂation coeﬃcient in the Taylor rule follows a normal
distribution centred at 1.7 as in Smets and Wouters (2002), while the prior mean
for the coeﬃcient on output growth is set at 0.20, which is within the range
of values typically used. I proceed in the same way and set the prior means
of the smoothing coeﬃcient in the Taylor rule and the persistence of shocks to
0.75, which lies between the 0.5 and 0.85 found in the literature. The prior
distributions for the standard deviations of the shocks are again based on Lama
and Rabanal (2014), although relatively more diﬀuse for the reason mentioned
above. The prior mean for the standard deviations of intratemporal preference
shocks is signiﬁcantly higher than for the remaining shocks, which is also the case
in Smets and Wouters (2002). Also worth noting that technology and cost-push
shocks are assumed to be less volatile than investment speciﬁc shocks, but more
volatile than intertemporal preference shocks.
1.3.3 Estimation Results
Table 2 and Table 3 show the posterior means and the 90% credible set of the es-
timated parameters.17 The baseline estimates can be found under spec. 1. Looking
ﬁrst at the estimates for the Eurozone, the posterior mean for the habit persist-
ence and the labour disutility parameters are identical to those found by Smets
and Wouters (2002). Regarding nominal rigidities, I ﬁnd that price contracts are,
on average, shorter than wage contracts. The mean estimates are very close to
those in Lama and Rabanal (2014), with prices adjusting every 3 quarters on
average while wages take 5 quarters. In general, the estimates for Portugal diﬀer
by little from their Euro Area counterparts. Among the exceptions is ψ, found
to be signiﬁcantly higher, and the survival rates of nominal contracts, with prices
adjusting more slowly than wages. The estimates for price indexation are small
for both regions and around 10%, which is in line with what Lama and Rabanal
(2014) obtain. Finally, our estimates for the area-wide Taylor rule are also very
similar to those in the literature.
Regarding the shock processes, I estimate intertemporal preference shocks to be
more persistent compared to intratemporal (or labour supply) shocks, a result
also obtained by Adolfson et al. (2007) and Lama and Rabanal (2014). On the
17The estimation results shown here were obtained holding capital utilization and consumption
taxes ﬁxed and equal to their steady state values. Further work is being undertaken to allow
these features to vary during estimation.
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contrary, the persistence coeﬃcients of stationary technology, investment speciﬁc
technology, and cost-push shocks are relatively lower than what is found in the
literature. Government expenditure shocks both in Portugal and in the Eurozone
appear to be quite persistent and very similar to the values estimated by Smets
and Wouters (2002), while the coeﬃcient on the risk premium is in line with
Adolfson et al. (2007). The estimates for the standard deviations reported in
Table 4 are generally in line with our prior expectations. Comparing both regions,
Portuguese shocks are systematically more volatile than Euro Area ones, and this
is particularly visible for investment speciﬁc technology and cost-push shocks.
While I only model trade between the two regions, Eurozone countries have mul-
tiple trading partners and, inclusively, trade with regions outside the monetary
union. Hence, the aggregate resource constraint in the model is inconsistent with
actual national accounts for it excludes exports and imports vis-à-vis regions out-
side the model. This is particularly troublesome given that Portugal accounts
for only a slim fraction of total net exports originating in the Euro Area. In
order to account for trade other than between the two regions, I added meas-
urement errors to the net exports in the model. I compare this methodological
choice to the approach taken by Lama and Rabanal (2014), who estimate the
model without measurement error and without including government expendit-
ures in the set of observables. The results, reported under spec. 2, show virtually
no changes in parameter estimates except for a smaller persistence of Portuguese
government expenditures and a higher volatility of Portuguese and Euro Area
government expenditure shocks. It thus seems that government expenditures are
not only capturing actual shocks to public spending, but also residual volatility
coming from trade outside the model. I also explore the impact of misspeciﬁcation
when I include government expenditures to the set of observables without adding
measurement error to net exports. Not only the parameter estimates deliver very
diﬀerent results, as can be seen under spec. 3, I also ﬁnd a striking mismatch
between the volatility of the observable time series implied by the model and
actual ﬁgures.
Turning to the second moments, the ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 report the stand-
ard deviations the data and those implied by the model evaluated at the posterior
mean under to the baseline estimation. The match is satisfactory for most vari-
ables, with two exceptions. On the one hand, Eurozone GDP is predicted to be
more volatile, a result that is also obtained by Lama and Rabanal (2014). On the
other hand, the model delivers a smaller standard deviation of Portuguese wages
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despite the high estimated volatility of labour supply shocks. Note also that, al-
though in the data the volatility of Portuguese GDP is only slightly smaller than
the volatility of consumption, the model delivers the inverse ordering, with GDP
predicted to be more volatile.
Table 5 also presents the unconditional variance decomposition of the variables I
use for estimation. I have aggregated some shocks in order to make the presenta-
tion neat.18 Similarly to Lama and Rabanal (2014), the international transmission
of shocks appears negligible for most variables, apart from Portuguese inﬂation
and the sovereign interest rate. Regarding the former, this ﬁnding indicates that
shocks in the Eurozone feed mostly through prices and do not have a signiﬁcant
direct impact in real quantities. On the other hand, as sovereign spreads are exo-
genous in the baseline scenario, the sovereign rate is mostly explained by spread
shocks themselves and by foreign shocks which feed through the common Taylor
rule. Interestingly, sovereign spread shocks have negligible eﬀects in the real eco-
nomy, a result that does not seem to have been inﬂuenced by the events taking
place in the very last part of the sample. In line with Ratto et al. (2008), I also
ﬁnd that monetary policy shocks explain only a small fraction of the volatility of
Euro Area variables. All in all, and similarly to previous studies, preference and
technology shocks represent the main source of ﬂuctuations in both regions.
1.4 Sovereign Spreads and Fiscal Transfers
In this section, I start by analysing the transmission mechanism of sovereign
spread shocks in the model and by assessing its conformity with actual events
during the sovereign debt crisis in Portugal. In the context of asymmetric shocks
within a currency area, as have been sovereign risk shocks in the Eurozone, ﬁscal
policy becomes a crucial tool to stabilize the economy. I show, however, that
sovereign risk and the ﬁscal outlook of a country constrains the set of actions
of the government. I then run a number of policy experiments exploring the
possibility of a new ﬁscal architecture within the EMU. In particular, I analyse
the potential beneﬁts of implementing a ﬁscal transfers scheme (FTS) among
Eurozone member-states. Although still exotic, ﬁscal federalism has been subject
18Preference shocks include both inter- and intratemporal shocks, whereas technology shocks
include the stationary and the unit root technology shocks. The two measurement errors are also
shown together. Moreover, for each variable the table reports the decomposition with respect
to local shocks. For instance, Portuguese variables are decomposed across diﬀerent shocks
originating in Portugal. All the remaining shocks are aggregated under the banner Abroad.
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of previous academic research. Importantly, however, it now appears to be a
matter of serious consideration within policy circles as well.
1.4.1 Inspecting the Mechanism
Figure 1 presents the impulse responses of selected variables to a shock that raises
the sovereign spread by 10% in annual terms, as seen in Portugal during 2011.19
The increase in uncertainty regarding the ability of the government to service its
debt lowers the value of government securities and, therefore, raises the return on
government bonds required by investors. As interest payments become heavier,
the government incurs a budget deﬁcit and the stock of public debt increases.
Under the baseline speciﬁcation, government expenditures do not respond to the
cycle20, whereas lump-sum taxes track the ratio of public debt to GDP. As such,
taxes are automatically raised and the government is induced to run a primary
surplus. Comparing to the actual deﬁcit of 7.4% for Portugal in 2011, the jump
in the budget deﬁcit predicted by the model seems small. Note however that
between 2010 and 2013, taxes and social contributions fell by more than 2%,
while unemployment beneﬁts, pensions, and other ﬁnancial liabilities all increased
(European Commission, 2014). Therefore, the baseline scenario serves as a lower
bound in what respects the deteriorating eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks on the
ﬁscal stance.
As the price of government bonds plunges, bankers, who hold these securities
in their portfolios, see their total net worth contract. This triggers a jump in
the leverage ratios of banks that persists over time. In terms of magnitudes and
recovery time, the model compares well with reality. Using the loan-to-deposits
ratio as a measure of leverage, the ﬁgure for Portuguese banks at the beginning of
2011 was equal to 157%. It took 15 quarters to reach 117%, a fall of about 25%
and similar to Figure 1. Banks' equity also went through a slow recovery, with the
average Core Tier 1 adjusting from 8.1% to 12% over the same period.21 Because
of the leverage constraint, banks are forced to reduce lending and to increase the
premium on loans to private ﬁrms in order to build up the value of their equity.
In terms of the pass-through of sovereign spreads to ﬁrm's borrowing costs, an
19Figure 6 plots the 10-year government bond spreads against the German bunds for some of
the countries at the centre of the European sovereign debt crisis.
20As a matter of fact, government expenditures as a share of GDP are constant. As GDP
falls, total government expenditures will fall as well.
21Figures taken from European Commission (2014).
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increase of 10% in the former leads to a 3.5% increase in the latter.
The drop in credit supplied by banks and the increase in borrowing costs induce
a collapse in investment (of more than 10% at the trough). As ﬁrms face higher
costs of capital, labour demand also contracts and total employment falls. Con-
sequently, real output falls, dropping more than 2% at the trough. The marked
contraction in domestic demand due to the fall in investment induces prices to
fall. However, given the small size of Portugal relative to the EMU, the nominal
interest rate is cut by less than 10 basis points. Clearly, monetary policy is not
designed to address country-speciﬁc shocks, with the negligible policy loosening
doing nearly nothing to buﬀer the recession in Portugal.
Figure 1 also shows that higher ratios of public debt intensify the magnitude of the
recession. In fact, doubling of the stock of public debt leads to a fall in GDP more
than twofold. When domestic banks hold a larger stock of government securities
in their balance sheets, a fall in the price of sovereign bonds generates a relatively
higher loss in their portfolio. As a consequence, the premium between the risk
free rate and the interest rate on loans to private ﬁrms can reach more than 3/4
of the spread originally generated on the sovereign rate. This number represents
quite a substantial pass-through. When public debt reaches 120% of GDP, the
collapse in investment and the drop in labour demand are sizeable too. Actual
ﬁgures for Portugal were not any less impressive: from 2011 to 2013, investment
fell nearly 30%, while the unemployment rate went from 12.2% to 17.3%.
1.4.2 Constraints on Domestic Fiscal Policy
During the sovereign debt crisis, there was no room for counter-cyclical policy.
European governments were forced to run sharp ﬁscal consolidation to avoid
rampant sovereign interest rates, despite the economic outlook remaining weak.
In this respect, the model provides informative insights on how sovereign interest
rates and the ﬁscal outlook constrain the set of ﬁscal responses. Figure 2 shows
the determinacy regions of the model for a range of parameter values governing
ﬁscal policy, given the ratio of public debt to annual GDP and the elasticity of
sovereign spreads to the ﬁscal outlook. In the ﬁgure, the values for κτ are within
the range used in the literature (e.g. see Pappa, 2009); κg < 0 corresponds to
the government running counter-cyclical policy; and regarding Θ, the elasticity of
sovereign spreads to the ﬁscal stance, I consider the range of values computed by
Corsetti et al. (2012). The white areas in the ﬁgure correspond to regions in the
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parameter space for which public debt grows unbounded.
As shown in the left panel, as Θ increases, taxes need to react more swiftly to
changes in public debt in order to keep it away from an explosive path. Since
higher spreads imply higher deﬁcits, and deﬁcits lead to widening spreads, the
government needs to raise taxes rapidly to avoid further increases in sovereign
interest rates.
The government can either raises taxes or lower public expenditure in order to
control public debt. The last panel to the right shows the trade-oﬀ between
how government expenditure can respond to the cycle and how taxes are used to
control public debt. Firstly, counter-cyclical policy is only possible when taxes
are suﬃciently ﬁrm in targeting public debt. On the other hand, pro-cyclical
public spending is not enough, per se, to stabilize public debt either. In fact,
the two ﬁscal tools work through diﬀerent channels. While taxes reduce public
debt directly, public spending aﬀects GDP via a demand eﬀect.22 Consequently,
spending alone might fail to bring sustainability to the ratio of public debt to
GDP.
Both grey areas in Figure 2 represent the determinacy regions of the model when
the ratio of public debt to annual GDP equals 60%. When this ratio equals
120%, determinacy only occurs within the dark grey areas. As all panels attest,
a higher stock of public debt requires ﬁscal discipline to be stricter. Importantly,
the scope for counter-cyclical government expenditures is reduced dramatically, as
shown in the central panel. In particular, when Θ increases, the feedback eﬀects of
counter-cyclical expenditure on sovereign spreads dwarf any attempts to stimulate
production via public spending. In eﬀect, in these cases, counter-cyclical spending
raises the ratio of public debt to GDP unambiguously, therefore failing to keep it
on a sustainable path.
Clearly, the ratio of public debt to annual GDP is key to determine the range of
sustainable ﬁscal policies that can be implemented by the government. As low
debt countries are better placed to use domestic ﬁscal policy as a tool to absorb
idiosyncratic shocks, it is not surprising the emphasis put on public debt and
budget deﬁcit ﬁgures since the early stages of the EMU. Nevertheless, the question
remains: how should the EMU respond when countries experiencing ﬁscal strain
cannot use domestic ﬁscal policy to countervail the recessionary eﬀects of large
22In the case of taxes, the eﬀects on GDP are of second order and depend of households'
consumption smoothing.
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asymmetric shocks?23
1.4.3 A Scheme of Fiscal Transfers: Symmetric Regions
In this section I use the estimated model to assess the welfare implications of a
federal transfers scheme (FTS) that has both countries operating transfers across
the border when sovereign spreads widen. Transfers from foreign to home are
determined by the following simple rule
St = κs
(
log (δt)− log
(
δ
))
(44)
An equivalent expression deﬁnes the transfers to be made the opposite way.24
Importantly, the parameter governing the magnitude of the transfers, κs, is equal
for both countries. As all variables in the model, including St and S?t , are deﬁned
in per capita units, an equal κs implies an equal per capita burden for home
and foreign households. Transfers are collected by the government and are made
between governments.25 Hence, the expressions for the government budget in
both countries and for the net foreign assets have to be adjusted accordingly. The
FTS proposed here addresses directly the problem of ﬁscal strain due to sovereign
spreads. As there is no direct transfers to households or ﬁrms, the feedback to
the real economy will be through taxation and public spending. Importantly, the
FTS will also feed-back to the real economy through its potential eﬀects on the
pass-through of sovereign spread shocks.
To contextualize my results, I start by considering a model where both regions
have symmetric governments and are both subject to sovereign spread shocks.
23The model presented in the previous section, although providing an accurate illustration
of how ﬁscal policy can run into indeterminacy, it is not especially gifted to analyse optimal
government spending. On the one hand, government spending is not productive nor utility
enhancing in the model. On the other hand, automatic stabilizers, such as unemployment
beneﬁts, are absent. That is partly the reason why pro-cyclical public expenditure might be
welfare improving for some parametrization in Figure 4. Integrating these elements in the model
is left for future research.
24By deﬁnition, transfers are only temporary, being equal to zero in the long-run.
25In this paper I assume δt is observable and, therefore, can be used to guide policy. In reality,
however, sovereign spread shocks might be diﬃcult to measure. Importantly, it might also be
the case that optimal transfers do not respond to all swings in sovereign spreads as measured,
for instance, by the diﬀerentials in government bond yields in the secondary market. It is also
not clear that targeting a more fundamental measure, such as public debt to annual GDP, solves
the problem. I leave these questions for future research.
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Crucially, I consider the case when both regions have equal sizes and per cap-
ita GDP. In Table 6, the parameter values used for the region labelled Periphery
correspond to those estimated for Portugal, whereas the estimates for the Euro-
zone are used for the region labelled Core. The FTS is deﬁned by the value of
κs that maximizes the aggregate welfare of the monetary union, that is, the sum
of each region's welfare weighted by its population size. I follow Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2007) and express welfare gains in terms of certainty-equivalent con-
sumption. First, I compute each country's welfare for a given set of allocations{
ckt , l
k
t
}∞
t=0
, where k corresponds to a particular value of τs ∈ R+0 . I then compare
it to the case of no ﬁscal transfers, deﬁning the welfare gain λ˜ as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
((
1 + λ˜
)
c0t , l
0
t
)
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
ckt , l
k
t
)
(45)
For positive values of λ˜, there are gains from implementing the FTS. Welfare is
computed up to a second order of approximation from the unconditional expected
lifetime utility.
Table 6 reports the welfare gains from both regions engaging in the FTS. In the
ﬁrst column I report the baseline case where the two regions diﬀer only in terms
of the estimated parameters. The results show that the FTS is welfare improving
for each region individually. This is an important ﬁnding because it states clearly
the mutual beneﬁts of both members entering the FTS. Interestingly, the Core
is the region beneﬁting the most, with a 4% increase in permanent consumption.
The diﬀerence in welfare gains between the two regions is largely explained by the
diﬀerence in the set of estimated parameters.26
However, the distribution of welfare gains and their magnitude can vary easily
depending on small asymmetries between the two regions, and in particular when
the ﬁscal outlooks diﬀer. For example, the second column shows that when public
debt to GDP is twice as big in the Periphery as it is in the Core, welfare gains fall
for the former, whereas they increase for the latter. Note that, up to the value
of κs, the transfers are identical to the baseline scenario given that they only
depend upon the sovereign spread shocks. Moreover, using the same κs = 7.27
as in the baseline, the Core still beneﬁts more from entering the FTS with a
Periphery with higher debt. Inspecting the reasons behind these results, I ﬁnd
26The other factors behind the discrepancy between welfare gains are the risk premium on
the interest rate on foreign bonds charged to home households and the asymmetry caused by
the fact that the policy rate is the foreign nominal rate.
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that transfers do not do enough to counteract the magnifying eﬀects of public
debt on real ﬂuctuations in the Periphery, whereas the additional gains to the
Core stem from the feedback eﬀects on the real exchange rate, as seen in Figure
1.
The third column reports the case when sovereign spreads respond to the ﬁscal
outlook in the Periphery. For a given κs, setting Θ 6= 0 increases the persistence
of sovereign spread shocks. As a result, transfers between countries become asym-
metric, with those incoming to the Periphery being more prolonged in time than
those incoming to the Core. This, together with the fact that spread shocks have
a greater impact on real activity when Θ 6= 0, explain the substantial welfare gains
of the FTS to the Periphery. On the contrary, the gains for the Core disappear,
clearly driven by the disproportionate costs of outgoing transfers to the Periphery
relative to the beneﬁts of incoming transfers. If I assume instead that Θ? = Θ,
the FTS becomes again welfare improving for both regions (results not shown in
the table).
The next two columns inspect the consequences of ﬁscal policy in the Periphery.
When taxes respond less to public debt, ﬁscal deﬁcits and public debt ﬂuctuate
more. Hence, after a sovereign spread shock, as banks accommodate the increase
in government debt, which in turn becomes less valuable, the pass-through is mag-
niﬁed. As transfers stabilize public debt, the welfare gains from the FTS for the
Periphery increase. On the contrary, counter-cyclical government expenditures
narrow the beneﬁts in both regions. In the Periphery, the impact of incom-
ing transfers in stimulating output is marginal when the government is already
carrying counter-cyclical policy (even when considering their positive impact in
stabilizing debt). On the other hand, the losses caused by outgoing transfers due
to the FTS are further magniﬁed by ﬁscal policy.27
Finally, the last column in Table 6 investigates the case when the volatility of
sovereign spreads in the Core is reduced to 95% of that seen in the Periphery. The
welfare eﬀects are strikingly clear: the Core has no advantage in joining the FTS,
whereas the Periphery has additional gains. The results are not surprising; but the
fact that a relatively small drop in the volatility of spread shocks produces such an
antagonistic result is symptomatic of the challenges posed to the implementation
of a FTS between diﬀerent regions. The discussion that follows is dominated
by this diﬃculty in supporting a FTS that causes welfare losses for some of its
27Note that public spending in our model is not utility enhancing, as discussed in a previous
note.
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participants.
1.4.4 A Scheme of Fiscal Transfers: Asymmetric Regions
Aggregate welfare is a good measure to assess the potential beneﬁts of interna-
tional ﬁscal transfers. However, it might be politically (and socially) impractic-
able to convince one country to participate in a FTS that reduces its own welfare.
Therefore, rather than searching for the FTS that maximizes aggregate welfare,
it is advisable to look at the welfare eﬀects for each country individually. In this
light, it turns out that modelling two countries with diﬀerent sizes constitutes
a challenge. In a nutshell, when the two countries diﬀer in size, equal per cap-
ita transfers imply necessarily an asymmetric aggregate ﬂow of transfers between
countries. The greater is the discrepancy in relative sizes, the more (less) impact
ﬁscal transfers have for welfare in the small (big) country.
To clarify the importance of relative sizes, I use again the model with symmetric
regions Core and Periphery and run the following exercise: First, I consider only
FTS for which the value of κs maximizes aggregate welfare. I then compute the
minimum relative size of the Periphery, n, for which entering the FTS has no
negative eﬀects to the Core. Figure 3 illustrates this exercise. The minimum
value I obtain is n = 48.72%, which plainly shows how easy the support for a FTS
can break down due to asymmetries between countries. As transfers are calculated
in per capita terms, their aggregate levels change one-to-one with n. Although
the per capita burden of engaging in a FTS with a smaller country diminish with
n, the per capita beneﬁts vanish more rapidly.
Conversely, one important aspect conveyed in the previous exercise concerns the
potentially large gains small countries can secure from entering a FTS. In fact, if
I were interested more broadly in FTS that generate a positive gain in aggregate
welfare, despite reducing welfare in one region in particular, the minimum value
of n sustaining a positive κs would be substantially lower. I therefore return to
the model I have estimated and conduct another experiment. Suppose that to
implement a FTS, all countries have to beneﬁt from welfare gains derived from
being part of a monetary union with ﬁscal transfers. That is, suppose ﬁrst that
entering the monetary union implies a gain of α˜ in terms of lifetime consumption
to all its members. A FTS can then be implemented as long as its welfare costs
are smaller than α˜. In other words, the alternative is not between implementing
a FTS or not, but rather between a monetary union with a FTS and leaving the
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union altogether.
Welfare costs and beneﬁts from entering a monetary union have been studied in the
literature and I take a passive stance here by simply adopting existing estimates.
On the negative side, the costs associated with entering a monetary union relate to
the lack of synchronization between individual countries' business cycles. Among
others, the costs arise from asymmetric shock to technology and ﬁscal policy,
home bias in consumption, and incomplete ﬁnancial markets. However, a growing
literature is quantifying the extent to which trade and ﬁnancial integration can oﬀ-
set these losses. For instance, Lama and Rabanal (2014) show that a fall in trade
costs, which they consider to be of a conservative magnitude, is responsible for a
1.2% increase in permanent consumption. However, if they include the business
cycle costs of the common currency, they obtain a welfare loss. Auray et al. (2010)
study the welfare eﬀects of an increase in trade ﬂows between member countries
of around 10%. They show that trade integration can account for an increase of
more than 7% in permanent consumption in an economy with incomplete ﬁnancial
markets, and that the beneﬁts from trade could reach more than 10% of lifetime
consumption if ﬁnancial markets are complete. Also focusing on the level of
ﬁnancial markets integration, Lama and Rabanal (2014) run a rough experiment
and assume that the EMU induces a sharp reduction in the volatility of private risk
premium due an increase banks' risk pooling. Under this scenario, they calculate
the welfare gains from entering the union to be higher than 2% of permanent
consumption.
For the purpose of my experiment, I focus on two scenarios for which entering a
monetary union brings welfare beneﬁts to its members due to gains from trade.
The more conservative scenario assumes a 1% increase in lifetime consumption,
whereas the second scenario has a more optimistic conjecture of a 5% increase in
permanent consumption. I make two more assumptions. First, I conjecture that
welfare gains are identical across all member countries. Second, I suppose that the
gains from trade are proportional to the size of each country entering the union.
With these two assumptions, a country of size n is responsible for a permanent
consumption increase of (n/ (1− n)) × α˜ to all the remaining member countries
of the union.
Table 7 shows the welfare eﬀects of the FTS under the two scenarios. Under the
assumption of a 1% gain derived from trade integration, Portugal could secure a
1.44% increase in lifetime consumption from the implementation of the FTS. In the
optimistic scenario, the gain jumps to 7.8%. Table 7 also reports an approximation
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to the potential beneﬁts bigger countries could secure from the FTS. Using the
estimated parameters for Portugal, I recalibrate the size n of the home country and
the ratio of per capita GDP to match Spain and Italy. This is a simple conjecture
since the parameter estimates are likely to diﬀer across countries. Notwithstanding
this caveat, the results show that for a fraction of the beneﬁts derived from trade
integration, welfare gains for the Periphery of the EMU are large.
The experiments reported in Table 7 serve to illustrate the magnitude of welfare
changes involved with the implementation of the FTS. In particular, it shows that
the smaller the recipient country is, the higher the potential gains it can obtain. In
fact, even if the beneﬁts from trade integration linked to the inclusion of a small
country in the union were smaller than the conservative scenario, the positive
impact on its welfare would still be substantial. The scheme has its limitations
however. For instance, big countries like Germany, which represents less than 48%
of the union, but signiﬁcantly more than the 18% of Italy, would be unable to
secure gains of the same magnitude as those reported in the table. Germany falls
in a grey area: it is too big to beneﬁt from sizeable welfare gains at the expense
of the rest of the union, and too small to engage in a FTS that improves welfare
everywhere as seen in Table 5.
As shown in Table 7, the welfare beneﬁts for Portugal change modestly regardless
of its domestic ﬁscal stance and policy. In Table 8, the value of κs is computed such
that the Eurozone loses (n/ (1− n)) × 1% in permanent consumption. Clearly,
the small size of Portugal explains the negligible variations in the values of κs.
Notwithstanding that Tables 6 and 8 were built under diﬀerent assumption, both
sets of results are coherent. For instance, when Θ 6= 0, κs falls so that the welfare
losses for the Eurozone remain constant. On the other hand, welfare beneﬁts are
maximized when Portuguese ﬁscal policy is less strict, with taxes responding more
weakly to public debt.
I have focused on the substantial welfare gains a federal transfer mechanism can
generate. However, it is important to acknowledge that the implementation of
the FTS requires some countries to forego a fraction of the initial gains obtained
from entering the EMU. That is, the political support for the implementation
of a transfers arrangement can not, by any means, be taken for granted. Yet,
important considerations linked to spillover eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks are,
at least partially, absent from the model. In reality, the destabilizing eﬀects of
the European sovereign debt crisis were also felt in the Core of the EMU, where
contagion was addressed seriously. For instance, in the model banks do not engage
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in international intermediation. As such, considerations regarding the systemic
risk one country's banking sector poses to area-wide stability are mute. Dedola et
al. (2013) show that country speciﬁc shocks aﬀecting the domestic banking sector
are transmitted to foreign banks when there is ﬁnancial integration, thus requiring
policy coordination to buﬀer shocks eﬃciently. Clearly, these channels have direct
implications for the welfare of current net losers from the FTS. Including such
considerations in the cost-beneﬁt analysis of the FTS could induce wider support
for a transfer scheme in these countries.
On the other hand, the push for the implementation of a Fiscal Union in Europe
is faced with concerns over the risk of moral hazard and free riding.28 Some
steps to mitigate these fears have been alluded to in the 5 Presidents Report
(Juncker et al., 2015), where the authors defend three important prerequisites
for the implementation of the Fiscal Union: (i) the economic convergence of the
member states, which will increase the synchronization of business cycles, (ii)
the enactment of ﬁscal rules that guarantee the sustainability of domestic ﬁscal
accounts, which as a by-product will enable domestic ﬁscal policy to react to
asymmetric shocks, and (iii) the guarantee that the interventions under the FTS
have only a temporary nature.
Regarding the ﬁrst point, as member states' business cycles become more syn-
chronized, the lower are the costs of a single monetary policy with ﬁxed exchange
rates (see, for instance, Rose 2008). As such, and as discussed above, the higher
the beneﬁts from being part of the union, the easier it will be to grant support
for the implementation of a FTS. Considering point (ii), I have rationalized how
domestic ﬁscal policy is endogenously constrained by the ﬁscal outlook and how
ﬁscal conditions can compromise the leeway needed for domestic policy to buﬀer
spread shocks. One important dimension that remains to be addressed concerns
how domestic policy should be conducted in an environment with transfers. As
I have shown, the political support for a FTS between countries rests on how
asymmetric ﬁscal conditions are. It is beyond the scope of this paper to draw
on potential conditionalities involved with a FTS to enforce ﬁscal prudence. The
model can, nevertheless, provide an accurate benchmark to think about the design
of a Fiscal Union, and certainly is a good starting point for further research.29
28Although most times not made explicit, these concerns are nonetheless evident in, for in-
stance, Juncker et al. (2015).
29Two aspects are particularly relevant. One the one hand, time inconsistent behaviour can
severely aﬀect the implementation of inter-governmental transfers. This can be due to the
impossibility to enforce structural reforms and ﬁscal prudence on a sovereign nation facing ﬁscal
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Finally, the FTS proposed in this paper satisﬁes point (iii) by construction.
1.4.5 Dynamics and Fiscal Policy
In this section, I compare the eﬀects of domestic counter-cyclical policy, on the
one hand, and of international ﬁscal transfers, on the other, to the transmission
of sovereign spread shocks. I construct Figure 4 in the following way: I begin by
assuming that Portugal and the Eurozone engage in a FTS deﬁned by κs = 0.05.
Secondly, I calculate the magnitude of the pass-through of sovereign shocks to the
private risk premium under the FTS. I then compute the value of κg that, in the
absence of the FTS, results in having an equal pass-through as the one calculated
in the second step. In other words, I match the eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks
on the borrowing costs of private ﬁrms between the two policies.
As Figure 4 shows, both policies reduce the pass-through of sovereign spread
shocks to private spreads. Although the fall in the price of government bonds
is equal regardless of having any policy in place, the net worth of banks falls
less in the presence of counter-cyclical policy and the FTS. This eﬀect is due
to the stimulus in aggregate demand generated by both policies, which feeds
into an increasing demand for capital from private ﬁrms. Despite the fact that
banks increase the risk premium in order to rebuild their net worth, the stimulus
moderates the fall in the demand for credit and allows banks to reduce the pass-
through. Consequently, the fall in investment is lessened as well as is the recession,
which at the trough becomes nearly 1% milder.
Interestingly, the response of GDP diﬀers between the two policies. Under counter-
cyclical government expenditures the trough is more pronounced but the recovery
is faster. With the FTS, the fall in GDP and its eventual recovery are more
gradual. The same applies to employment, with the recovery under the FTS
taking even longer than what would otherwise happen without any policy at
place.
stress. If reforms and/or consolidation are not properly executed, the need for foreign transfers
might persist, the positive spillovers from improving the ﬁscal stance might not materialize
and the distribution of welfare gains from the FTS can skew easily. The same is true with
respect to the donating country, which might be better-oﬀ not making a transfer when its fellow
union member requires. On the other hand, but still related, alternative transfer rules to (44)
might altogether improve the potential to implement a FTS. For instance, a mechanism that
encompasses automatic reforms as well as transfers has the potential to maximize the positive
externalities of risk-sharing at the same time as reducing the risks of moral hazard and free
riding. These aspects, although extremely relevant, are left for future research.
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Clearly, the two policies are not equivalent. With counter-cyclical policy, the
deﬁcit grows further and stays higher for longer. With the FTS, the magnitude
of the initial jump is very similar to the baseline scenario, as is its evolution
towards the steady state. The similar dynamics of the deﬁcit under the FTS and
the baseline are due to the fact that, as GDP contracts less under the FTS, the
increase in taxes needed to control public debt is also smaller. In eﬀect, ﬁscal
transfers substitute, at least partially, the need for domestic taxation.
In terms of aggregate demand, the FTS generates an indirect stimulus through
the need for less taxation, whereas with counter-cyclical policy there is a reshue
in domestic demand, with government expenditure leading the stimulus. Instead
of crowding out other domestic sources of aggregate demand, the FTS appears
to be a more eﬃcient stimulus measure. One indicator supporting this claim is
inﬂation, which reacts considerably less compared to the other two scenarios. This
is due to the impact of ﬁscal transfers on the real exchange rate, which mitigates
the need for a domestic devaluation and reduces the ineﬃciencies caused by price
changes.
The diﬀerences in the operating mechanisms of counter-cyclical policy and the
FTS are made patently clear when I make sovereign spreads elastic to the ﬁscal
outlook. In Figure 5 I take the same values for κs and κg as before, but assume
instead that Θ = 0.05, that is, that sovereign spreads react to the ratio of public
debt to GDP. In this scenario, sovereign spread shocks vanish relatively slower.
Considering counter-cyclical policy, the spread banks charge to ﬁrms actually
increases when compared to the baseline. Yet, employment and GDP still perform
better when compared to the no policy scenario, with the demand eﬀect lead by
the government supporting real activity despite the negative impact on banks.
The key for this apparently counter-intuitive result lies in the behaviour of asset
prices. The price of government bonds falls more abruptly when the government
runs an expansion, causing the net-worth of banks to contract more than in the
absence of policy. The evolution in the price of government bonds explains why
banks are unable to reduce the pass-through of sovereign spreads to the private
sector. As before, the FTS outperforms domestic counter-cyclical policy and,
most importantly, does not cause the perverse eﬀects on the supply of credit to
the economy.
Figure 4 presents, at least partially, the trade oﬀ of domestic counter-cyclical
policy. For some parametrization of the model, counter-cyclical policy can be
welfare improving, insofar as it supports economic activity, reduces inﬂation and
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the miss-allocation of resources. However, the elasticity of sovereign spreads can
invert these results and potentially cause a deeper recession. There are, however,
important features missing in the model. On the one hand, public expenditures
have no productive nor utility enhancing use. On the other hand, taxation is
modelled in a very reduced form. A study of optimal domestic public policy in
an environment with sovereign spreads and international transfers has to address
these aspects. It is left for future research.
1.5 Conclusion
The recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe has tested the resilience of the most
ambitious supra-national endeavour seen in the old continent. The viability of the
common currency, and of European integration itself, has been openly threatened.
The central question has concerned the type and extent of the response the mon-
etary union should give to asymmetric shocks to its member countries. Related
to this is yet the question of what level of solidarity can be reasonably expec-
ted between members. The answers so far have been in the direction of more
integration and discipline, with the Banking Union and the Fiscal Compact being
just some examples. Looking ahead, however, the completion of a fully ﬂedged
monetary union requires some form of ﬁscal arrangement at the federal level as
well. After all, it was the inability of domestic ﬁscal policy to tackle sovereign
spread shocks in the countries most aﬀected by the crisis that sparked the severe
tensions seen within the EMU.
In this paper, I set up and estimate a model capable of providing a consistent
narrative of the crisis. The model features ﬁnancial frictions due to leverage
constraints on banks which link the availability of credit to productive ﬁrms to
the value of bank's net worth. Domestic banks are also the suppliers of credit to
the government, therefore being exposed to sovereign credit risk. I illustrate the
mechanisms at work during a sovereign spread shock and compare its dynamic
eﬀects to the case of Portugal in 2011. I show that the ratio of public debt to
GDP and the elasticity of sovereign spreads to the ﬁscal outlook can substantially
magnify the pass-through of sovereign spreads to private borrowers. I also show
that counter-cyclical policy is not feasible when sovereign spreads react sharply
to a deterioration in public ﬁnances and the debt burden is at the levels seen in
the periphery of the Eurozone during the crisis.
I contribute to the debate about a future ﬁscal capacity at the EMU level. I
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propose a simple ﬁscal transfer scheme between member countries triggered when
sovereign spreads widen. The scheme acts at the root of the transmission mech-
anism of spread shocks by alleviating the ﬁscal strain on the government. At
the same time, it provides a stimulus to real activity and reduces the impact
of sovereign spreads on private lending rates. The ﬁscal arrangement I propose
improves welfare when countries have symmetric structures, and in particular
when the relative size of their economies and the proﬁle of their ﬁscal stances
is almost identical. However, asymmetries across countries induce welfare losses
for some members. As a result, the proposed transfers scheme can easily lose
political support for its implementation. Nevertheless, I demonstrate through a
simple exercise that the welfare gains for a small country, like those at the core
of the recent crisis, can be large. Importantly, I show that these gains can be
sustained through a scheme under which the costs for the remaining members
of the union is signiﬁcantly smaller than the beneﬁts they secure by sharing the
common currency.
This paper provides a realistic set up where asymmetric shocks to a currency union
are addressed via a supra-national scheme of ﬁscal transfers. It shows the large
potential gains derived from a simple, reduced form scheme and highlights the
fragilities regarding its implementation. Further research needs to investigate the
mechanisms by which these fragilities can be reduced. Namely it should explore
the spillover consequences of localized asymmetric shocks and understand the role
of policy coordination and enforceability at the national level.
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1.6 Tables
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Elasticity of substitution Home and Foreign goods γ 1.00
Capital share on production α 0.36
Steady state depreciation rate σ 0.025
Elasticity of capital utilization ı 1.71
Elasticity of substitution across types of goods µp 11
Elasticity of substitution across types of labour µw 6
Private ﬁrms' risk premium rx − rh 0.01
Steady state leverage ratio φ 4
Fraction of divertable assets ι 0.35
Start-up funds of new banks  0.0038
Banker survival probability λf 0.975
Steady state sovereign spread δ 0.002
Home's population share n 0.03
Foreign to Home per capita GDP gdp
?
/gdp 1.7
Degree of home bias in Home ω 0.7
Degree of home bias in Foreign ω? 0.9945
Steady state Government Expenditure to GDP g˜ 0.2
Steady state labour supply l 0.33
Weight on labour disutility ζ 18.86
Steady state Government Debt to GDP d˜g 0.6
Sovereign spread elasticity Θ 0
Fiscal response to public debt κτ 0.15
Government Expenditure response to GDP κg 0
Fiscal transfer scheme κs 0
Share of consumption taxes in revenue κc 0.4
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Table 2: Estimation: model parameters
prior posterior
parameter pdf mean s.d. spec. 1 spec. 2 spec. 3
Habit persistence % gamma 0.50 0.10 0.51 0.52 0.76
(0.39 , 0.63) (0.40 , 0.63) (0.69 , 0.84)
Habit persistence %? gamma 0.50 0.10 0.54 0.55 0.86
(0.39 , 0.67) (0.40 , 0.70) (0.80 , 0.91)
Inv. elast. of labour supply ϕ gamma 1.00 0.25 0.82 0.81 0.80
(0.46 , 1.15) (0.47 , 1.16) (0.46 , 1.11)
Inv. elast. of labour supply ϕ? gamma 1.00 0.25 1.02 0.99 1.39
(0.64 , 1.42) (0.60 , 1.38) (0.96 , 1.81)
Investment adjust. costs ψ gamma 2.00 1.00 3.45 3.20 4.59
(2.11 , 4.79) (1.89 , 4.56) (3.22 , 5.92)
Investment adjust. costs ψ? gamma 2.00 1.00 2.57 2.57 10.64
(1.11 , 4.05) (1.14 , 3.92) (7.51 , 13.68)
Price stickiness λp beta 0.75 0.05 0.78 0.78 0.76
(0.73 , 0.83) (0.73 , 0.83) (0.70 , 0.83)
Price stickiness λp? beta 0.75 0.05 0.71 0.71 0.81
(0.63 , 0.79) (0.63 , 0.78) (0.78 , 0.85)
Indexation to past inﬂation ϑ beta 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08
(0.02 , 0.18) (0.02 , 0.17) (0.01 , 0.15)
Indexation to past inﬂation ϑ? beta 0.20 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.02
(0.02 , 0.21) (0.02 , 0.20) (0.01 , 0.03)
Wage stickiness λw beta 0.75 0.05 0.69 0.69 0.75
(0.63 , 0.75) (0.64 , 0.78) (0.69 , 0.78)
Wage stickiness λw? beta 0.75 0.05 0.82 0.81 0.54
(0.76 , 0.89) (0.76 , 0.87) (0.49 , 0.60)
Interest rate smoothing ρi beta 0.75 0.10 0.83 0.83 0.95
(0.80 , 0.86) (0.80 , 0.86) (0.94 , 0.96)
Taylor rule inﬂation ρpi normal 1.70 0.20 1.69 1.69 1.69
(1.44 , 1.93) (1.44 , 1.92) (1.40 , 1.98)
Taylor rule GDP growth ρy normal 0.20 0.10 0.52 0.51 0.22
(0.40 , 0.64) (0.39 , 0.63) (0.06 , 0.38)
Cost of foreign position Γ inv. gamma 0.001 0.005 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0002 , 0.001) (0.0003 , 0.001) (0.0003 , 0.001)
Parameters with ? are for the Euro Area, the remaining are for Portugal. Note that
there is a common Taylor rule for both regions. The table reports the posterior mean
estimates and the 90% credible set.
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Table 3: Estimation: persistence parameters
prior posterior
parameter pdf mean s.d. spec. 1 spec. 2 spec. 3
Intratemporal preferences ρl beta 0.75 0.10 0.34 0.34 0.39
(0.23 , 0.47) (0.22 , 0.46) (0.26 , 0.53)
Intratemporal preferences ρl? beta 0.75 0.10 0.66 0.68 0.95
(0.49 , 0.83) (0.54 , 0.82) (0.89 , 0.99)
Intertemporal preferences ρc beta 0.75 0.10 0.89 0.89 0.90
(0.83 , 0.96) (0.83 , 0.96) (0.82 , 0.98)
Intertemporal preferences ρc? beta 0.75 0.10 0.85 0.85 0.54
(0.79 , 0.93) (0.77 , 0.93) (0.37 , 0.70)
Stationary technology ρs beta 0.75 0.10 0.73 0.72 0.97
(0.56 , 0.90) (0.56 , 0.90) (0.96 , 0.99)
Stationary technology ρs? beta 0.75 0.10 0.66 0.67 0.82
(0.46 , 0.86) (0.47 , 0.86) (0.73 , 0.91)
Investment technology ρz beta 0.75 0.10 0.44 0.44 0.74
(0.30 , 0.59) (0.29 , 0.58) (0.65 , 0.84)
Investment technology ρz? beta 0.75 0.10 0.64 0.64 0.75
(0.53 , 0.75) (0.54 , 0.74) (0.62 , 0.89)
Cost-push ρλp beta 0.75 0.10 0.72 0.72 0.74
(0.57 , 0.87) (0.58 , 0.86) (0.58 , 0.90)
Cost-push ρλp? beta 0.75 0.10 0.69 0.69 0.72
(0.50 , 0.87) (0.52 , 0.87) (0.57 , 0.89)
Government expenditure ρg beta 0.75 0.10 0.94 0.79 0.94
(0.91 , 0.97) (0.70 , 0.87) (0.91 , 0.98)
Government expenditure ρg? beta 0.75 0.10 0.94 0.92 0.90
(0.90 , 0.98) (0.88 , 0.96) (0.85 , 0.95)
Sovereign risk premium ρδ beta 0.75 0.10 0.92 0.92 0.93
(0.89 , 0.96) (0.89 , 0.96) (0.90 , 0.97)
Measurement error (h) ρe beta 0.75 0.10 0.84 - -
(0.77 , 0.90)
Measurement error (f) ρe? beta 0.75 0.10 0.90 - -
(0.86 , 0.95)
Parameters with ? are for the Euro Area, the remaining are for Portugal. Note that
there is a common Taylor rule for both regions. The table reports the posterior mean
estimates and the 90% credible set.
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Table 4: Estimation: standard deviations
prior posterior
parameter pdf mean s.d. spec. 1 spec. 2 spec. 3
Intratemporal preferences σl gamma 0.200 0.150 0.470 0.465 0.676
(0.248 , 0.677) (0.258 , 0.667) (0.382 , 0.962)
Intratemporal preferences σl? gamma 0.200 0.150 0.304 0.242 0.048
(0.066 , 0.714) (0.081 , 0.420) (0.033 , 0.066)
Intertemporal preferences σc gamma 0.010 0.0075 0.022 0.022 0.051
(0.016 , 0.027) (0.016 , 0.028) (0.037 , 0.065)
Intertemporal preferences σc? gamma 0.010 0.0075 0.013 0.013 0.035
(0.009 , 0.017) (0.009 , 0.018) (0.023 , 0.047)
Stationary technology σs gamma 0.020 0.015 0.020 0.020 0.064
(0.001 , 0.039) (0.001 , 0.039) (0.043 , 0.086)
Stationary technology σs? gamma 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.172
(0.001 , 0.017) (0.002 , 0.016) (0.128 , 0.215)
Investment technology σz gamma 0.050 0.045 0.146 0.134 0.127
(0.093 , 0.200) (0.082 , 0.187) (0.094 , 0.160)
Investment technology σz? gamma 0.050 0.045 0.041 0.041 0.059
(0.025 , 0.059) (0.025 , 0.057) (0.025 , 0.094)
Cost-push σλp gamma 0.020 0.015 0.052 0.052 0.015
(0.012 , 0.085) (0.015 , 0.085) (0.001 , 0.029)
Cost-push σλp? gamma 0.020 0.015 0.008 0.007 0.013
(0.001 , 0.016) (0.001 , 0.014) (0.001 , 0.025)
Government expenditure σg gamma 0.010 0.0075 0.013 0.053 0.013
(0.011 , 0.014) (0.046 , 0.059) (0.011 , 0.015)
Government expenditure σg? gamma 0.010 0.0075 0.008 0.023 0.024
(0.007 , 0.010) (0.020 , 0.026) (0.020 , 0.027)
Monetary shock σi gamma 0.001 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001 , 0.001) (0.001 , 0.001) (0.002 , 0.003)
Sovereign risk premium σδ gamma 0.020 0.010 0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.014 , 0.019) (0.014 , 0.019) (0.014 , 0.018)
Trend technology σu gamma 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.02
(0.006 , 0.011) (0.006 , 0.010) (0.015 , 0.025)
Measurement error (h) σe gamma 0.005 0.0015 0.008 - -
(0.007 , 0.009)
Measurement error (f) σe? gamma 0.005 0.0015 0.004 - -
(0.003 , 0.005)
marginal likelihood (Laplace) 3678.76 3214.72 2817.20
marginal likelihood (Harmonic mean) 3681.30 3216.74 2819.07
average acceptance rate 0.29 0.32 0.34
Parameters with ? are for the Euro Area, the remaining are for Portugal. Note that
there is a common Taylor rule for both regions. The table reports the posterior mean
estimates and the 90% credible set.
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Table 5: Variance Decomposition
data model Pref. Tech. Inv. Gov. C.P. Mon. Def. Abroad M.E.
∆gdp 1.03 1.16 19.2 17.2 45.1 2.2 1.4 9.7 1.0 3.5 0.7
∆gdp? 0.68 1.05 6.5 35.4 38.1 2.0 7.1 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.6
∆c 1.14 1.09 84.2 9.0 0.7 0.1 0.2 2.4 0.0 3.3 0.0
∆c? 0.55 0.60 45.9 27.8 15.7 1.2 2.2 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
∆z 4.44 4.03 2.4 3.1 83.8 0.0 1.1 4.1 2.1 3.2 0.0
∆z? 2.31 2.81 2.6 22.5 62.8 0.1 5.6 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆g 1.24 1.01 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆g? 0.84 0.76 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆w 1.37 0.68 72.2 21.3 1.3 0.0 3.1 0.2 0.0 1.9 0.0
∆w? 0.29 0.37 15.5 51.4 12.2 0.2 17.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.1
∆pi 0.44 0.40 18.6 24.5 5.1 0.2 3.6 13.9 0.2 33.8 0.1
∆pi? 0.29 0.34 9.7 20.8 35.3 0.7 16.8 16.4 0.0 0.0 0.2
ib 0.60 0.58 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 60.6 33.3 0.1
i? 0.43 0.36 8.9 12.6 70.6 1.4 1.9 4.3 0.0 0.1 0.3
Standard deviations are in percent. Standard deviations implied by the
model and the unconditional variance decomposition are performed at the
posterior mean estimates of the model's parameters. Shocks are aggregated
as explained in the main text.
Table 6: Two Equal-sized Regions
dg 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Θ 0 0 0.01 0 0 0
κt 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.2 0.2
κg 0 0 0 0 -0.05 0
σ?δ σδ σδ σδ σδ σδ 0.95× σδ
welfare gains (% CE consumption)
κs 7.27 7.88 8.99 7.58 4.04 7.27
Core 4.08 4.50 0.00 4.08 1.49 -3.95
Periphery 0.72 0.49 5.76 0.88 0.33 8.91
The table reports unconditional welfare gains measured as %
of certainty equivalent consumption. The values of κs reported
correspond to the maximizers of aggregated welfare, assuming
n = 0.5 and gdp?/gdp = 1. Unless otherwise stated, d?g = 0.6,
Θ? = 0, κ?t = 0.2, κ
?
g = 0.
52
Table 7: One Small Open Country in a Wider Monetary Union
n 3% 12% 18%
gdp?/gdp 1.7 1.2 1
dg 0.6 0.6 0.6
Θ 0 0 0
κt 0.2 0.2 0.2
κg 0 0 0
welfare gains (% CE consumption)
trade gains of 1% CE consumption
κs 0.006 0.018 0.023
Eurozone -0.03 -0.14 -0.22
Periphery 1.44 1.05 0.86
trade gains of 5% CE consumption
κs 0.032 0.091 0.115
Eurozone -0.15 -0.68 -1.09
Periphery 7.80 5.38 4.44
The table reports unconditional welfare gains
measured as % of certainty equivalent consump-
tion. The values of κs are such that the welfare
losses of the Eurozone are no bigger that the trade
gains corresponding to the Periphery entering the
union (assuming trade gains are equal across all
union members).
Table 8: The Case of Portugal
n 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
gdp?/gdp 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
dg 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.6
Θ 0 0 0.01 0 0
κt 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
κg 0 0 0 0 -0.05
welfare gains (% CE consumption)
κs 0.0064 0.0064 0.0060 0.0064 0.0064
Eurozone -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031
Portugal 1.515 1.521 1.521 1.535 1.575
The table reports unconditional welfare gains
measured as % of certainty equivalent consump-
tion. The values of κs are such that the wel-
fare losses of the Eurozone are no bigger that the
trade gains corresponding to Portugal entering the
union.
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1: Responses to a Sovereign Spread Shock
Impulse responses are expressed in terms of percet deviations from the steady state, except
for the governmnet deﬁcit and net exports, which are expressed in levels. Default values
of κt = 0.15, κg = 0 and Θ = 0.
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Figure 2: Determinacy Regions
κt: elasticity of taxes to government debt to GDP, κg: responce of government ex-
penditures to GDP and Θ: elasticity of sovereign spread to the ﬁscal outlook. Grey
areas represent determinacy regions. Both areas represent determinacy for govern-
ment debt to annual GDP of 60%. For government debt to annual GDP of 120%,
determinacy occurs only for the dark grey areas. Default values of κt = 0.15, κg = 0
and Θ = 0.
Figure 3: Welfare in a (almost) Symmetric World*
*Estimated parameters and standard deviations diﬀer across regions. Besides assum-
ing n = 0.5 and gdp?/gdp = 1, the Core is assumed to have a government sector
identical to the Periphery, including sovereign spread shocks.
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Figure 4: Dynamic Impact of Fiscal Policy (Θ = 0)
Figure 5: Dynamic Impact of Fiscal Policy (Θ = 0.05)
Impulse responses are expressed in terms of percet deviations from the steady state, except
for the governmnet deﬁcit, which is expressed in levels. Default values of κt = 0.2 and
public debt to annual GDP of 60%.
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Figure 6: 10-year Sovereign Spreads (%)
Spreads computed against the 10-year yields of German bunds.
Source: Eurostat.
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Chapter 2
Exogenous Shocks and Endogenous
States
Keywords: Markov-switching VAR; sign-restricted SVAR; terms-of-trade shocks.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C32, E32, F41.
Firenze, November 2013
2.1 Introduction
It is plausible to suspect that the reaction of a small open economy to terms-
of-trade shocks diﬀers across time. These diﬀerences can be due to a number of
factors, ranging from the characteristics of the country's economic structure and
institutional framework, to factors largely determined by exogenous conditions.
In this paper, I set up an empirical model to investigate the existence of these
diﬀerences in the context of a commodity exporter. The model is speciﬁcally
designed to achieve two objectives. Firstly, it accounts for structural changes per-
taining to the domestic economy. These changes are deemed endogenous insofar
as they reﬂect changes in the stochastic processes of domestic variables. Secondly,
it distinguishes terms-of-trade shocks according to their foreign causes, which are
exogenous to the small open economy. The careful identiﬁcation of terms-of-trade
shocks is particularly important because diﬀerent shocks can produce diﬀerent
outcomes within the domestic economy. Hence, by accurately distinguishing dif-
ferent foreign shocks, the model I propose is able to investigate the diﬀerences in
the transmission of terms-of-trade shocks due to endogenous changes alone. As I
show through a case study featuring Australia, isolating these diﬀerences not only
has empirical relevance, it also has important policy implications.
Countries in which the resource sector represents a large share of total output or of
total exports are particularly dependent on how commodity prices evolve in world
markets. Consider, for instance, an increase in international commodity prices.
For a small commodity-exporting economy, this triggers a shift in investment
towards the resource sector. Production factors, including labour, are transferred
to the commodity sector, which expands at the pace of the bonanza generated
by the increasing value of commodity revenues. At the same time, an income
eﬀect, both reﬂected in terms of private earnings and in terms of tax collection,
will induce an increase in aggregate demand. As the price of tradeable goods
and services is ﬁxed to global prices, the exchange rate is forced to appreciate.
Consequently, foreign-produced tradeables become more competitive compared to
those produced domestically. This prompts a sectoral transformation, whereby the
production of non-tradeable goods expands and imports increase at the expense
of a contraction of the domestic tradeable sector.
The simple economic trends outlined above are, however, dependent on various
domestic characteristics, including structural and related to policy. Regarding the
former, suppose that wage setting is centralized, with contracts and bargaining
determined and enforced homogeneously across diﬀerent sectors. Labour demand
pressures in the commodity sector would then spillover to the remaining industries,
pushing wages upwards economy-wide. This would increase production costs and
further harm the competitiveness of the tradeable sector. It could inclusively lead
to total output losses, generate higher inﬂation and a rise in unemployment. On
the other hand, consider monetary policy being mandated to keep the exchange
rate ﬁxed. In this circumstance, the purchasing power of domestic households
vis-à-vis foreign-produced tradeables does not improve. As the commodity sec-
tor expands and absorbs production factors, the supply of domestically-produced
goods might not be able to respond to the increase in demand by domestic agents.
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As a result, prices wil grow. With monetary policy tied to keep the nominal ex-
change rate pegged, inﬂation will rise until the real exchange rate adjusts fully to
the shock.
These examples illustrate how multiple factors within a small open economy can
generate disparate results in terms of the transmission of commodity price shocks.
Yet, domestic characteristics are not the only source behind these diﬀerences.
Shocks to commodity prices that have distinct causes can also have diﬀerent con-
sequences to a commodity exporter. For example, a shock to commodity prices
caused by an expansion in world demand comes together with a general increase
in world prices, notably of tradeable goods. In this scenario, the terms of trade
do not improve necessarily, insofar as the increase in both prices is of the same
magnitude. The implications of such a shock are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those
relative to a shock caused by a drop in the production of commodities elsewhere
or due to an increase in precautionary demand. These shocks do not generate an
increase in the price of tradeables and therefore do not contribute directly to an
increase in domestic inﬂation.
In this paper, I propose an empirical model consisting of a structural VAR with
two blocks: one with variables describing the world market for commodities and
one containing domestic variables. Importantly, I impose an exogeneity restric-
tion with regards to the world block, isolating world variables from developments
within the small open economy. In order to disentangle the variation in the trans-
mission of shocks accruing to endogenous and exogenous factors, I combine two
econometric tools for time-series analysis. First, to account for changes within the
small open economy, the domestic block is assumed to follow a Markov-Switching
(MS) process. As such, the parameters of the VAR for the domestic variables can
change according to a latent variable describing which regime the economy is in.
Furthermore, the estimated probabilities of each regime occurring at a given point
in time are entirely driven by the data.
Second, the identiﬁcation of the structural shocks is done through Sign-Restrictions
(SR), which are imposed on the world block only. SR are a ﬂexible method to ex-
tract an economic interpretation of structural shocks as they can be implemented
on the impulse response of relevant variables upon the impact of a shock, on any
following period, and on the sign and magnitude of the response. Moreover, iden-
tiﬁcation through SR does not rely on possibly unlikely zero restrictions implied
by traditional methods. On the downside, SR do not provide an exact identiﬁca-
tion of structural shocks as there is a continuum of structural models complying
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with the same SR. Notwithstanding this, I am able to isolate the changes in the
transmission of structural shocks across diﬀerent domestic states by imposing SR
only on the world block and assuming that the world block is time-invariant. In
this way, I am able to measure the eﬀects of state changes for each structural
model individually.
I provide an illustration of the empirical model through an application to Aus-
tralia. Rich in mineral resources, notably iron ore and coal, commodity exports
account for around 40% of total exports. During the last decade, the rapid growth
of emerging markets, and of China in particular, caused a boom in commodity
prices that positioned Australia at the forefront of a large and lasting economic
expansion. However, positive shocks to commodity prices did not always result in
successful outcomes, with the episodes in the late 1970's being rather disastrous.
The macro policy framework and the economic structure of the Australian eco-
nomy also changed considerably between these two experiences. I therefore use the
model to account for these changes within Australia and assess the transmission
of commodity price shocks.
Using a sample ranging between 1971 and 2010, I ﬁnd a clear change in regime in
late 1990. This change is consistent with the transition to inﬂation targeting that
was oﬃcially announced two years later. It also coincides with the implementation
of a number of gradual reforms aimed at decentralizing wage negotiations. In
terms of impulse responses, I ﬁnd that after the change in regime, real GDP
and inﬂation react less abruptly and adjust quicker to terms-of-trade shocks. I
also conﬁrm that not all terms-of-trade shocks are alike. In particular, commodity
price shocks that are driven by supply disruptions in world markets have a negative
impact on output, a result also described for Canada by Charnavoki and Dolado
(2014). Moreover, as the estimated impact on inﬂation appears to be modest, my
ﬁndings support the view that, during these shocks, monetary policy can provide
further support to the economy.
Literature: There is a growing literature exploring time-variation of VAR para-
meters to trace the diﬀerences in impulse responses across time. Using a Bayesian
MS-VAR, Rubio-Ramírez, Waggoner and Zha (2005) study whether the beginning
of the European Monetary Union changed the conduct of monetary policy. They
use diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies (including SR) to obtain structural impulse
responses. Sims and Zha (2006), and Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008) investig-
ate whether monetary policy in the US has changed using a MS mechanism as
well. In turn, Baumeister and Peersman (2010) estimate a VAR with time-varying
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parameters on oil market variables and impose SR to identify structural shocks.
Camacho and Pérez-Quirós (2013) use Cholesky decomposition in a MS-VAR to
study the impact of commodity prices on the GDP of Latin American commod-
ity exporters. They show that commodity price shocks are procyclical and that
positive shocks are more expansionary when these economies are in recession.
Apart from those using exactly-identiﬁed strategies, like Cholesky, most of these
works focus on state-dependent structural models for the identiﬁcation of struc-
tural shocks. The majority also imposes identiﬁcation restrictions on the impulse
responses of relevant variables. In this paper, I argue that a better comparison
of time diﬀerences in objects like impulse responses and variance decompositions
should only take into account the diﬀerences arising from the data, and not those
imposed by time-dependent structural identiﬁcation strategies.
In a paper investigating the impacts of oil shocks, Kilian (2009) is the ﬁrst to
highlight the diﬀerences in the response of US variables to shocks with distinct
underlying causes. Using Cholesky decomposition, he shows that an increase in
oil prices caused by an expansion in the world economy does not cause the typical
economic disruptions associated with increases in oil prices prompted by supply
shortages. Peersman and Van Robays (2009) defend that SR achieve a more
plausible identiﬁcation of diﬀerent oil shocks. They focus on the Euro-area and
demonstrate that although all oil shocks push inﬂation up, oil shocks caused by
an increase in world economic activity produce a transitory expansion, whereas oil
shocks caused by a disruption in oil supply lead to a permanent drop in output.
In a closely related paper, Jääskelä and Smith (2011), JS11 henceforth, use SR
to identify terms-of-trade shocks to the Australian economy and ﬁnd that these
are not necessarily inﬂationary. In particular, they ﬁnd that shocks speciﬁc to the
commodity market tend to lower inﬂation and to expand total output. I follow
this strand of the literature to motivate the identiﬁcation scheme I use in the
application to Australia.
Isolating diﬀerences in impulse responses due to regime changes from those due to
the structural identiﬁcation of shocks is particularly important when using SR. As
Fry and Pagan (2011) point out, even in time-invariant models, SR can generate
potential inconsistency problems due to the non-uniqueness of structural models
complying with a unique set of SR. In particular, computing objects like impulse
responses using the median across diﬀerent models, as is typically done in the
literature, can deliver misleading results insofar as the median response is not
consistent with any single structural model. This problem is clearly exacerbated
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when structural models are state-dependent. For instance, Lane, Lütkepohl and
Maciejowska (2010), Herwartz and Lütkepohl (2011), and Lütkepohl and Net²un-
ajev (2012) show that the number of identiﬁcation restrictions needed to be veri-
ﬁed increases for models with time-varying volatility. This is because the set of
identiﬁcation restrictions that is satisﬁed in a given state may not be in other
states. These additional restrictions greatly complicate the identiﬁcation of struc-
tural models complying with SR in all states. By successfully addressing these
inconsistency problems, the model I propose is well equipped to the use of SR to
study changes in the transmission of foreign shocks to a small open economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
econometric model and explains how comparison of impulse responses and vari-
ance decompositions across diﬀerent periods can be done in a coherent manner.
In section 3, I present the empirical application. I start by testing the main as-
sumptions implied by the model. I then interpret the estimated MS states and
discuss the diﬀerences I ﬁnd in the time-varying impulse responses and variance
decompositions. The last section concludes.
2.2 Model
This section lays out the empirical model. The econometric framework has three
main features: First, the model contains two blocks of variables, with one block
begin exogenous with respect to the other. This restriction makes the exogenous
block immune from development occurring in the endogenous block, while main-
taining the inverse channel open: the process for the endogenous block is still
aﬀected by the exogenous variables. Second, the endogenous block is assumed to
follow a MS process, with the VAR parameters (including the variance matrix)
evolving according to a latent variable dictating regime changes. The probabilities
of being in a given regime are estimated and, therefore, entirely data-dependent.
Third, the structural shocks are identiﬁed through SR on the exogenous block.
Due to the exogeneity restriction, the identiﬁcation of structural shocks is time
invariant and, as a result, the transmission of shocks through the endogenous
block can be compared across regimes in a consistent manner.
The ﬂexibility of the model proposed in this paper allows for its application to
a wide range of empirical questions. Apart from the one investigated here, there
are a number of other examples where it is relevant to understand the diﬀerences
in the propagation of exogenous shocks due to structural change. The model has
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the advantage of combining a ﬂexible and economically sound identiﬁcation of
structural shocks with a model structure that guarantees a consistent comparison
of objects like impulse responses or variance decompositions across diﬀerent time
periods. In other words, it is able to isolate the diﬀerences in the propagation of
shocks that are due to structural change alone.
2.2.1 A Two-Block VAR
The empirical model can be succinctly represented in the form of a standard VAR,
which I write as
Yt = α +
p∑
i=1
AiYt−i + et (1)
The VAR is composed of two blocks of variables, one containing variables de-
scribing the exogenous conditions in the world markets for commodities and one
describing the domestic conditions of the small commodity-exporting economy.
There are n world variables and d domestic variables. I can partition the VAR
into Yt =
[
Wt Dt
]′
, where Wt is the n × 1 vector of world variables, and Dt
represents the d×1 domestic block. Finally, α is a (n+ d)×1 vector of intercepts,
et ∼ (0, Σe) the (n+ d)× 1 vector of residuals, the sample size is T , and p is the
number of lags in the VAR.
The exogenous block: The world block is assumed not to be inﬂuenced by
developments occurring within the domestic block. Additionally, the world bock is
also assumed not to be subject to state changes. Therefore, its dynamic behaviour
can be represented by a standard linear VAR.
The assumption that the world block does not depend on the domestic variables
implies that the coeﬃcient matrices in (1) can be deﬁned as
Ai =
[
AWWi 0n×d
AWDi A
DD
i
]
(2)
with AWWi , A
WD
i , and A
DD
i of dimensions n × n, d × n, and d × d, respectively.
Given (2), the world block can be represented as a VAR of the form
Wt = α
W +
p∑
i=1
A1,Wi Wt−i + e
W
t (3)
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with eWt ∼ N (0, ΣeW ). The expression (3) can be directly estimated by OLS.
The endogenous block: On the contrary, the process for the domestic time
series can involve regime changes1. To account for this, the domestic block is
modeled as a MS-VAR. While allowing for non-linearities, the MS mechanism is
an attractive device to identify economically meaningful states across the sample
time. J. Hamilton was the ﬁrst to apply the MS framework to the study of
non-linearities in economic time-series. Hamilton (1989) studies the behaviour
of the US real GDP and shows that MS states deliver a good description of
US recessions and expansions. Hamilton (1990) presents an algorithm to obtain
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters following a MS process. This
algorithm is also used here and details can be found in the Appendix.2
With regards to the domestic block, its VAR representation is of the form
Dt = α
D
s +
p∑
i=1
[
AWDs,i Wt−i + A
DD
s,i Dt−i
]
+ eDt,s (4)
with eDt,s ∼ N
(
0, ΣeD,s
)
. Note the inclusion of exogenous regressors in (4). These
are the lags of the world variables through which the exogenous shocks impact
the domestic economy.3
The subscript s in (4) denotes the MS state, which depends on a latent vari-
able st = {1, . . . , s, . . . , S}. The unobservable st evolves according to an ergodic
Markov-chain process, with st taking a particular value with conditional probab-
ility
P {st = j|st−1 = i, st−2 = k, Yt−1, Wt} = P {st = j|st−1 = i} = pji ≥ 0
These probabilities are collected in the transition matrix P. Each element of P
located at the intersection of row j with column i corresponds to the transition
probability that state i will be followed by state j. Obviously,
∑S
j=1 pij = 1. The
state probabilities are entirely driven by the data during the estimation routine.
Consequently, the econometrician does not impose a priori choices regarding the
1For simplicity, the terms regime and state are used interchangeably in this paper.
2An excellent textbook exposition of MS and the EM algorithm can be found in Krolzig
(1997).
3While (3) is a standard VAR, (4) is a VAR with additional exogenous regressors. Throughout
the paper, whenever the domestic block is mentioned, it is meant to refer to the speciﬁcation in
(4).
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timing of structural breaks or state switches. Instead, the only task left is to
interpret the economic content behind the diﬀerent states and the timing of their
transition. Finally, I assume that the model is stable and with white-noise Gaus-
sian residuals eDt,s.
The notation in (4) is not meant to imply necessarily that all the parameters
diﬀer between states. As in Krolzig (1997), some parameters might be assumed
to remain constant. In Lütkepohl and Net²unajev (2012), for instance, only ΣeD,s
is state dependent, whereas in Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008) all parameters are
allowed to change. An important aspect regarding the choice of which parameters
can change has to do with the economic interpretation of the various regimes. For
instance, allowing AWDs,i to change might result in having the MS states to follow a
pattern more in line with how the domestic block is inﬂuenced by world variables,
rather than identifying states speciﬁcally related to the interaction of domestic
variables. I check the robustness of the interpretation I give to the MS states by
estimating (4) under diﬀerent restrictions on the parameters that are allowed to
change .
2.2.2 Extracting Structural Shocks
To draw conclusions about how domestic variables respond to a shock, it is ﬁrst
necessary to identify what the shock in question exactly represents. A simple
procedure to achieve identiﬁcation is to rewrite (1) in such a way that the struc-
tural shocks become orthogonal. This ﬁrst step makes it possible to analyze one
shock at the time, given that each shock is now uncorrelated with the remaining
ones. A second step consists in giving an economic interpretation to the struc-
tural shocks. Due to the existence of a continuum of normalizations delivering
orthogonal shocks, I can constrain the set of normalizations to those for which
the shocks induce a particular dynamic behaviour of the time series. Insofar as
these dynamics are consistent with sound economic predictions, I can derive an
economic interpretation to each shock.
Once the system (1) is normalized, it gives rise to a structural VAR of the form
A0Yt =
p∑
i=1
AiYt−i + εt (5)
with εt ∼ (0,Σε) representing the structural shocks. The normalization of (1)
is done through the matrix A0, with Ai = AiA0, i > 0 and εt = A0et. For
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simplicity, it is useful to make Σε = I, imposing that the structural shocks are not
only uncorrelated but also with standard deviations equal to 1. Lastly, one further
restriction needs to be imposed on A0: in order to maintain the independence of
the world block from domestic variables in (5), A0 has to be such that, for any i,
Ai =
[
AWWi 0n×d
AWDi ADDi
]
(6)
This restriction is satisﬁed if, for instance, A0 is lower triangular. In the literature,
the default choice for A0 is the Cholesky decomposition of Σe, C. Cholesky is
appealing because, as Σe = CC ′, setting A0 = C−1 not only renders the structural
shocks orthogonal, it also makes Σε = I. More importantly still, as C is a lower
triangular matrix, (6) is also satisﬁed.
However, setting A0 = C−1 might not be suﬃcient to achieve a satisfactory identi-
ﬁcation of structural shocks. As has been discussed in the literature4, the dynam-
ics associated with the shocks obtained through the Cholesky normalization might
fail to match the predictions provided by economic theory. I therefore propose
the use of SR on the impulse responses of the world variables in order to obtain
a valid identiﬁcation.
SR amount to imposing further restrictions on A0 such that the impulse responses
of selected variables to a given structural shock comply with economic theory in
terms of sign, magnitude, and persistence. To implement SR, note ﬁrst that, for
any orthogonal matrix P˜ , Σe = CP˜ P˜ ′C ′ = CC ′.5 As such, CP˜ is also a valid
candidate to obtain (5). Moreover, because A−10 = CP˜ and Ai = AiA0, i > 0,
diﬀerent P˜ imply diﬀerent structural dynamics of (5). Therefore, I can paramet-
rize P˜ in such a way that the responses of the world variables to the structural
shocks comply with the chosen SR scheme. Finally, P˜ also must comply with (6),
which is the case if6
P˜ =
[
P˜WW 0n×d
P˜WD P˜DD
]
(7)
Assuming that the world variables are independent from developments within
4Peersman and Van Robays (2009) provide a discussion on how SR seem more appropriate
than zero restrictions in order to identify structural shocks in a context closely related to the
one here.
5By deﬁnition, if P˜ is an orthogonal matrix, P˜ P˜ ′ = I.
6Refer to the Appendix for the technical details regarding the implementation of the sign
restrictions.
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the domestic block implies that the coeﬃcients and the covariance matrix in (3)
are state independent. This simpliﬁes the implementation of the SR and the
computation of impulse responses. Consider again Σe, the covariance matrix of
model (1). Its top-left n × n block contains ΣeW , which is state independent.
Moreover, due to the parametrization in (2) and (3), and to the fact that the
Cholesky decomposition of Σe is a lower triangular matrix, the dynamics of the
world variables depend only on the reduced form shocks eWt . Hence, searching
for the decompositions of Σe that comply with a given set of SR is equivalent to
searching for the decompositions of ΣeW that deliver the same result. Hence, to
extract structural shocks it is not necessary to consider the domestic block.7
Apart from easing the computational burden, imposing SR only on the responses
of world variables is also crucial from an empirical point of view. On the one hand,
if the impulse responses of the domestic variables were restricted, the conclusions
about the eﬀects of endogenous regime changes would be biased by construction.
On the other hand, if the structural shocks were extracted within the MS-VAR
block, it would have to be necessary to check the SR for each state at a time. Two
approaches would then be possible: First, to accept only the decompositions that
respect the SR in all states. Second, to accept the decompositions that respect
SR for each state individually.8 On the contrary, in the model proposed here, the
SR need to be validated only once, as the same decomposition is valid for all S
states.
As discussed by Fry and Pagan (2011), each P˜k can be seen as a particular struc-
tural model.9 Hence, comparing the dynamics associated with diﬀerent decompos-
itions amounts to comparing diﬀerent structural models. My objective, however,
is to compare the dynamics associated with regime changes, and not due to dif-
ferent decompositions. Hence, because all decompositions that satisfy the SR are
valid for all states, I guarantee that only the data is responsible for the diﬀerences
7The Cholesky decomposition of Σe is an upper triangular matrix for which its top-left n×n
block corresponds to the Cholesky decomposition of ΣeW .
8Suppose that the SR scheme involves κ restrictions. The ﬁrst approach then implies checking
S×κ restrictions in total, which is computationally demanding and practically unfeasible (refer
to Lane, Lütkepohl and Maciejowska, 2010; Herwartz and Lütkepohl, 2011; and Lütkepohl and
Net²unajev, 2012 for further discussion). The second option is the approach followed by Rubio-
Ramírez, Waggoner and Zha (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), and Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008),
and amounts to ﬁnding P˜ (s), for s = {1, . . . , S}, with P˜ (s = i) 6= P˜ (s = j). Here, the aim is
to ﬁnd a P˜ such that P˜ (s = i) = P˜ (s = j) for ∀ s.
9Suppose that each decomposition A0 represents a diﬀerent theoretical model depicting dif-
ferent impulse responses. These possible diﬀerences are denoted by model uncertainty in this
paper.
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in the impulse responses. In other words, the dynamic diﬀerences across time are
only due to the system being in a diﬀerent state, and not because a diﬀerent struc-
tural model was imposed by the econometrician. This is particularly important
given that the relevant comparisons are to be made about the domestic variables,
which have been left unrestricted and can, as a result, behave very diﬀerently
depending on the structural model.
2.2.3 Impulse Responses, Variance Decomposition and a
note on Model Uncertainty
A number of recent works focuses on the derivation of impulse responses in the
context of a MS-VAR model. State-dependent impulse responses, unlike those
obtained from linear VARs, depict non-linearities that depend on the moment
the structural model is hit by a shock, and on the size and sign of the shock.
By comparing the impulse responses across regimes, it is possible to determine
the magnitude and sign of the these non-linearities. Moreover, to the extent
that the MS regimes are clearly identiﬁed, these diﬀerences have important policy
implications. Ehrmann, Ellison and Valla (2003) derive state-dependent impulse
responses conditional on the state the system is in when the shock occurs. In
addition, they assume that the regime remains unchanged throughout the duration
of the response. This amounts to computing impulse responses within each MS
state. For this method to be valid, the duration of the response must not be longer
than the expected duration of the state. Karamé (2010) also assumes that the
state is known when the structural shock occurs, but allows the regime to switch
along the duration of the response, with the regime change being itself inﬂuenced
by the shock. In turn, Camacho and Pérez-Quirós (2013) allow the sate to be
endogenously chosen also at the moment the shock hits the economy. Without
the shocks, the information about which state is prevailing can be backed from the
estimated smooth probabilities delivered by the EM algorithm. However, when a
shock hits the economy, it is necessary to compute these probabilities again.10
Computing time-varying impulse responses to sign-restricted structural shocks is
not trivial. Instead, because the Cholesky decomposition of Σe is unique, one
can simply compute Cs for each state. Importantly, although Cs necessarily diﬀer
across states, these diﬀerences are only driven by the data. This is the approach
10Refer to the Appendix for a description of the EM algorithm and on how to compute non-
linear impulse responses.
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taken by Camacho and Pérez-Quirós (2013). With SR however, as there are mul-
tiple decompositions complying with the same restrictions, one P˜k must be chosen
between all decompositions satisfying the SR scheme. In this paper I follow the
proposal by Fry and Pagan (2011) and select the P˜l that produces the impulse
responses that are the closest to the point-wise median responses across all P˜k
complying with the SR. This is obtained by minimizing the normalized distance
between the impulse responses associated with a given P˜k and the point-wise me-
dian response, across all shocks and all responses, for both world and domestic
variables.11 The normalization is performed with the point-wise standard devi-
ation. I denote this decomposition by P˜mt. If P˜mt is unique, non-linear impulse
responses and variance decompositions can be easily computed. Because only
one structural model is used (the one associated with P˜mt) diﬀerences in impulse
responses across time are only due to regime changes.12
Measuring uncertainty within a sign-restricted MS structural VAR is not trivial
either. There are two sources of uncertainty: model uncertainty, due to the mul-
tiplicity of P˜k satisfying the SR, and statistical uncertainty, relating to the data
sample used for estimation. Considering the former, and taking the reduced form
estimates of the MS-VAR as given, conﬁdence bands around impulse responses
can be computed by ranking the impulse response of variable i to a structural
shock j, at horizon h after impact, across all P˜k satisfying the SR, and selecting
the x% and 100− x% values. However, regarding statistical uncertainty, matters
are more complex. A method proposed by Gonçalves and Kilian (2004), and adap-
ted by Herwartz and Lütkepohl (2011), consists of a ﬁxed-design wild-bootstrap
that preserves the heteroskedasticity structure of the data. This is done for a
given structural model, say for P˜mt. Given that parameter changes depend on
the MS states, Herwartz and Lütkepohl (2011) estimate the conﬁdence intervals
conditional on the transition probabilities. However, conﬁdence intervals com-
puted this way tend to be biased, and this remains even after implementing the
bootstrap-after-bootstrap method suggested by Kilian (1998). Another problem
has to do with the fact that for each bootstrapped sample, the SR might not
be satisﬁed by P˜mt anymore. In these situations, one could drop the bootstrap
samples that do not comply with the SR under P˜mt. In practice, however, conﬁd-
11The point-wise median response is obtained by ranking the response of variable i to stroc-
tural shock j at time h after impact, across all decompositions k that satisfy the SR, and
selecting the median value.
12For more details regarding the computation variance decompositions in a MS-VAR setting
refer to Bianchi (2013).
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ence intervals computed using these diﬀerent methods appeared unsatisfactory in
the context of the case study presented in the next section. This is clearly a topic
of further research.
2.3 Case-study: Australia
In this section, I present an application of the empirical model just described.
The section starts with a brief description of Australia's recent economic history.
I highlight the importance of terms-of-trade shocks for Australia's economic per-
formance and of institutional reforms that could be behind structural changes.
Secondly, I present the data used for estimation, test the main speciﬁcation as-
sumptions implied by the empirical model, and discuss the structural identiﬁcation
scheme used. Thirdly, I estimate the model and investigate the potential economic
interpretations of the MS regime probabilities and parameter estimates. Finally, I
assess whether state changes across time have had an impact on the transmission
of exogenous shocks to the Australian economy and discuss the policy implications
of my ﬁndings.13
2.3.1 Background
As reported in Figure 1, during most part of the last decade Australia has be-
neﬁted from an unprecedented rise in commodity prices. From 2000 to 2010, global
prices for Australia's resource exports, in Australian dollar terms, increased by 9%
per annum.14 By 2010, exports of natural resources accounted for more than half
of total exports, with iron ore, coal, oil and gas representing the biggest shares.
Table 1 and Figure 2 report the composition and the relative size commodity
exports represent for the Australian economy. The rapid growth in industrial
production and housing construction in Southeast Asian and China was the lead-
ing cause behind the jump in commodity prices. Given its proximity, Australia
was a privileged supplier to the region. In 2010, mining revenues were about 15%
of Australia's GDP, while investment accounted for 4% . These ﬁgures, about
13OLS and MS estimation, including the EM algorithm, were coded in Matlab. Diﬀerent
MS speciﬁcations were nested within the main code, whereas speciﬁcation tests were coded
separately. I also developed the code for all the statistical tests but the QP tests, which were
performed using existing Gauss code.
14If not stated otherwise, the ﬁgures presented in here are taken from Connolly and Orsmond
(2011), who provide a comprehensive survey on the Australian mining industry during the 2000s,
and from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA).
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twice their value since the year 2000, continued to grow. Kent (2013) estimates
that the resource sector has accounted for 18% of GDP in 2012, while mining
investment has reached a record 8% of GDP.
The growth rate of direct employment, of 10% per year, is also remarkable. Ac-
cording to estimates by Rayner and Bishop (2013), total employment generated
by the mining sector, both directly and owing to resource-related activities, has
represented 10% of total employment in 2012. This is again twice the ﬁgure of
2000. Overall, unemployment remained low throughout the boom, with manu-
facturing being the only sector with a net reduction in the number of employees.
Although wages in the mining industry have typically been higher than in the
rest of the economy, the gap increased throughout the decade. According to Lowe
(2012), since 2004 wages in the resource sector have increased by around 10%
relative to the average of the remaining sectors.
With GDP growing at an average rate of 3% per year, as shown in Figure 3,
Australia preformed well above major developed economies around the globe.
Domestic prices remained relatively stable, with inﬂation under the target band of
around 2 to 3% per annum on average, as reported in Figure 4. This is particularly
notable in light of the sharp rise in Australia's terms of trade, which jumped by
around 80% since the beginning of the boom. The nominal exchange rate, free to
adjust to market pressures, appears to have worked as an eﬃcient buﬀer to the
rise in the terms of trade. Indeed, the appreciation of the real exchange rate was
mostly driven by the appreciation of the nominal rate, which allowed domestic
inﬂation to remain within the oﬃcial target.
The successful experience just described is in sharp contrast with the commod-
ity boom that occurred in Australia nearly three decades earlier. In the late
1970s/early 1980s (Battellino, 2010, dates the boom from 1978 to 1983), the price
of energy commodities, such as steaming coal, oil and gas, went up in the wake
of the second oil price shock. However, as described by Connolly and Orsmond
(2011) , the rise in commodity prices, of 40% on average, was not accompanied
by an improvement in the terms of trade. As import prices also rose at a consid-
erable speed, Australia's terms of trade remained fairly stable. Figures collected
from Freebairm (1987) show that resource-based industries accounted for 80% of
total export receipts at that time. In the peak of the boom, the mining sector
represented around 5% of total national income.
Pagan (1987) provides a detailed account of the events. At the beginning of the
boom, mining investment went up fast, following the belief that commodity prices
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would remain high. Unemployment fell and output grew at an average of 3.6%
between 1978 to 1980. Optimism about the duration of the boom allowed trade
unions to obtain real wage increases. At the peak, nominal wage growth reach
almost 30% . As collective wage bargaining was encouraged by the government,
wage inﬂation spread through all sectors of the economy. However, the euphoria
lasted shorter than expected. By the end of the mining boom, Australia entered a
severe recession. At the bottom, which occurred in 1983, the decline in output was
the greatest since the great depression and unemployment reached a record high
of 11%. At the time, as the Australian dollar was pegged to a trade-weighted
index of foreign currencies, the slow appreciation of the exchange rate was not
enough to prevent inﬂation from jumping to more than 10%.
Among the causes for such contrasting outcomes are institutional factors. In
between the two booms, important reforms took place in Australia, among which
the reforms to the labour market and to the conduct of monetary policy seem
particularly relevant. Considering the former, the decentralization of wage set-
ting, which aimed at preventing sectoral wage pressures to spillover across the
economy, was initiated during the beginning of the 1980s. In a response to the
rapid degradation of the economic outlook, wage indexation ceased formally in
1981. As this was not enough to curb wage inﬂation, wages of public employees
and private workers covered by federal awards were frozen by the end of 1982. Not
long after, the government and trade unions agreed on further wage moderation
across other sectors of the economy. Other reforms were gradually implemented
also during the 1990s. As a result, instead of widespread wage inﬂation of the late
1970s, during the recent boom the gap between commodity and non-commodity
wages was allowed to widen. In particular, as wages in the tradeable sector were
no longer indexed, wage moderation could sustain export's competitiveness during
the boom.
Monetary policy was also subject to important reforms. In 1983, the exchange rate
was let to ﬂoat, and ten years later, in 1993, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)
was oﬃcially given the mandate to pursue inﬂation targeting. Not surprisingly,
and unlike previous occasions, the nominal exchange rate accommodated most
of the adjustment owing to the increase in the terms of trade during the recent
boom. The appreciation eﬀectively shifted demand from Australian tradeables
at the same time as making imports cheaper in Australian dollar terms. Both
eﬀects reduced the inﬂationary pressures induced by the boom, helping the RBA
to achieve the mandated target for inﬂation. Together with the reforms in the
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labour market, these changes have allowed the RBA to anchor inﬂation and wage
expectations, letting supply and demand pressures in speciﬁc sectors not to spread
to the whole economy.
The focus of the next subsections is on the following questions: First, to what
extent have these reforms altered the way term-of-trade shocks propagate to the
Australian economy? Second, and following Kilian (2009), I investigate whether
diﬀerent term-of-trade shocks produce similar outcomes? When comparing the
diﬀerences between two booms in commodity prices, it is important to ﬁrst clarify
whether the two episodes represent the same shock. If the two shocks are diﬀerent,
their transmission to the economy, all else equal, will most likely diﬀer as well.
For instance, Australia's terms of trade reached record high levels during the
most recent boom, whereas they barely moved during the previews one. Is this
diﬀerence the reason behind the contrasting outcomes described above? On the
contrary, if I compare the same shock across diﬀerent periods in time, diﬀerences
in the reaction of the economy, all else equal, will most likely be due to diﬀerent
domestic circumstances. I employ the empirical model described above to shed
light on these questions.
2.3.2 Model Speciﬁcation
Data: The terms of trade of a country are deﬁned as the ratio of the price of
exports to the price of imports. The terms of trade inform how a country beneﬁts
from trading internationally, with an improvement implying that the revenues
from exporting domestically-produced goods and services can aﬀord the purchase
of a larger volume of imports. In the context of a small commodity-exporting
economy, commodity prices assume a signiﬁcant role in the evolution of the terms
of trade, as commodities represent a large share of total exports.
In order to capture the exogenous conditions relevant to Australia's terms of trade,
and following JS11, the world block is composed of the following three variables:
the world prices of Australian exports and imports, and an aggregate indicator of
economic activity for Australia's major trading partners. Australian export (im-
port) prices are obtained from the seasonally-adjusted implicit price deﬂator for
expenditures on exports (imports) of goods and services. These deﬂators, which
are denominated in Australian dollars, are multiplied by the quarterly average
of the nominal trade-weighted index. The conversion to world prices is made in
order to abstract from ﬂuctuations in export (imports) prices caused by move-
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ments in the exchange rate. The economic activity indicator is obtained from
the seasonally adjusted export-weighted real GDP of Australia's major trading
partners.15
Regarding the domestic block, the main objective is to study the impact of terms-
of-trade shocks on real GDP. However, interpreting the MS states is also of par-
ticular relevance. Consequently, and following the discussion presented in the
previous subsection, I add to the domestic block a measure of consumer price in-
ﬂation and of changes in the nominal exchange rate. A more detailed explanation
regarding this choice of variables is found in the next subsection. Real output
growth is obtained from the seasonally adjusted chain volume measure of Aus-
tralia's GDP, while consumer price inﬂation (CPI) is derived from the seasonally
adjusted all-groups consumer price index, excluding the tax changes of 1999-2000.
The growth rate of the nominal exchange rate is obtained from the trade-weighted
index.
The data was collected from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the
RBA, in levels and already seasonally adjusted. The sample used for estimation
runs from the ﬁrst quarter of 1971 to the last quarter of 2010. The sample period
purposely includes years of major policy changes, notably the ﬂoat of the Aus-
tralian dollar in December 1983 and the announcement of inﬂation targeting in
the ﬁrst quarter of 1993. Unlike JS11, the sample period used here also includes
the least recent boom mentioned in the previous section.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that all variables are stationary at a 1%
signiﬁcance level. Moreover, standard criteria suggest the use of one lag in the
VAR, which is what is assumed for the estimations.16 These results are also ob-
tained for the sub-samples obtained by dividing the sample in two at two diﬀerent
dates: in the last quarter of 1990 and in the ﬁrst quarter of 1993. The reason to
check stationarity and the lag length of the VAR within these shorter samples is
the following. The last quarter of 1990 is suggested by tests for structural breaks
in the data, whereas 1993Q1 is suggested by the discussion in the previous sub-
section, for it was the ﬁrst quarter under oﬃcial inﬂation targeting. These are two
probable dates for state changes, and the results are reassuring about the validity
of the speciﬁcation choices made here.17
15Major trading partners comprise Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand,
UK, and US.
16I used the AIC, AICC, and SIC criteria to select the lag length p.
17The choice of the lag length p of the VAR and the number of MS states S follows the
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Model assumptions: One important assumption embedded in the model out-
lined in the previous section concerns the composition of matrix A.18 Table 2
presents tests for the null that ADW = 0n×d , i.e. , that the domestic variables
have no signiﬁcant impact on the world variables. The table reports this test un-
der diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In particular, given that the world block is constructed
with the purpose of identifying terms-of-trade shocks, and specially commodity
price shocks, I also test whether international commodity prices are exogenous
with respect to domestic variables. This is shown in the ﬁrst panel of the table.
The commodity price index is from the RBA and is computed using the prices
for the main commodities exported by Australia.19 Using the commodity price
index, the bivariate test for Granger causality shows that real GDP growth, ∆yd,
and domestic inﬂation, pid, do not have signiﬁcant explanatory power with re-
gards to the price index. ∆yd also does not seem to Granger-cause the world
block composed of the three variables described in the previous section. On the
contrary, the change in the nominal exchange rate, ∆s, seems to have statistical
signiﬁcance in describing both commodity prices and the world block. In the
multivariate context using the three domestic variables, block exogeneity of both
the the commodity price index and of the world block cannot be rejected at the
standard 5% signiﬁcance level.20
The other implicit assumption in Section 2 is the presence of structural changes
within the small open economy. Table 3 provides evidence of the existence of
changes on the intercepts, coeﬃcients and variance of the domestic block. The
tests reported in the table do not address speciﬁcally the existence or type of the
non-linearities present in the domestic block. Instead, they assess the signiﬁcance
strategy used, for instance, in Herwartz and Lütkepohl (2011). Other strategies are suggested
in Krolzig (1997) or in Psaradakis and Spagnolo (2006).
18For ease of notation, and given that p = 1, the subscript i is dropped.
19The index is plotted in Figure 1. Table 1 reports the shares of the main commodities used
to build the index.
20Measured in terms of commodity exports, Australia is indeed a major player in world
markets, where Australian exports can account for more than half of total exports of some com-
modities. However, in terms of total production, Australian shares are signiﬁcantly lower. For
instance, in 2007, Australia accounted for 57% of world exports of coking coal and 32% of world
exports of iron ore. Yet, Australia's shares of world production were 18% for both commodities.
In fact, a large share of commodity production is consumed domestically in countries like China,
India and the US. This, together with the fact that several mining companies operate within
Australia in a competitive environment, render support to the assumption that Australia is
rather a price taker in world commodity markets. Refer to Andrews (2009), Atkin and Connolly
(2013) and references therein for further discussion and ﬁgures.
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and timing of parameter changes. For each domestic variable at a time, I ﬁrst
perform Chow tests for parameter changes for every date in the 15− 85% window
of the sample period. The maximum test value is then compared to the critical
values presented in Stock and Watson (2002). Moreover, for each variable and for
the date the Chow test reaches the highest value, I again preform standard Chow
tests to investigate which parameter changes are signiﬁcant. This approach allows
me to identify both the most likely timing and type of the structural change. To
test for breaks in the variance of each variable, I use the maximum likelihood tests
described in Qu and Perron (2007), henceforth QP tests. These tests are also used
to investigate the timing and type of parameter changes for the multivariate case.
Finally, all the VAR speciﬁcations include either the commodity price index or
the world variables as exogenous regressors, as described in (4). For the QP tests,
only the speciﬁcation with the world variables is shown.
Univariate Chow tests with unknown date fail to show a signiﬁcant change in
parameters for the univariate speciﬁcation with only real GDP growth. On the
contrary, QP tests do ﬁnd a break around the end on 1983, notably in the standard
deviation. That year, as Australia suﬀered a sever recession in the aftermath the
of commodity boom of the late 1970s/early 1980s, a number of labour market
reforms aiming at curbing wage rise demands was set forth. These, together with
the ﬂoat of the exchange rate, can explain the date of the break.
Regarding CPI inﬂation, the three sets of tests detect a signiﬁcant change in
all parameters around the last quarter of 1990. Inﬂation targeting was oﬃcially
announced in the beginning of 1993. But as Macfarlane (1997) explains, the
transition to inﬂation targeting had begun much earlier. In fact, the RBA initiated
the practice of announcing changes to the cash rate in as early as January 1990,
with the inﬂation target of 2−3% starting to appear in oﬃcial statements already
in 1992. Considering the changes in the intercepts and VAR coeﬃcients for the
nominal exchange rate, Chow tests ﬁnd a break between 1993 and 1995, depending
on the VAR speciﬁcation. However, QP tests ﬁnd a signiﬁcant break in the
univariate VAR already during the third quarter of 1984, a few quarters after the
ﬂoat was oﬃcially announced.
Interestingly, when the QP test is done for the multivariate VAR, which includes
all domestic variables, a structural break is detected in the last quarter of 1990.
Instead, if only breaks in Σe are allowed, then the date is anticipated to the be-
ginning of 1984. One interpretation, consistent with the diﬀerences in parameter
estimates for each of the two sub-samples determined by the QP tests, is that the
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ﬂoat of the nominal exchange rate was determinant for the stabilization of the
Australian economy. By buﬀering foreign shocks more eﬃciently and, therefore,
reducing the volatility of domestic variables, the impact of the ﬂoat is seen dir-
ectly on second moments more than on the structure of the domestic economy.
On the other hand, the parameter changes caused by the implementation of in-
ﬂation targeting appear to be more noted in terms of VAR coeﬃcients, i.e., on
the economic inter-relations within the domestic block. All things considered,
the end of the commodity price boom in the early 1980's together with the ﬂoat
of the exchange rate in 1983, on the one hand, and the beginning of inﬂation
targeting in the early 1990's, on the other hand, appear to be highly relevant in
explaining the ﬁndings reported in Table 2. As I discuss in the next subsection,
the timing of these events is also relevant for the interpretation of the MS regimes.
Identiﬁcation of structural shocks: The scheme I use to identify terms-
of-trade shocks follows that of JS11. In particular, I decompose movements in
Australia's terms of trade into three diﬀerent types of shocks. To achieve this,
I impose SR to the impulse responses of the variables in the world block on the
quarter the shock impacts these variables. The SR scheme is depicted in Table 4.
In the table, a + (−) denotes a positive (negative) response of the respective
variable, whereas na implies that no restriction has been imposed. pix stands for
export price inﬂation, pim for import price inﬂation, and ∆yw is the growth rate
of Australia's trading partners.
Following the order in Table 3, a world demand shock is assumed to represent an
aggregate demand shock from Australia's major trading partners, which pushes
up prices and economic activity. Given that the bundle of exported and imported
goods and services might diﬀer, the price index for exports and imports need not
move by the same magnitude. In any case, both prices move upwards in response
to an increase in aggregate demand. As in Australia commodities represent a
large share of total exports, this shock captures the evolution of commodity prices
associated with the global business cycle.
On the other hand, a commodity-market shock intends to capture an increase
in the price of Australian exports resulting from an increasing demand for Aus-
tralian natural resources. Unlike a world demand shock, the causes for the rise
in commodity prices can be traced to, for instance, a decrease in the supply of
commodities elsewhere or an increase in ﬁnancial investment in commodities. The
shock can also be due to an increase in precautionary demand for commodities
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caused, for example, by an increase in the perceived uncertainty regrading the
forecasted evolution of commodity prices. World economic activity is assumed
not to pick up, excluding this to be the source of the increase in commodity
prices.
Finally, a globalization shock is interpreted as an expansion of Emerging Markets'
economic activity. This is characterized by an increase in Australian export prices,
at the same time as the price of imports falls. JS11 interpret this type of shocks
to be linked to the increasing role these countries have come to play in world
trade. First, as these countries grow, their demand for bulk commodities increases,
pushing up prices. On the contrary, the increase in industrial production at
relatively competitive prices, puts downward pressure on prices of a range of non-
commodity tradeable goods. Given the composition of Australian exports and
imports, the combination of these price movements results in an improvement in
the terms of trade.
As discussed, and although the notation may be misleading, all three shocks im-
ply an increase in commodity prices.21 Clearly, movements in Australia's terms
of trade alone, or their absence, can fail to reveal important developments in the
commodity market. Distinguishing the underlying causes for these developments
can, in turn, be relevant both empirically and for policy. It is therefore of para-
mount importance to identify the causes for the swings in commodity prices and
compare the impacts of diﬀerent shocks on the Australian economy.
2.3.3 MS States and Parameter Estimates
The ﬁnal task before turning to the estimation of (1) is to decide the number
of MS states S. Table 5 presents the values for the AIC, BIC and HQC criteria
for a linear VAR and MS-VARs with two to four MS states. For each criteria,
the minimum value is preferred.22 The values associated with the linear VAR are
merely illustrative.23 Considering the univariate speciﬁcation with only real GDP
growth, all criteria give preference to the most parsimonious MS-VAR. However,
when the complete block of domestic variables is considered, only the BIC supports
the choice of S = 2, whereas S = 3 is preferred by the AIC and HQC criteria.
21The labeling of the shocks was kept unchanged for ease of comparison with the literature.
22Refer to footnote 16 and references therein regarding the use of penalty criteria to guide the
choice of S.
23Krolzig (1997) explains why comparing a MS-VAR with S > 1 to a linear VAR is not a
simple task due to the existence of the nuisance parameter under the null of S = 1.
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The results for the univariate speciﬁcations for domestic inﬂation and the nominal
exchange rate, which can be found in Table 6, are useful to explain these ﬁndings.
For instance, for the case of inﬂation, the AIC prefers 4 states, whereas the other
two criteria choose 2 states. For the exchange rate, the AIC and the HQC choose 4,
with the BIC picking 3 states. Hence, the reason behind the preference for S = 3
in the multivariate speciﬁcation seems to be due to the inclusion of inﬂation and
the exchange rate. This is particularly obvious for the AIC and HQC criteria,
which are more sensitive and tend to pick a higher number of states for these two
variables. For the BIC, the choice of S = 2 clearly dominates.
Notwithstanding the fact that Table 5 only partially supports the choice of S = 2,
it seems wise to opt for the most parsimonious of the MS models for three
rather practical reasons. The ﬁrst regards the number of parameters to be estim-
ated. With some speciﬁcations allowing all parameters (including the variance-
covariance matrix) to be state-dependent, a smaller number of states greatly im-
proves the quality of the estimates. Secondly, and related to this, is the relatively
short sample available. This is due to the world block, and in particular to the
indicator for economic activity of Australia's major trading partners, for which a
larger sample is not available. Again, the higher the number of states, estimation
tends to be poorer when the sample size remains ﬁxed. The third reason is due
to interpretation. Having more than two states greatly complicates the derivation
of an economic interpretation to each state.
After choosing the lag-length, p = 1, and the number of MS states, S = 2, I es-
timate model (1) through maximum likelihood performed using the EM algorithm
described in the Appendix. Figure 5 and Figure 6 present the estimated smoothed
probabilities of state 1, along the sample period, for various speciﬁcations. The
ﬁrst panel of Figure 5 shows the smoothed probabilities for the univariate speciﬁc-
ation using real GDP growth only. The speciﬁcation in the second panel includes
the complete domestic block. For the each speciﬁcation, I ﬁrst experiment with
all parameters of the VAR to be time-dependent. These include the intercept α,
the VAR coeﬃcients AWD and ADD, and the variance-covariance matrix Σe. I
then investigate the drivers for the smoothed probabilities. Firstly, by only allow-
ing Σe to be state-dependent. Secondly, by allowing α and Σe to change in time.
Figure 6 explores the eﬀects on the estimated smoothed probabilities of including
inﬂation and the nominal exchange rate in the domestic block.
Across all speciﬁcations, state 1 clearly prevails during the ﬁrst part of the sample,
giving way to state 2 at diﬀerent dates and sometimes with episodic recurrences.
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The date when state 2 replaces state 1, which I denote by transition date, and
the occurrence of episodic recurrences of state 1 depend on which variables are
included in the domestic block and which set of parameters are state-dependent.
Considering ﬁrst the univariate speciﬁcation for real GDP growth, the transition
date is found to occur in late 1983. This is broadly consistent with the evidence
reported in Table 3. When only Σe is time-dependent, there are no recurrences,
whereas if α or all parameters are state-dependent as well, state 1 peaks around
1990 and 1997. This renders support to the claim that Σe is behind the transition
in 1983. Looking at the estimated variance of the residuals on the real GDP
equation, I ﬁnd that Σe is around 5 times higher in state 1 compared to state 2.
Two tentative hypothesis seem plausible. First, the ﬂoat of the nominal exchange
rate in 1983. As explained above, a ﬂoating exchange rate tends to isolate domestic
activity from foreign shocks, thereby stabilizing total output. Second, the labour
market reforms that begun being introduced in the early 1980s. In particular, the
phasing out of wage indexation in 1980, the accord on wages and competitiveness
of 1983, and the implementation of a more decentralized wage-setting system
in the early 1990s. These reforms may have rendered output more resilient to
sectoral wage swings and, consequently, also more resilient to foreign shocks. Yet,
it is worth investigating the remaining panels before conclusions are drawn.
The implications of adding consumer price inﬂation and changes in the nominal
exchange rate to the domestic block are twofold. Firstly, the transition date tends
to be postponed to the end of 1990. When other parameters besides Σe are state-
dependent, the transition date occurs in late 1990. However, when Σe is the only
state-dependent parameter, the transition date falls back to 1983, with state 1
emerging again around 1990. This leads me to conclude that the transition in
1983 is mostly driven by the real GDP series. The same can be said about the
recurrence in 1990. In fact, and analyzing Figure 3 once more, it seems that
state 1 is absorbing the periods of higher GDP volatility, which can be broadly
matched to the probabilities displayed in speciﬁcation 5) in Figure 5. In addition,
the transition in 1983 does not seem to be driven by the nominal exchange rate
either. In fact, whenever real GDP growth is included in the domestic block, the
transition happens in late 1983, as can be seen in Figure 6, speciﬁcations 2) and
3). On the contrary, as depicted in speciﬁcation 4), when only the two nominal
variables are included, 1990 clearly dominates over 1983.
Secondly, the two states become more stable and with less recurrences. State
recurrences only tend to happen when real GDP growth is added to the domestic
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block. However, as shown in Figure 6, they are slightly diﬀerent depending on
which nominal variable pairs real GDP. Together with the time-series of the nom-
inal variables, Figure 4 marks the episodes the inﬂation rate fell outside the RBA
oﬃcial target band and when the RBA intervened in the foreign exchange market
after 1983.24 When inﬂation pairs GDP growth in speciﬁcation 2), some recur-
rences match the dates when inﬂation was outside of the oﬃcial band (around
1997, 2001 and late 2008, although the peak in 2001 appears barely unnoticed).
Regarding speciﬁcation 3), the recurrences after 1983, with the exception of the
one around 2005, coincide with oﬃcial interventions in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. Interestingly, none of these recurrences remain when the two nominal vari-
ables enter the domestic block, as in speciﬁcation 4) in Figure 5 and 4) in Figure 6.
The inclusion of pid and ∆s partly justiﬁes the composition of the domestic block.
On the one hand, including these two variables avoids state 1 recurrences. This
facilitates the economic interpretation of the MS regimes, since interpreting a
once-and-for-all transition is clearly easier than interpreting multiple state trans-
itions along the sample period. On the other hand, however, the new transition
date does not render such a clear cut interpretation as the one in 1983. As adding
more variables necessarily makes interpretation more complex, I chose to keep
only these three and rely on the state-dependent parameter estimates to gather a
better sense of the economics behind the 1990 transition date.
A brief note regarding the choice of the inﬂation series I use before turning to the
parameter estimates. Unlike the remaining speciﬁcations, the inﬂation series used
under speciﬁcation 1) in Figure 6 does not account for the tax reform package
introduced in 2000. As a result, and comparing with speciﬁcation 4) in Figure 5,
using this measure leads to the emergence of a recurrence of state 1 around the
year 2000. If the tax reform is taken into consideration, and the measure of
inﬂation is cleared from the GST hike, this peak vanishes completely. This is why
I chose not to use the original CPI inﬂation measure.
Table 7 presents the estimates for α, AWD, ADD, and Σe, for both MS states, under
speciﬁcation 4) in Figure 5. Starting with the analysis of α and Σe, I ﬁnd that the
average of real GDP growth is lower and the variance of the respective residuals
considerably higher in state 1. After 1993, Australia has been experiencing a
long cycle of continuous growth, immune to the major global slumps such as
the Asian ﬁnancial crises of 1997 or the dot-com crash of 2000. In turn, CPI
24From the ﬂoat in 1983 to 1989, there are no episodes oﬃcially dated, although interventions
occurred often.
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inﬂation is, on average, higher in state 1 and with more volatile residuals. This
can be explained by the fact that, since the drop in 1990, as Figure 4 shows,
inﬂation has remained low compared to historical levels and ﬂoating around the
RBA's target band. Lastly, although the volatility of the residuals of the exchange
rate equation does not change much, its intercept changes sign. As depicted in
Figure 4, during the period state 1 dominates, the nominal exchange rate traces a
prolonged depreciation. On the contrary, it appreciates, at a lower pace, in state
2. It is important to note that the nominal exchange rate used in the estimation is
a trade-weighted index of bilateral exchange rates and that the Australian dollar
was pegged to the US dollar alone from 1971 to 1974. Moreover, although the
Australian dollar was pegged to the trade-weighted index in 1974, as shown in
Figure 4, the hard peg was replaced by a crawling peg in 1976. This can shed
light to the small diﬀerences found in the volatility of the residuals of the exchange
rate equation across states.
Regarding the estimates for AWD and ADD, a complete interpretation of state dif-
ferences is less straight-forward, specially in a multivariate context. Nevertheless,
most estimate changes, and notably those relating to the persistence coeﬃcients
and to the coeﬃcients on lagged domestic inﬂation, corroborate the discussion
held so far. It is also worth noting that the state probabilities, and hence their
interpretation, do not depend on having AWD and ADD changing across states,
as shown in Figure 5.
These ﬁndings are all consistent with a transition to a more ﬂexible regime, where
inﬂation is maintained lower and both output growth and prices remain more
stable. Clearly, associating the beginning of inﬂation targeting, which as discussed
earlier started in the early 1990s, with the transition to state 2 is tempting. How-
ever, I prefer to complete this association with the two other reforms I have alluded
to. In fact, both the transition from an exchange rate peg to inﬂation targeting
and the gradual implementation of labour market reforms provide, together, a
more complete and coherent description of the smoothed state probabilities and
parameter estimates just discussed.
2.3.4 Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition
Once model (1) is estimated, I draw a number of orthogonal matrices P˜k and
compute the corresponding impulse responses. If the SR described in Table 4
are satisﬁed, P˜k is stored. When 2.000 draws are stored, the algorithm stops.
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Under the various speciﬁcations I have experimented with, the acceptance rate was
around 10% of all draws. In the following ﬁgures, I report the point-wise median
response of the accepted draws and the 16th − 84th percentiles. As proposed by
Fry and Pagan (2011), I also show the median target model. In general, I ﬁnd
that the latter does not diﬀer much from the median response.
Figure 7 presents the impulse responses of the world variables to the three terms-
of-trade shocks. The ﬁgure makes the SR from Table 4 notorious. Apart from the
response of import price inﬂation, pim, to a commodity-market shock, which is left
unrestricted, all the remaining responses are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero as
imposed by the SR. The responses of export price inﬂation, pix, to world demand
and globalization shocks, and of foreign economic growth, ∆yw, to a commodity-
market shock take longer to vanish. Nevertheless, after the shock all variables
adjust within no more than 5 quarters.
Recall from (3) that the world block is a standard linear VAR. Consequently, the
responses of the world variables are time-invariant. I investigate the robustness
of this assumption by estimating model (3) for a sub-sample running from 1981
to 2010, as in JS11. Comparing Figure 7 and Figure 8, which plots the impulse
responses under this sub-sample, unveils virtually no diﬀerences. Apart from the
response of import price inﬂation to a commodity-market shock, which inverts its
sign abruptly around the second quarter after impact, the homogeneity between
the two ﬁgures is reassuring of the time-invariability of the world block.25
Figure 9 and Figure 10 present the impulse responses of the domestic variables
for each of the two MS states. After a world demand shock, Australia's real
GDP growth rises. This is true in both states, despite the response in state
2 appearing considerably milder. On the contrary, an increasing demand from
Australia's trading partners has opposite eﬀects on domestic inﬂation depending
on the state. Before 1990, a world demand shock reduces inﬂation, while after
that date it becomes inﬂationary. As discussed below, these ﬁndings point to an
increasing coordination between Australian and global business cycles. Lastly, I
ﬁnd that the nominal exchange rate appreciates around 2% in both states, a ﬁgure
consistent with JS11.
Considering commodity-market shocks, I ﬁnd they are detrimental to real output.
The contraction is more accentuated in state 1, reaching its trough 3 quarters after
impact and causing a rise in inﬂation. In state 2, the eﬀects are again substantially
25Figure 7 and the responses obtained after estimating (3) for a sub-sample from 1971 to 1980,
not shown in this paper, look even more alike.
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milder, with almost no impact on inﬂation. The dismal performance of output
is not contradicted by JS11, and is also found in Charnavoki and Dolado (2014)
for the case of Canada.26 These eﬀects can be due to the existence of adjustment
costs following an increase in commodity prices. Notably, the contraction in state
1 is in line with the discussion regarding labour market rigidities. In particular,
due to the wage-setting framework before 1990, Australia found it diﬃcult to gain
competitiveness in world markets and to avoid the recession. Alternatively to this
interpretation, the slowdown of real output growth can be the result of spillover
eﬀects from the deceleration of Australia's major trading partners.
This shock has particular relevance for policy. In fact, despite the improvement in
the terms of trade, policy needs to monitor carefully the underlying causes of the
rise in commodity prices. With a global contraction, an increase in commodity
prices seems not to be enough to sustain output. In these circumstances, and in
particular during state 2, for which inﬂation remains nearly unchanged after the
shock, some policy loosening might be warranted to stimulate growth.
Finally, a globalization shock happening before 1990 has a clear positive eﬀect
on output and an equally clear negative eﬀect on inﬂation. Both eﬀects last
for around three quarters. With export prices picking up while import prices
fall (which include prices of intermediaries used by Australian industries), output
growth is stimulated. On the contrary, as the fall in import prices is detrimental to
domestic tradeable producers, they struggle to thrive against foreign competition.
Hence, the positive eﬀect on total output of higher export prices might be eclipsed
by the negative impact of cheaper imports. This can explain the very little eﬀects
on domestic variables observed in state 2. The nearly mute response of inﬂation
is also in line with empirical evidence of a declining pass-through of import prices
to domestic inﬂation.27
The previous ﬁgures have shown impulse responses computed under the assump-
tion that the shocks do not aﬀect state probabilities. In other words, I have
assumed that there is a probability equal to 1 of a given state being prevalent
on impact and throughout the time of the response. This is the approach used
by Ehrmann, Ellison and Valla (2003). However, and following the discussion in
Camacho and Pérez-Quirós (2013), it might be that the estimated state probab-
ilities are inﬂuenced by the shocks. Figure 11 reports these non-linear impulse
responses. The responses are computed at the end of the transition from state 1
26Charnavoki and Dolado (2014) link these eﬀects to the Dutch disease literature.
27Refer to Chung et al. (2011) and references therein.
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to state 2 in 1992. For ease of comparison, I report the previous (linear) impulse
responses as well. All impulse responses are for the median target model, P˜mt.
As shown in Figure 5, state 2 occurs with probability 1 in 1992. Considering ﬁrst
a world demand shock, it appears that the shock has no signiﬁcant impact on
the estimated state probabilities. Therefore, the non-linear impulse responses are
essentially the same as the ones under the assumption state 2 prevails with prob-
ability 1. On the other hand, the responses to a commodity market shock and to
a globalization shock present noticeable diﬀerences. Although displaying roughly
the same shapes as the responses under state 2 being ﬁxed, their magnitudes are
higher. This seems counter-intuitive. The explanation simply lies on the impact
the shocks have on state probabilities. As these shocks increase the probability
of state 1, which would be nearly zero otherwise, the diﬀerences between the ex-
pected value of the domestic variables with and without the shock become larger.
As a result, both the commodity-market and the globalization shocks have more
pronounced eﬀects around 1992, when the small open economy may be induced
to return to state 1.
Table 8 presents the last set of results. The table reports the variance decom-
position of the domestic variables under the median target model and allows me
to investigate whether the explanatory signiﬁcance of each shock, in terms of the
volatility of the domestic variables, changes between states. Recall that, although
model (5) has n + d equations, I only identify n structural shocks, leaving the
remaining d shocks without an economic interpretation. These unspeciﬁed shocks
are grouped under the banner domestic shocks in Table 8.
Before 1990, more than 10% of real GDP growth volatility is due to the identiﬁed
shocks to Australia's terms of trade. Among these, globalization shocks appear to
be the most relevant. The same is true for domestic inﬂation. Interestingly, world
demand and commodity-market shocks explain more than half of the volatility of
the nominal exchange rate, with globalization shocks accounting for less than 10%.
Comparatively, in state 2 the share of the variance of real GDP growth explained
by the same shocks is more than halved, in line with evidence from the impulse
responses. Instead, world demand shocks account for a considerably larger share
of the ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and in the nominal exchange rate. The case for
inﬂation is particularly striking, with a change from 4.5% in state 1 to 23% in
state 2. Also worth mentioning is the fact that the identiﬁed shocks account for
a smaller share of the volatility of the nominal exchange rate in state 2 compared
to state 1.
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These results deserve a few notes. First, world demand shocks represent the bulk
of terms-of-trade shocks to the Australian economy. This ﬁnding, although not
contradicting JS11, is more obvious here. The increasing importance of these
shocks can be attributed to the relative reduction in the importance of the re-
maining shocks, as the overall volatility is lower in sate 2 (see Table 7). However,
its considerable importance after 1990 deserves a careful examination. On the
one hand, the increasing sensitivity of inﬂation to exogenous pressures can be
due to the number of free-trade agreements and other trade accords Australia
started to promote since the 2000s. Less tariﬀs and restrictions on trade imply
less control over foreign market conditions, and therefore could explain the sig-
niﬁcant increase in Australia's synchronization to global business cycles. On the
other hand, it could point out to some lack of control by the RBA when facing
world demand shocks. As pointed out by Plumb et al. (2013), forecasts of Aus-
tralia's terms of trade made by the RBA tended to under-predict the extent of the
commodity price boom since 2005. These under-predictions of Australia's terms
of trade can explain a relatively poorer management of domestic inﬂation, spe-
cially when compared to a relative improvement in dealing with other inﬂationary
pressures.
Second, commodity-market shocks have lost importance. One interpretation is
that demand for Australian commodities has been driven by the expansion of for-
eign economies and not due to precautionary factors or disruption in the supply
of commodities by other exporting countries. In fact, the expansion of China and
of Southeast Asia has been reﬂected in the markedly increase in these countries'
shares of Australia's commodity exports. Therefore, after 1990, it appears to
be economic growth, rather than precautionary motives, the driver behind the
increase in demand for Australian commodities and the consequent rise in com-
modity prices.
Third, the idea that globalization shocks are a recent reality with the opening
of China and India to world trade ﬁnds no empirical support. At least, shocks
that assume a reduction in import price inﬂation while export prices grow are
relatively less important after 1990. In fact, in state 2, and in line with JS11,
globalization shocks are the less important of the three identiﬁes shocks.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I design an empirical model suitable to compare the transmis-
sion of exogenous shocks to a small open economy subject to structural change.
In particular, I contribute to the empirical literature by proposing a framework
that guarantees the comparability of diﬀerent structural shocks across time. This
consistency gain is of paramount importance. On the one hand, comparing the
transmission of the same shock between diﬀerent dates allows me to explore the
implications of structural change. In the literature, structural change within an
economy is found to be an important factor accounting for diﬀerences in the trans-
mission of exogenous shocks. On the other hand, a careful identiﬁcation of shocks
avoids misleading conclusions. A growing strand in the literature is unveiling the
distinct consequences of seemingly similar shocks. By using a robust identiﬁca-
tion, I am able to single out speciﬁc shocks and make sure that the diﬀerences
across time are indeed compared under the same shock. I therefore combine two
powerful econometric tools into a consistent framework that isolates the diﬀer-
ences in the transmission of shocks caused by endogenous structural change from
those implied by diﬀerent exogenous shocks.
I provide an application of the model using Australia as an illustrative example.
As a small commodity-exporting economy, Australia is highly exposed to com-
modity price shocks. I use SR to distinguish diﬀerent commodity price shocks
based on their underlying causes. I identify three types of shocks: a world de-
mand shock, a commodity-market shock, and a globalization shock. With regards
to structural change, I ﬁnd a once-and-for-all regime transition occurring around
1990. Moreover, I ﬁnd that this transition appears to match relatively well the
consequences of major institutional reforms in Australia, such as the ﬂoat of the
exchange rate, the ﬂexibilisation of the wage-setting system, and inﬂation target-
ing.
Comparing the impulse responses of real GDP growth, inﬂation, and changes
to the nominal exchange rate, I ﬁnd that structural change alters the way the
identiﬁed shocks propagate to the economy. Before 1990, real GDP growth reacted
more to the three shocks and had a slower adjustment, while it has a milder
and quicker response to the same shocks after the transition. Moreover, positive
terms-of-trade shocks are only inﬂationary after 1990 and as a reaction to a world
demand shock. Otherwise, inﬂation appears almost immune to shocks after that
date. This is in clear contrast with the eﬀects found before the transition.
89
The less exacerbated responses to the shocks and the quicker adjustments of real
GDP growth after the transition are in line with the ﬂexibilisation of the labour
market, notably the wage-setting decentralization that occurred during the 1990s.
Also, the more moderate responses of inﬂation are consistent with the move to
inﬂation targeting, as opposed to the nominal exchange rate management prac-
tised before the transition. Yet, it seems that the RBA has not been able to curb
inﬂation hikes due to world demand shocks.
The results found in this paper point out signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the way the
Australian economy has reacted to shocks to its terms of trade. These diﬀer-
ences illustrate how changes at the policy and institutional levels can aﬀect the
propagation of foreign shocks to the domestic economy. Moreover, they also in-
form policy-making by identifying how the economy reacts to commodity price
shocks that have diﬀerent underlying causes.
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2.5 Tables
Table 1: Weights used to build the Price Indices
Iron ore 32,7%
Metallurgical coal 16,4%
Thermal coal 8,4%
Gold 8,0%
LNG 6,0%
Crude oil 6,0%
Wheat 3,2%
Source: RBA.
Table 2: Granger Tests of Non-Causality
ComPI*
∆ydt cannot reject H0
pidt cannot reject H0
∆st signiﬁcance at 10%
[ ∆ydt pi
d
t ∆st ] cannot reject H0
World Block**
∆ydt cannot reject H0
pidt signiﬁcance at 1%
∆st signiﬁcance at 1%
[ ∆ydt pi
d
t ∆st ] signiﬁcance at 10%
*SDR. Using a nominal or a real index does not
alter the results. **Includes: Export and Import
prices in world prices, and an index of economic
activity of major trading partners. The inverse
non-causality is rejected.
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Table 3: Testing for Structural Breaks
Stock and Watson
ComPI* World Block**
∆ydt 1993Q4 (not) 1979Q2 (not)
pidt 1990Q4 (1%) 1990Q4 (1%)
∆st 1995Q3 (10%) 1993Q3 (1%)
Chow
ComPI* World Block**
∆ydt beta (1%) beta (1%)
pidt all (1%) all (1%)
∆st const (1%) all (1%)
Qu and Perron***
all beta variances
∆ydt 1983Q3 (1%) 1983Q3 (not) 1984Q1 (1%)
pidt 1990Q4 (1%) 1990Q4 (1%) 1991Q1 (1%)
∆st 1984Q3 (1%) 1984Q3 (not) 1984Q3 (1%)
[ ∆ydt pi
d
t ∆st ] 1990Q4 (1%) 1990Q4 (1%) 1984Q1 (1%)
*Commodity Price Index in SDR (using a nominal or a real
index does not alter the results). **Includes export and import
prices in world prices, and an index of economic activity of
major trading partners. ***Estimation and testing using Gauss
code provided by the authors. Speciﬁcation using World Block.
Table 4: Sign Restrictions
pixt pi
m
t ∆y
w
t D
world demand shock + + + na
commodity-market shock + na - na
globalization shock + - + na
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Table 5: Number of States
[ ∆ydt ]
log L AIC BIC HQC
VAR(1) -232,77 477,55 496,00 485,04
MS(2)-VAR(1) -197,92 423,83 466,89 441,31
MS(3)-VAR(1) -188,60 425,20 499,00 455,16
MS(4)-VAR(1) -176,90 425,80 536,50 470,75
[ ∆ydt pi
d
t ∆st ]
log L AIC BIC HQC
VAR(1) -682,24 1418,49 1501,52 1452,20
MS(2)-VAR(1) -777,63 1667,26 1839,47 1737,19
MS(3)-VAR(1) -707,06 1588,13 1855,67 1696,77
MS(4)-VAR(1) -705,47 1650,94 2019,96 1800,78
AIC = −2× logL + 2×K, BIC = −2× logL + K × log(T ),
and HQC = −2 × logL + 2 × K × log(log(T )); with K =
S × (S − 1 + l × k × (1 + k) + k × (k + 1)/2).
Table 6: Number of States (cont.)
[ pidt ]
log L AIC BIC HQC
MS(2)-VAR(1) -142,00 312,01 355,06 329,49
MS(3)-VAR(1) -127,71 303,42 377,22 333,38
MS(4)-VAR(1) -113,38 298,77 409,47 343,72
[ ∆st ]
log L AIC BIC HQC
MS(2)-VAR(1) -432,84 893,68 936,73 911,16
MS(3)-VAR(1) -407,32 862,64 936,45 892,61
MS(4)-VAR(1) -387,26 846,52 957,22 891,47
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Table 7: Estimates
AWD ADD
α pixt−1 pimt−1 ∆ywt−1 ∆ydt−1 pidt−1 ∆st−1
∆ydt 0,16 0,02 0,00 0,52 -0,13 0,03 -0,01
State 1 pidt 1,73 0,06 0,08 -0,14 -0,13 0,20 -0,09
∆st -1,03 0,26 0,30 -0,02 0,07 -0,26 -0,29
∆ydt 0,96 -0,01 0,02 0,04 -0,03 -0,17 -0,01
State 2 pidt 0,60 0,00 0,06 0,14 -0,11 0,00 -0,01
∆st 0,29 -0,50 0,43 0,58 0,68 -1,21 0,23
Σe
∆ydt 1,38
State 1 pidt -0,07 0,99
∆st 0,52 -1,35 14,99
∆ydt 0,34
State 2 pidt -0,02 0,12
∆st 0,46 0,26 15,18
Table 8: Variance Decomposition
State 1
∆ydt pi
d
t ∆st
World Demand 3,66% 4,26% 32,36%
Commodity Market 2,56% 1,31% 24,53%
Globalization 5,94% 7,48% 9,68%
Domestic shocks 87,84% 86,95% 33,42%
State 2
∆ydt pi
d
t ∆st
World Demand 3,12% 22,85% 35,13%
Commodity Market 1,20% 0,60% 8,30%
Globalization 1,68% 1,78% 5,78%
Domestic shocks 94,00% 74,77% 50,79%
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2.6 Figures
Figure 1: Commodity Price Indices
Source: RBA. Base = 100 in January 1986; quarterly averages.
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Figure 2: Export Shares
Source: ABS and author's calculations. Current values, free on board.
Figure 3: Real GDP Growth
Source: ABS. Chain volume measures.
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Figure 4: CPI Inﬂation and Nominal Exchange Rate
Source: ABS and RBA.
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Figure 5: Smoothed Probabilities of state 1
Figure 6: Smoothed Probabilities of state 1, cont.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses: World Block full sample
Median response (black line); Median target response (blue line), 16% − 84%
percentile range (grey area).
Figure 8: Impulse responses: World Block from 1981Q1
Median response (black line); Median target response (blue line), 16% − 84%
percentile range (grey area).
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Figure 9: Impulse responses: State 1
Median response (black line); Median target response (blue line), 16% − 84%
percentile range (grey area).
Figure 10: Impulse responses: State 2
Median response (black line); Median target response (blue line), 16% − 84%
percentile range (grey area).
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Figure 11: Non-linear impulse responses, 1992Q1
State 1 (black line); State 2 (blue line), Non-linear (red line).
101
2.7 Appendix
Implementation of sign restrictions: Σe is a real symmetric matrix with posit-
ive entries. Using Cholesky decomposition, Σe can be expressed as Σe = CC′ , where
C is lower triangular. Therefore, making A−10 = C ensures that the structural shocks
are orthogonal and with standard deviations normalized to unity. Nevertheless, this
decomposition might not satisfy Table 1. A way to overcome this is to obtain an ortho-
gonal matrix P˜ and setting A−10 = CP˜ . Given that P˜ P˜ ′ = I, it must also be true that
CP˜ P˜ ′C′ = A−10 A′−10 = Σe.
In order to search over possible P˜ satisfying both the exogeneity restrictions for the
world block and the SR depicted in Table 1 is to proceed as follows. Deﬁne H a random
matrix with non-negative real entries of the form
H =
[
H1n×n 0n×d
0d×n H2d×d
]
(8)
For any given random draw of H (the entries of H1n×n and H2d×d are randomly drawn
from a N (0, 1) distribution), employ a QR decomposition and deﬁne H = QR, with
R a lower triangular matrix and Q an orthogonal matrix. Make P˜ = Q, compute the
impulse response functions and check whether the SR are satisﬁed.
The EM algorithm: The EM algorithm is a two steps process. First, it estimates the
conditional probabilities of the latent state to take a value at each point in time. Second,
it maximizes the likelihood of the time series (using the probabilities just estimated)
and ﬁnds the maximum likelihood estimates of the model's parameters Θ (the VAR
coeﬃcients Γj , the covariance matrices Σ,j , and the transition probabilities). It is an
iterative algorithm, repeating the two steps until the maximum likelihood estimates are
constant between two consecutive iterations. Here, the ﬁrst step is presented. For the
computation of the maximum likelihood estimates refer to Krolzig (1997).
From (4), the conditional density the observation Dt is
f (Dt|st = j, Yt−1; Θ) = (2pi)−
d
2
∣∣∣Σ−1j ∣∣∣ 12 exp{−12 (Dt − ΓjZt)′Σ−1j (Dt − ΓjZt)
}
(9)
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which is stack in ηt for each state st
ηt =

f (Dt|st = 1, Yt−1; Θ)
...
f (Dt|st = s, Yt−1; Θ)
...
f (Dt|st = S, Yt−1; Θ)

(10)
Denote ξt|t−1 the vector of conditional state probabilities
ξt|t−1 =

P {st = 1|Yt−1; Θ}
...
P {st = s|Yt−1; Θ}
...
P {st = S|Yt−1; Θ}

(11)
which are the inferences about the value of st based on data obtained through date t−1
and knowledge of Θ. With these two deﬁnitions, Hamilton (1994) shows that
ξt|t =
(
ξt|t−1  ηt
)
1′S
(
ξt|t−1  ηt
) (12)
ξt+1|t = Pξt|t (13)
where  denotes the element-by-element multiplication and 1S a S × 1 vector of ones.
The sample log likelihood can be obtained as
L (θ) =
T∑
t=p+1
log (f (Dt|Yt−1; θ)) (14)
with f (Dt|Yt−1; θ) = 1′S
(
ξt|t−1  ηt
)
A relevant quantity is ξt|T (j) = P (st = j|YT ; Θ), the smoothed inference about the
state at t given the information of the whole sample. This is obtained through iterating
ξT−j|T = ξT−j|T−j 
{
P′
[
ξT−j+1|T  ξT−j+1|T−j
]}
(15)
for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , p + 1, and is started with ξT |T obtained from (15) at t = T .
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One other quantity of interest is ξt−1,t|T which can be computed as
ξt−1,t|T (i, j) =
pjiξt−1|t−1 (i) ξt|T (j)
ξt|t−1 (j)
(16)
where ξt−1,t|T = P (st = j, st−1 = i|YT ; θ) is the probability that state j occurred at
t after state i had occurred at t − 1, given data observed through the full sample of
observations.
The starting value ξ1|0 = ρ is set to ρ = 1S1S , together with random values for Θ. To
initiate iteration g, the initial values are set as
ρ = ξ1|T (17)
pij =
∑T
t=p+2 ξt−1,t|T (i, j)∑T
t=p+2 ξt−1|T (i)
(18)
Γ′s = Γˆ
′
s (19)
Σs = Σˆs (20)
obtained from iteration g−1 (Γˆ′s and Σˆs are, respectively, the estimated coeﬃcients and
covariance matrices).
MS impulse responses: When the domestic block can transit between more than
one state, that is, when S > 1, the computation of state-dependent impulse responses
becomes more sophisticated. Following Camacho and Pérez-Quirós (2013), a naïve ap-
proach is taken by considering that only one shock hits the system, at time t, and
compute the responses for an horizon H. That is, apart from the shock at time t, no
other shocks occur before nor after. Denote ξt|k a S×1 vector with the inferred probab-
ilities of state s to prevail at time t, given the information available up to period k, and
Dt+h|t a d × S matrix whose entries are the estimated values of the domestic variables
for each state (computed directly from the estimated version of (4)). The unconditional
h-period ahead forecast of the domestic variables, given the information available at
time t, is denoted by Dft+h|t and equal to Dt+h|tξ
f
t+h|t, where ξ
f
t+h|t = P
hξt|t.28
Therefore, it is crucial to compute the vector ξt|t: the probabilities of each state at
28Dft+h|t is an d × 1 vector with the expected values of the domestic variables, computed as
the sum of the within state forecasts weighted by the probability of the corresponding state to
occur.
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the beginning of response. When no shocks hit the system, ξt|t coincides with ξt|T ,
the smoothed inference about the state at t given the information of the whole sample.
When a shock hits the system at time t, the vector of probabilities is denoted by ξ∗t|t
and has to be inferred from η∗t and ξt|t−1. The latter can be obtained directly from
the EM algorithm, since it is assumed that no shock occurred before time t, while η∗t
is computed using the estimated value of the domestic variables Dft|t plus the shock for
each state. Finally, ξ∗t|t is obtained from
ξ∗t|t =
(
ξt|t−1  η∗t
)
1′S
(
ξt|t−1  η∗t
) (21)
with 1′S a vector of ones of dimension S. Finally, the impulse responses are obtained as
Υt = D
f∗
t+h|t −Dft+h|t (22)
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Chapter 3
Monetary Policy and Sectoral
Relative Wage Rigidity
Keywords: labour market rigidity; search-and-matching; terms-of-trade shocks;
commodity prices; monetary policy.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E24, E52, F41, J64.
Sydney, December 2014
3.1 Introduction§
As with any other price, wages are a fundamental piece of market construction.
They match demand and supply, signal changes in market conditions to economic
agents and promote the eﬃcient allocation of labour services. Wages are particu-
larly important. They are a direct determinant of households' disposable income,
§Parts of this chapter were completed during my PhD internship at the Reserve Bank of
Australia (RBA) in the last quarter of 2014. I am grateful to Dan Rees for his support during
my stay at the Bank. The views I express here do not necessarily represent those of the RBA
or its staﬀ.
thereby aﬀecting households purchasing power and living standards. Moreover,
as labour services are indispensable in virtually any economic activity, wages are
also a key determinant for production and economic competitiveness. Unlike most
prices, however, wages are typically prevented from being formed purely by market
forces. Most current arguments for mediation of wage formation, usually super-
vised by governmental entities, lie on the exact same causes that make wages a
special price: their importance for household's living standards and for economic
competitiveness. Contrary to market forces, the argument goes, centralized wage
setting smooths undesirable wage variation, both in time and across segmented
sectors of the economy, balances asymmetric negotiation powers between employ-
ers and employees and internalizes equity considerations ignored in decentralized
systems.
In this paper, I study the implications of sectoral relative wage rigidity for the
conduct of optimal monetary policy in a small commodity-exporting economy.
When wages in one sector increase relative to wages elsewhere, all else equal,
labour supply tends to shift to the former. This reallocation of resources across
the economy occurs insofar as sectoral labour services are close substitutes. In an
economy with no slack, these movements cause a contraction elsewhere. Moreover,
as long as relative wages remain disparate, households' income also varies across
sectors. To avoid these outcomes, which might be deemed socially or politically
undesirable, wage-setting mediation may ﬁnd appropriate to curb movements in
sectoral relative wages.
For a small commodity-exporting economy, commodity prices have a considerable
inﬂuence on economic performance. The sizeable share the resource sector rep-
resents both in terms of total output and of total exports makes these countries
highly dependant on swings of commodity prices. Figure 1 reports the deviations
from trend of commodity-price indexes for four commodity-exporters, illustrat-
ing how large and volatile commodity price shocks are. As with any country,
commodity price shocks aﬀect real activity and inﬂation insofar as commodities
constitute intermediate goods in production or are used for consumption. In ad-
dition, commodity-exporters are also aﬀected through the resource reallocation
spurred by commodity price shocks. Crucially, this last eﬀect depends on the
wage-setting framework in place.
Consider an increase in commodity prices which triggers an expansion of the
commodity sector. This induces a rise in relative wages awarded in the resource
industry and leads to the reallocation of labour across the economy. At the same
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time, the shock generates an income eﬀect and induces an appreciation of the
exchange rate. As the increase in relative wages shifts supply away from the non-
commodity sectors and the appreciation of the exchange rate reduces competitive-
ness of domestic tradeables both at home and abroad, the non-commodity sector
contracts. If labour markets are ﬂexible and labour is perfectly substitutable
between sectors, relative wages adjust and labour is eﬃciently allocated. How-
ever, if labour markets are segmented and wage-setting is centralised, commodity
price shocks can cause ineﬃcient labour market movements across the economy.
Several commodity-exporters have experienced the consequences of centralized
wage-setting arrangements.1 Table 1 presents a number of indices that character-
ize the wage-setting framework for the same group of countries in Figure 1. In
Canada, wage formation is highly decentralized, generally taking place at industry
or ﬁrm level, whereas in Norway wages are negotiated at the national level. In
Australia and New Zealand, labour market reforms have reduced the extent of
wage-setting centralization, with sectoral and ﬁrm level negotiations being pro-
gressively encouraged. In these countries, sectoral relative wage diﬀerentials have
grown since.
Do these diﬀerences in wage formation aﬀect employment, production and inﬂa-
tion? Do they matter for the conduct of monetary policy? Assume that wages
in the non-commodity sectors are forced to accompany the rise in wages in the
commodity sector. For non-commodity industries, a rise in commodity prices and
wages raises total costs and shrinks proﬁt margins. As non-commodity tradeables
face increasing competition from foreign producers, the rise in production costs is
felt particularly painfully. Moreover, if labour markets are segmented and relative
wages sticky, low labour mobility together with sectoral upward wage pressures
cause severe losses in output and employment. On the other hand, as production
falls and ﬁrms pass wage pressures on to prices, inﬂation starts going up. If these
eﬀects are strong enough, the shock becomes inﬂationary despite the impact the
appreciation of the exchange rate has in reducing import prices. Therefore, un-
derstanding the mechanisms behind the transmission of commodity price shocks
is of paramount importance to the design of optimal monetary policy. Should
these inﬂationary pressures be curbed by the monetary authority? Can monetary
policy mitigate the eﬀects of sectoral relative wage rigidity?
1For Australia, which constitutes the illustrative example used in this paper, refer to the
descriptions of the commodity boom in late 1970s/early 1980s in, for instance, Pagan (1987),
Battellino (2010), and Connolly and Orsmond (2011).
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In order to address these questions, I construct a general equilibrium model of a
two-sector, small commodity-exporting economy with segmented labour markets.
The commodity sector is directly exposed to exogenous commodity price shocks,
as the bulk of commodity output is exported. The remaining small share of
domestically-extracted commodities is used in the production of non-commodity
tradeable goods. Labour services can be transferred between the two sectors.
However, labour mobility is subject to frictions due to market segmentation. In
particular, new hires are subject to matching frictions which depend on the num-
ber of existing vacancies and the number of job seekers. These frictions can
generate a wedge in sectoral wages. I introduce relative wage rigidity in the non-
commodity sector by assuming that wages there are staggered and linked to the
evolution of wages in the commodity sector.
I calibrate the model to the Australian economy and show that, for a positive
commodity price shock that raises wages in the commodity sector, non-commodity
ﬁrms reduce output and their demand for labour more the higher the degree of sec-
toral relative wage rigidity. As ﬁrms internalise the degree of relative wage rigidity,
they anticipate upward wage pressures due to the expansion of the commodity sec-
tor, downsizing their hiring schedule in order to sustain proﬁt margins. Although
relative wage rigidity magniﬁes the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, the
increase in nominal wages forces inﬂation to rise. As nominal wages in diﬀerent
sectors are tightly related, sectoral shocks amplify movements of labour. With
segmented labour markets, labour reallocation is slow and ineﬃcient, generating
unemployment and inﬂation. As a result, I ﬁnd that for economies where relative
wages are slow to adjust, both inﬂation and unemployment are more volatile.
I derive a micro-founded welfare measure and study how monetary policy should
respond to inﬂation under diﬀerent levels of sectoral relative wage rigidity. I
study simple feedback rules to the nominal interest rate and show that a stronger
response to inﬂation for higher degrees of relative wage rigidity is optimal. In-
terestingly, however, comparing the optimal feedback rule with a zero-inﬂation
policy, I ﬁnd that the latter is comparatively worse when relative wages are less
ﬂexible. As sectoral nominal wages become less ﬂexible, price inﬂation smooths
the evolution of real wages by partially cancelling out nominal changes. Hence,
although still being optimal to respond more aggressively to price inﬂation, strict
inﬂation targeting is more detrimental the higher the degree of relative wage ri-
gidity. To shed light on these apparently opposing ﬁndings, I complement the
analysis using general loss functions to describe the preferences of the monetary
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authority. I show that, if the monetary authority's objective is to minimize price
and non-commodity output volatilities alone, the response to inﬂation needs to
be more aggressive for higher degrees of sectoral relative wage rigidity. Instead,
if the objective is to reduce price and unemployment volatilities, the response to
inﬂation should be milder for higher degrees of relative wage rigidity. This clearly
shows the trade-oﬀ between price and wage inﬂation volatility.
Literature: Erceg et al. (2000) provide a seminal contribution to the study
of wage stickiness in a general equilibrium framework and study the trade-oﬀ
between price and wage inﬂation for monetary policy. They establish that strict
price inﬂation targeting is not optimal, as I do here, and show that a simple rule
targeting both price and wage inﬂation performs nearly as well as the optimal rule.
Gertler and Trigari (2006) introduce staggered wage bargaining in a search-and-
matching framework, while Gertler et al. (2008) further include wage indexation
to past inﬂation. These features allow their model to ﬁt labour market data rel-
atively well. In a contemporaneous contribution, Thomas (2008) also introduces
staggered wages and search-and-matching frictions to a single-sector, closed eco-
nomy model to investigate its implications for monetary policy. He shows that
optimal monetary policy puts more weight on wage inﬂation as nominal wages
become stickier. Yet, monetary policy is unable to fully oﬀset the detrimental
eﬀects of wage stickiness on welfare. My paper complements this literature by
generalizing its ﬁnding to a multi-sector, small open economy. In addition, I ex-
tend the literature by focusing on the implications of relative wage rigidity for the
conduct of monetary policy.
The hump-shape hypothesis conjectured by Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) consti-
tutes a central piece within the literature on wage-setting centralization.2 They
establish that both extremes of no and full centralisation are conducive to real
wage moderation and lower unemployment in a closed economy. Their argument
also highlights the role of price inﬂation. For lower levels of centralisation, ﬁrms
are reluctant to accept wage rises because they are price takers and cannot adjust
margins. At industry level, wage rises become easier to secure as the whole in-
dustry can pass the extra costs on to prices. This is true insofar as the elasticity of
substitution between goods of diﬀerent industries is low. Finally, at the national
level trade unions internalise the eﬀects of nominal wage rises on prices, thereby
leaving real wages unchanged.
Driﬃll and van der Ploeg (1993) extend the analysis to an open economy and
2Calmfors (1993) provides a thorough review of the literature on the hump-shape hypothesis.
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ﬁnd that centralisation raises wages and unemployment. In their model, as wage
rises cause an appreciation of the exchange rate, the overall eﬀect on inﬂation is
negative. In a world where ﬁrms set prices as a mark-up over marginal costs, this
eﬀect seems contradictory. Instead, in the model presented here wage rises are
inﬂationary for higher degrees of sectoral relative wage rigidity. Cukierman and
Lippi (1999) study the implications of monetary policy in a model that preserves
the hump-shape hypothesis, and show that the response of monetary policy to
inﬂation depends on the degree of wage-setting centralization. If the monetary
authority cares about inﬂation and unemployment volatility, they ﬁnd that the
optimal response to inﬂation is milder for higher degrees of centralisation. In
the model used here, I extend these ﬁndings in a model of sectoral relative wage
rigidity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe the
model with a particular emphasis on the structure of the labour market and of
wage formation. In section 3, I derive the log-linear conditions that link wage-
setting to employment and output. Section 4 reports the calibration of the model.
I use Australia as an illustrative case study and base the parametrization on
previous studies. In addition, I use GMM to match the second moments of key
variables that are particularly relevant for the analysis of monetary policy. In
section 5, I study optimal monetary policy by comparing the welfare implications
of various policy rules under diﬀerent degrees of sectoral relative wage rigidity.
Section 6 complements this analysis by focusing on loss functions that depend
on inﬂation, non-commodity output, and unemployment volatilities. Section 7
concludes.
3.2 Model
The model described in this section extends the two-sector model of Hevia and
Nicolini (2013) by including segmented labour markets and search and matching
frictions. These features allow sectoral wages to diﬀer. Households direct their
job-search eﬀorts between the two sectors and sectoral wages are set through
Nash bargaining. In the non-commodity sector, besides search and matching
frictions, wages are sticky as in Thomas (2008). Each period, only a fraction of
wage contracts are optimally renegotiated. The remaining wage contracts follow
an exogenously determined indexation rule. This rule determines how sensitive
wages in the non-commodity sector are to the evolution of wages in the commodity
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sector.
3.2.1 Households
A large representative household composed of a continuum of measure 1 of agents
chooses the optimal bundle of domestic and foreign consumption goods and how
much labour services to supply to the two production sectors. As in Merz (1995),
household members are assumed to pool their income so that consumption is equal
regardless of work status. The household's lifetime utility is given by
U˜ = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u (ct)− l
(
nht , n
x
t
)}
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and ct = h
(
cht , c
f
t
)
is a composite
good made of domestic and foreign-produced goods. I assume h
(
cht , c
f
t
)
is a
function homogeneous of degree one and increasing in both arguments, while
u (ct) is increasing and concave. Household members can be either working or
unemployed
nt + ut = 1
where nt denotes total employment, and ut the number of unemployed members.
In turn, employed members work either in the non-commodity sector or in the
commodity sector, nt = nht + n
x
t , and derive disutility from work according to
l
(
nht , n
x
t
)
, which I assume is increasing in both arguments and convex. Finally,
unemployed members are also assumed to be directing their job-searching eﬀorts
in either one of the two sectors, ut = uht + u
x
t .
Household members can trade two risk-less nominal bonds, b˜t and b˜?t , denomin-
ated in domestic and foreign currency, respectively. They receive nominal wages
W ht and W
x
t from the non-commodity and commodity sectors, respectively, and
aggregate real net proﬁts Π˜t from ﬁrms. The household's budget constraint can
therefore be written as
ct +
pit+1
it
b˜t +
pi?t+1
i?t
qtb˜
?
t ≤
W ht
Pt
nht +
W xt
Pt
nxt + b˜t−1 + qtb˜
?
t−1 + Π˜t
where qt is the real exchange rate, pit and pi?t are domestic and foreign gross inﬂation
rates, and it and i?t are the gross nominal interest rates between periods t− 1 and
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t. Pt is the consumer price index and is obtained by maximizing ct subject to
Ptct = P
h
t c
h
t + P
f
t c
f
t . The solution to the households problem implies an Euler
equation of the form
u′ (ct) = βEt
[
it
pit+1
u′ (ct+1)
]
(1)
and the non-arbitrage between domestic and foreign bonds, which determines the
uncovered interest parity condition, is given by
it = i
?
tEt
[
pit+1
pi?t+1
qt+1
qt
]
(2)
3.2.2 Non-commodity Sector
The structure of the non-commodity sector comprises three types of ﬁrms. At
the start of the production chain, perfectly competitive wholesale ﬁrms produce
an intermediate homogeneous good that they sell to retail ﬁrms for the real price
ϕht . Wholesalers choose the optimal ratio of factor inputs and participate in the
bargaining process with workers in order to set wages. In turn, retailers are
monopolistic competitors who transform the homogeneous good into diﬀerenti-
ated goods. This gives them market power, which they use to ﬁx the price of
their product. However, I introduce price setting frictions and assume that not
all retailers are able to set prices optimally every period. Finally, perfectly com-
petitive ﬁnal ﬁrms buy the diﬀerentiated goods from retailers and produce a ﬁnal
composite good that is sold for consumption domestically and abroad.
Final ﬁrms: Final ﬁrms produce the ﬁnal good by aggregating non-tradeable
intermediate goods sold by a continuum of measure 1 of retailer ﬁrms indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1]. They do so using the following technology
Y ht =
[ˆ 1
0
y
hµ
h−1
µh
it di
] µh
µh−1
(3)
where µh > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Final
ﬁrms take as given the price of the ﬁnal good, P ht , as well as the prices of each
intermediate good, P hit . Solving for the optimal composition of intermediate goods
114
yields the demand function for retailer ﬁrm i
yhit = Y
h
t
(
P hit
P ht
)−µh
(4)
Substituting these into (4), I obtain the price of the ﬁnal good
P ht =
[ˆ 1
0
P h 1−µ
h
it di
]1/(1−µh)
which is a composite index of the intermediate prices.
Retail ﬁrms: Retailers buy intermediate goods produced by wholesale ﬁrms at
the perfectly competitive real price ϕht . In turn, as they have market power, they
can set the price P hit for which they sell their goods to the ﬁnal good producers.
However, they face price adjustment rigidities as in Calvo (1983), only being able
to adjust prices with probability (1− δp). As such, retailers solve
maxEt
∞∑
s=0
βt,t+s (δ
p)s
[
P hit
Pt+s
− ϕht+s
]
yhit+s
subject to (4), and where βt,t+s ≡ βsu′ (ct+s) /u′ (ct) is the stochastic discount
factor between t and t + s. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to P hit can be
expressed as
P h∗t
P ht
=
µh
µh − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 βt,t+s (δ
p)s ϕht+sY
h
t+s
(
Pht
Pht+s
)−µh
Et
∑∞
s=0 βt,t+s (δ
p)s Y ht+s
Pht+s
Pt+s
(
Pht
Pht+s
)1−µh (5)
Note that price setters behave symmetrically. Furthermore, using the expression
for the price index, I can write the evolution of P ht as(
P ht
)1−µh
= (1− δp) (P h∗t )1−µh + δp (P ht−1)1−µh (6)
where I used the fact that ﬁrms are randomly chosen to adjust their price. With
price dispersion, there is a real loss in terms of ﬁnal production. To see this,
I deﬁne yht ≡
´ 1
0
yhitdi and, using the demand functions for each retailer, obtain
yht = Υ
h
t Y
h
t , where Υ
h
t ≡
´ 1
0
(
P hit/P
h
t
)−µh
di ≥ 1 is an index of price dispersion.3
3Υht equals unity when all retailers practice the same price P
h
it = P
h
t , ∀i.
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Wholesale ﬁrms: At the core of the non-commodity sector is a continuum of
measure 1 of wholesale ﬁrms, which I index by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each of them produces
an homogeneous good with technology given by
yhjt = α
hZt
(
nhjt
)αh1 (xhjt)1−αh1
where αh =
(
αh1
)−αh1 (1− αh1)−(1−αh1), and Zt is a stationary technology shock
common to all ﬁrms. Wholesalers use domestic commodities, xhjt, and labour, n
h
jt,
as inputs to production. In order to hire new workers, they post vacancies, vhjt,
for which they incur a cost in terms of units of consumption. Hence, wholesale
ﬁrms solve
Fjt = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
u′ (ct+1)
u′ (c0)
(
ϕht α
hZt
(
nhjt
)αh1 (xhjt)1−αh1 − P xtPt xhjt − W
h
jt
Pt
nhjt
− ς
h
1 + ψh
1
u′ (ct)
(
vhjt
nhjt
)1+ψh
nhjt

with ψh > 0.4
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the domestic commodity can be expressed
in aggregate terms as
ϕht
(
1− αh1
)
αhZt
(
nht
xht
)αh1
=
P xt
Pt
(7)
Due to constant returns to scale in production, the input ratio is equalized across
ﬁrms.5 As a result, aggregate production from wholesalers is given by
yht = α
hZt
(
nht
)αh1 (xht )1−αh1 (8)
where nht =
´ 1
0
nhjtdj and x
h
t =
´ 1
0
xhjtdj.
4The choice of the functional form of hiring costs follows Thomas (2008) and is essentially due
to the fact that convex costs of vacancy posting prevent corner solutions. With nominal wage
stickiness, wage dispersion will induce dispersion in vacancy posting across ﬁrms. If hiring costs
were linear, marginal costs of posting vacancies would be equal across ﬁrms and only the ﬁrm
paying the lowest wage, and therefore having the highest marginal beneﬁt of posting vacancies,
would post vacancies.
5Deﬁning yht ≡
´ 1
0
yhjtdj, I can write y
h
t = α
hZt
(
nht /x
h
t
)αh1 ´ 1
0
xhjtdj.
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3.2.3 Commodity Sector
I follow the approach in Rayner and Bishop (2013) and take a broad deﬁnition
of the commodity sector. As such, I assume it to include not only the extracting
industry, but also the manufacturing industry that transforms raw commodities
into products that are traded as commodities, as well as all the supporting services
and industries closely related to mining activity. Moreover, because commodity
prices are largely determined in international markets, I assume that commodity
ﬁrms behave as price takers and have no market power over price setting. I denote
by P x?t the foreign currency price of domestically-produced commodities and by
P xt the producer nominal price. Assuming the law of one price holds, the real
price domestic ﬁrms face is then given by P xt /Pt = qtP
x?
t /P
?
t .
For simplicity, and given the discussion above, I consider a single representative
commodity ﬁrm producing commodity xt with the following technology
xt = At (n
x
t )
αx1 (9)
where At is a stationary technology shock speciﬁc to the commodity sector, and
0 < αx1 ≤ 1. As in Hevia and Nicolini (2013), labour is the only explicit factor in
production. The assumption behind αx1 < 1 relates to the existence of an implicit
factor in the mining industry, which is assumed to be ﬁxed and can be interpreted
as land.
The commodity ﬁrm posts vacancies in order to hire new workers in the next
period. However, as with wholesale ﬁrms, vacancy posting is costly, depending
on the ratio of vacancy posts, vxt , to total employees. Hence, the intertemporal
problem of the representative commodity ﬁrm can be expressed as
Ct = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
u′ (ct+1)
u′ (c0)
(
P xt
Pt
At (n
x
t )
αx1 − W
x
t
Pt
nxt −
ςx
1 + ψx
1
u′ (ct)
(
vxt
nxt
)1+ψx
nxt
)
with ψx > 0 governing the elasticity of vacancy posting. Finally, domestic com-
modities are sold to non-commodity producers and to export
xt = x
h
t + x
f
t
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3.2.4 Labour Market
In Hevia and Nicolini (2013), labour is fully mobile since labour services are per-
fectly substitutable between the two sectors. Consequently, the labour market
is homogeneous and a single nominal wage equalizes marginal productivities of
labour in both sectors. On the contrary, I assume here that the labour market
is segmented, allowing wages to diﬀer between sectors. To achieve this, I intro-
duce sectors speciﬁc search-and-matching technology and diﬀerent wage-setting
systems. In the non-commodity sector, wages are assumed to be sticky and to
follow an exogenous indexation rule linking wages there to the evolution of wages
in the commodity sector. Instead, in the commodity sector wages are ﬂexibly set
each period.6
The evolution of the labour force employed in sector s = h, x follows a law of
motion governed by two forces. First, an exogenous separation rate 0 < λs < 1,
determining the average duration of contracts between ﬁrms and workers. Second,
an endogenous matching rate ms (vst , u
s
t), which depends on a constant returns to
scale technology over aggregate sectoral vacancies, vst , and job-seekers, u
s
t . I as-
sume that new matches only become productive one period after being generated.
Furthermore, when deciding about the number of vacancy posts and in which
sector to search for a job, ﬁrms and the household take as given the sector-wide
matching rates. In turn, matching rates are a function of the aggregate labour
market tightness in each sector, which is given by the ratio of vacancies to job-
seekers. Hence, deﬁning the aggregate sectoral job-ﬁnding rate by ιst ≡ ms/ust ,
the evolution of household's employment in each sector can be expressed as
nst+1 = ι
s
tu
s
t + (1− λs)nst
Equivalently, deﬁning by νst ≡ mst/vst the hiring rate of each ﬁrm j in the non-
commodity sector and of the representative commodity ﬁrm, I can write the law
of motion of wholesale ﬁrm j's employment as
nhjt+1 = ν
h
t v
h
jt +
(
1− λh)nhjt
whereas the law of motion of employment in the representative commodity ﬁrm
6To motivate this assumption, refer to the discussion of the environment characterizing the
commodity sector had earlier and to D'Arcy et al. (2012) for evidence respecting Australia.
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is given by
nxt+1 = ν
x
t v
x
t + (1− λx)nxt
Households: Under the assumption of labour market segmentation, the repres-
entative household has to choose how many of its unemployed members to direct
to a speciﬁc sector in search for a job. In sector s, the worker surplus is given by
Hsjt =Wsjt−U st , where Wsjt is the asset value of being matched to ﬁrm j in sector
s and U st is the value of being unemployed in sector s. Hsjt is then given by
Hsjt =
W sjt
Pt
− κ
s
c−σt
− ιstEt
{
βt,t+1
ˆ 1
0
vsjt
vst
Hsjt+1dj
}
+ (1− λs)Et
{
βt,t+1H
s
jt+1
}
(10)
The worker surplus is the diﬀerence between the real wage earned and the disutil-
ity derived by being employed, adjusted to the future probability of being hired
elsewhere and the continuation value of remaining employed with ﬁrm j in sec-
tor s. As in Gomes (2012), optimality implies that there are no additional gains
from searching in one sector vis-à-vis the other. That is, Uht = Uxt must hold in
equilibrium, which is true if
ιhtEt
{
βt,t+1
ˆ 1
0
vhjt
vht
[
Hhjt+1
]
dj
}
= ιxtEt
{
βt,t+1H
x
t+1
}
(11)
Note that in (11), the expression with respect to the commodity sector is simpli-
ﬁed by the fact that only one representative ﬁrm is considered, whereas the future
value of being hired in the non-commodity sector depends on the distribution of
vacancies across the j ﬁrms.
Non-commodity sector: In the non-commodity sector, I assume that ﬁrms
can renegotiate wages with probability (1 − δw) each period. As a result, wages
are staggered and the bargaining between workers and ﬁrms becomes dynamic,
requiring present discounted valuations of future surpluses. This set-up follows
Thomas (2008) closely. However, I extend his model of staggered wages by in-
troducing wage indexation. When wages are not renegotiated, they are updated
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according to an exogenous indexation rule. Therefore, nominal wages in ﬁrm j in
period t+ k evolve according to
W hjt+k =
W h∗jt+k with probability 1− δwW h∗jt [∏ki=1 (piWt+i−1)]γw with probability δw (12)
where W h∗jt+k is the nominal wage that results from renegotiation in period t+ k,
and the term in square brackets is the indexation rule. As I discuss below, in this
paper the indexation rule is a proxy for sectoral relative wage rigidity.
With staggered wages, the worker surplus in a renegotiating ﬁrm can be written
as
Hh∗jt =
W h∗jt
Pt
− κ
h
u′ (ct)
− ιhtEt
{
βt,t+1
ˆ 1
0
vhit
vht
Hhit+1di
}
+
(
1− λh)Et {βt,t+1 [δwHhjt+1|t + (1− δhw)Hh∗jt+1]}
where the subscript |t indicates that ﬁrm j hasn't been able to renegotiate wages
since period t, whereas the superscript ∗ indicates that wages at time t in ﬁrm j
have been renegotiated. Integrating Hh∗it forward yields
Hh∗jt = Et
∞∑
k=0
βt,t+k
(
1− λh)k (δw)k
W h∗jt
[∏k
i=1
(
piWt+i−1
)]γw
Pt+k
− w˜hwt+k

+
(
1− λh) (1− δw)Et ∞∑
k=0
βt,t+k
(
1− λh)k (δw)k [Hh∗jt+1+k] (13)
with
w˜hwt+k =
κh
u′ (ct+k)
+ ιht+kEt
{
β
u′ (ct+k+1)
u′ (ct+k)
ˆ 1
0
vhjt+k
vht+s
Hhjt+k+1dj
}
On the other hand, the ﬁrm surplus for each j wholesaler is deﬁned as Jhjt ≡
∂Fhjt/∂nhjt, which can be written as
Jhjt = ϕ
h
t α
h
1
yht
nht
− W
h
jt
Pt
+
ψhςh
1 + ψh
1
u′ (ct)
(
vhjt
nhjt
)1+ψh
+
(
1− λh)Etβt,t+1Jhjt+1
where the ﬁrst term is the marginal product of labour and, as I have shown before,
is constant across ﬁrms. Firm j's surplus from employing one more worker is
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given by the diﬀerence between the marginal product of labour and the real wage,
adjusted by the marginal ease in hiring costs, which comes from relaxing labour
market tightness, and the continuation value of having one extra worker employed
in the future. When renegotiation occurs, the ﬁrm surplus can be expressed as
Jh∗jt = ϕ
h
t α
h
1
yht
nht
+
ψhςh
1 + ψh
1
u′ (ct)
(
vhjt
nhjt
)1+ψh
− W
h∗
jt
Pt
+
(
1− λh)Et {βt,t+1 [δwJhjt+1|t + (1− δw) Jh∗jt+1]}
and integrating it forward yields
Jh∗jt = Et
∞∑
k=0
βt,t+k
(
1− λh)k (δw)k
w˜fwt+k|t − W h∗jt
[∏k
j=1
(
piWt+j−1
)]γw
Pt+k

+
(
1− λh) (1− δw)Et ∞∑
k=0
βt,t+k
(
1− λh)k (δw)k [Jh∗jt+1+k] (14)
with
w˜fwt+k|t = ϕ
h
t+kα
h
1
yht+k
nht+k
+
ψhςh
1 + ψh
1
u′ (ct+k)
(
vhjt+k|t
nhjt+k|t
)1+ψh
For simplicity, I assume that new contracts follow a Nash-type bargaining rule
by which workers and ﬁrms share the combined surpluses according to ηhHh∗jt =(
1− ηh) Jh∗jt , where ηh ∈ (0, 1) is the bargaining power of ﬁrms. Using expressions
(13) and (14), W h∗jt is determined by
0 = Et
∞∑
k=0
βt,t+k
(
1− λh)k (δw)k
W h∗jt
[∏k
i=1
(
piWt+i−1
)]γw
Pt+k
− wh tarjt+k|t
 (15)
where
wh tarjt+k|t =
(
1− ηh) w˜fwt+k|t + ηhw˜hwt+k (16)
is the target wage. If wages were renegotiated every period, ﬁrms would do so in
a symmetric fashion. The resulting real wage would then be equal to the target
wage in (16), with the additional simpliﬁcation coming from the fact that all ﬁrms
would set an equal vacancy ratio vhjt/n
h
jt. However, due to wage dispersion, ﬁrms
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ﬁnd it optimal to adjust their vacancy posting according to the wage bill of existing
contracts. From the deﬁnition of Fj and the law of motion for employment in ﬁrm
j , the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to vhit is given by
ςh
(
vhjt/n
h
jt
)ψh
= νht Etβu
′ (ct+1) Jhjt+1
Using the deﬁnition of Jhjt, I can write ﬁrm j's job-creation condition as
ςh
u′ (ct)
(
vhjt
nhjt
)ψh
= νht Etβt,t+1

ϕht+1α
h
1
yht+1
nht+1
− Whjt+1
Pt+1
+ ψ
hςh
1+ψh
1
u′(ct+1)
(
vhjt+1
nhjt+1
)1+ψh
+
(
1− λh) ςh
νht+1
1
u′(ct+1)
(
vhjt+1
nhjt+1
)ψh

(17)
This expression demonstrates how wage dispersion across ﬁrms leads to disper-
sion in vacancy rates as well. Consequently, employment is also variable across
wholesalers.
Commodity sector: As commodity producers are perfectly competitive and
wages are ﬂexibly set each period, there is no wage dispersion within the com-
modity sector. As such, expression (10) collapses to
Hxt =
W xt
Pt
− κ
x
c−σt
+
(
1− λj − ιxt
)
Et
{
βt,t+1H
x
t+1
}
(18)
On the other side of the labour market, the real value of an existing match for
the representative commodity ﬁrm, the ﬁrm surplus, is deﬁned as Jxt ≡ ∂Ct/∂nxt .
This can be written as
Jxt =
P xt
Pt
αx1
xt
nxt
− W
x
t
Pt
+
ψxςx
1 + ψx
1
u′ (ct)
(
vxt
nxt
)1+ψx
+ (1− λx)Etβt,t+1Jxt+1
(19)
and has a similar interpretation to Jhjt.
Every period, the combined surpluses of workers and ﬁrms is maximized through
Nash bargaining over the nominal wage. This implies a sharing rule given by
ηxHxt = (1− ηx) Jxt , where ηx ∈ (0, 1) is the bargaining share of ﬁrms. Using the
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expressions (18) and (19), the real wage in the commodity sector is given by
W xt
Pt
= (1− ηx)
(
P xt
Pt
αx1
xt
nxt
+
ψxςx
1 + ψx
1
u′ (ct)
(
vxt
nxt
)1+ψx)
+ηx
(
κx
u′ (ct)
+ ιxtEt
{
βt,t+1H
x
t+1
})
Note how W xt /Pt is simply a weighted average of both the ﬁrm's and household's
surpluses, where the weight on each surplus is given by the respective bargaining
share ηx and 1− ηx.
The representative commodity ﬁrm also has to choose how many vacancies to post
each period. From the deﬁnition of C and the law of motion of labour for ﬁrms,
the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to vxt writes
ςx (vxt /n
x
t )
ψx = νxt Etβu
′ (ct+1) Jxt+1 (20)
Replacing Jxt in (20), I obtain the job-creation condition in the commodity sector
ςx
u′ (ct)
(
vxt
nxt
)ψx
= νxt Etβt,t+1

Pxt+1
Pt+1
αx1
xt+1
nxt+1
− Wxt+1
Pt+1
+ ψ
xςx
1+ψx
1
u′(ct+1)
(
vxt+1
nxt+1
)1+ψx
+ (1− λx) ςx
νxt+1
1
u′(ct+1)
(
vxt+1
nxt+1
)ψx

(21)
As matched vacancies in period t only become productive in t+ 1, at the margin,
the cost of posting a vacancy equals the expected beneﬁt of that vacancy being
matched. Moreover, using (20) together with the bargaining rule over nominal
wages, I can rewrite the equilibrium real wage as
W xt
Pt
≡ wx nasht = ηx
κx
u′ (ct)
+ (1− ηx) ς
x
u′ (ct)
vxt
uxt
(
vxt
nxt
)ψx
+ (1− ηx)
(
P xt
Pt
αx1
xt
nxt
+
ψx
1 + ψx
ςx
u′ (ct)
(
vxt
nxt
)1+ψx)
(22)
3.2.5 Foreign Sector and Market Clearing
Final ﬁrms in the non-commodity sector sell part of their production to house-
holds at home and export the rest. In equilibrium, market clearing in the non-
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commodity sector implies
Y ht = c
h
t + c
h?
t (23)
where cht denotes domestic consumption of the domestically-produced ﬁnal good,
and ch?t denotes foreign demand, which I deﬁne as
ch?t = K
h?
t
(
P h?t
P ?t
)−γh
(24)
with γh > 1. Foreign demand is a decreasing function of the foreign-currency
price of domestically-produced ﬁnal goods and is subject to exogenous demand
shocks, which I denote by Kh?t . As with commodity prices, I assume the law of
one price holds for non-commodity ﬁnal goods. Hence, domestic ﬁnal ﬁrms export
price is given by
P h?t
P ?t
=
1
qt
P ht
Pt
(25)
As discussed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), equilibrium dynamics in open
economy models with imperfect international ﬁnancial markets are not stationary.
As household members only have access to a risk-less bond denominated in foreign
currency, I induce stationarity by assuming that the interest rate on domestic
foreign assets is subject to a risk premium, which I deﬁne as
i∗t = i
∗
exp
(
−ψb
(
qtb
?
t
rgdpt
−B
)
+ ξbt
)
(26)
where rgdpt denotes total real output
rgdpt =
P ht
Pt
Y ht +
P xt
Pt
xft (27)
The foreign risk premium is a decreasing function of total net foreign assets held
by domestic agents, which I denote by b?t . The law of motion of net foreign assets
evolves according to
qtb
?
t−1 + tbt = qt
pi∗t+1
i∗t
b?t (28)
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where tbt is the trade balance of the small commodity-exporter
tbt =
P ht
Pt
ch?t +
P xt
Pt
xft −
P ft
Pt
cft (29)
One other feature of standard small open economy models is their inability to
match the volatility of the exchange rate presented in the data. Following Smets
and Wouters (2002) and Adolfson et al. (2007), I mitigate this problem by assum-
ing incomplete exchange rate pass-through in the import sector. In particular, I
introduce a continuum of measure 1 of monopolistic competitor import ﬁrms in-
dexed by i ∈ [0, 1] . As with non-commodity retailers, importers have market
power to set prices but are subject to nominal rigidity as in Calvo (1983). As
such, they import foreign goods at price qtP
f?
t and sell their imperfectly substi-
tutable intermediate goods to a ﬁnal aggregator ﬁrm at price P fit . Each period,
optimizing ﬁrms set their price according to
P f∗t
P ft
=
µf
(µf − 1)
Et
∑∞
s=0 β
s c
−σ
t+s
c−σt
(
δf
)s
qt+sc
f
t+s
(
P ft
P ft+s
)−µf
Et
∑∞
s=0 β
s c
−σ
t+s
c−σt
(δf )s
P ft+s
Pt+s
cft+s
(
P ft
P ft+s
)1−µf
where µf > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated intermediate
imported goods, and δf is the probability that import ﬁrms are not be able to
reset prices. As with the non-commodity price index P ht , the law of motion for
P ft is given by (
P ft
)1−µf
=
(
1− δf) (P f?t )1−µf + δf (P ft−1)1−µf (30)
where P f?t is the exogenous price of foreign-produced goods. Note from (30) that
incomplete pass-through implies a departure from the law of one price with respect
to import prices.
3.3 Implications of Nominal Wage Dispersion
Only a share of wholesale ﬁrms in the non-commodity sector is able to negotiate
wages with workers in a given quarter. Consequently, wages in each ﬁrm are
history dependent and vary according to the period they were last renegotiated.
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Furthermore, as shown above, wage dispersion causes vacancy posting to vary
across wholesalers as well, despite the fact that all wholesalers are able to adjust
their vacancy rates every period.
Dispersion of nominal wage and vacancy posting are particularly problematic
when it comes to derive equilibrium aggregate conditions. Although there is no
closed-form expression for all aggregate conditions in the set-up described in the
previous section, it is obviously intractable to account for a set of equilibrium
conditions for the continuum of wholesalers. Instead, in this section, I derive
ﬁrst-order log-linear approximations to the equilibrium conditions regarding the
non-commodity labour market and investigate the consequences of wage dispersion
in the aggregate. I show that each ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to adjust vacancies in a
tight relation to the wages they pay. Moreover, given that wage stickiness is
ineﬃcient, dispersion in vacancy rates is detrimental to labour allocation and
output.
3.3.1 Functional Forms
For ease of exposition of the derivations below and to fully acknowledge the im-
plications of the parametrization I chose, I ﬁrst report the functional forms I
consider throughout the remainder of the paper. The immediate utility function
is assumed to be given by
u (ct) =
c1−σt
1− σ
where σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The con-
sumption bundle ct = h
(
cht , c
f
t
)
is a CES function
h
(
cht , c
f
t
)
=
[
(αc)
1
γc
(
cht
) γc−1
γc + (1− αc) 1γc
(
cft
) γc−1
γc
] γc
γc−1
where αc denotes the home bias in consumption and γc is the elasticity of substi-
tution between domestic and foreign-produced consumption goods. Maximizing
ct subject to Ptct = P ht c
h
t +P
f
t c
f
t yields the demand for each type of consumption
good
cht = α
c
(
P ht
Pt
)−γc
ct and c
f
t = (1− αc)
(
P ft
Pt
)−γc
ct
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Substituting cht and c
f
t in h
(
cht , c
f
t
)
for the respective demands yields the deﬁni-
tion of the consumer price index
(Pt)
1−γc = αc
(
P ht
)1−γc
+ (1− αc)
(
P ft
)1−γc
(31)
In turn, I assume that the disutility from work is linear but let the disutility from
working in each particular sector to diﬀer
l
(
nht , n
x
t
)
= κhnht + κ
xnxt
Finally, the matching function in sector s = h, x is given by
mst = χ
s (vst )
s (ust)
1−s
where χs > 0 commands the matching eﬃciency, and 0 < s < 1 is the elasticity
of matches with respect to vacancies. The job-ﬁnding rates can then be expressed
as ιst = χ
s (θst )
s and the hiring rates as νst = χ
s (θst )
s−1, where θst ≡ vst /ust can be
interpreted as an index of labour market tightness. Also, denote by φsjt ≡ vsjt/nsjt
the vacancy rate in ﬁrm j. In what follows, I perform a change of variables from
vst /u
s
t and v
s
t /n
s
t to θ
s
t and φ
s
t to simplify the algebra.
3.3.2 Steady State
One important decision concerns the point around which to perform the log-linear
approximation. In this paper, I choose to log-linearise the model around the non-
stochastic eﬃcient steady state. Besides rendering the log-linear approximation
simpler, the appealing property of the eﬃcient steady state is that it allows me to
derive of a micro-founded quadratic welfare measure as well. As I discuss later,
some features of the model complicate the full derivation of the welfare criterion,
even around the eﬃcient steady state. Yet, it is useful to derive a benchmark
criterion.
There are three sources of nominal rigidities and four real rigidities that cause
the decentralised steady state to depart from its eﬃcient equilibrium. On the one
hand, price stickiness in the non-commodity sector, imperfect exchange rate pass-
through, and staggered wages all lead to real eﬃciency losses. As a result, I per-
form the log-linearisation around a zero-inﬂation (both price- and wage-inﬂation)
non-stochastic steady state. On the other hand, monopolistic competition in the
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non-commodity and import sectors and wage bargaining in the non-commodity
and commodity sectors also generate an ineﬃcient steady-state allocation. The
following two assumptions oﬀset these ineﬃciencies.
Assumption 1: Non-commodity and importer retailers have their sales subsid-
ised at a rate τ l = 1/(µl − 1) for l = h, f . These subsidies are raised through
lump-sum taxation. 
Assumption 2: The Hosios condition is satisﬁed in both sectors: ηs = s for
s = h, x. 
Monopolistic competition introduces a mark-up between prices and marginal costs
equal to µl/
(
µl − 1), which is oﬀset by τ l since (µl/ (µl − 1)) (1/ (1 + τ l)) = 1.
On the other hand, and following Hoisos (1990), equalizing the bargaining share
of ﬁrms to the elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies delivers eﬃcient job
creation.7
3.3.3 Log-linear Conditions
For any variable hit, let hˆit ≡ log
(
hit/h
)
be the log deviation of hit from its eﬃcient
steady state h . For variables with cross-sectional dispersion, deﬁne hˆt ≡
´ 1
0
hˆitdi
its cross-sectional average. For prices and wages, small letters denote real variables
and caps denote nominal, that is pit = P
i
t /Pt. The proofs of the propositions below
can be found in the appendix.
In what concerns the nominal rigidity in the non-commodity and import sectors,
the following Phillips curves summarize the aggregate behaviour of price setters.
Proposition 1: Price inﬂation in the non-commodity sector is given by
pˆiht =
(1− βδp) (1− δp)
δp
{
ϕˆht − pˆht
}
+ βEtpˆi
h
t+1 (32)

7These two assumptions are standard in the New Keynesian and the search and matching
literatures, respectively.
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Proposition 2: Price inﬂation in the import sector is given by
pˆift =
(
1− βδf) (1− δf)
δf
{
qˆt + pˆ
f∗
t − pˆft
}
+ βEtpˆi
f
t+1 (33)

The wedge between the real price and marginal costs induced by nominal rigidity
in prices is made explicit by expressions (32) and (33) . Without nominal frictions,
all ﬁrms would be able to adjust their price. That would be the case if δl −→ 0 ,
l = p, f , and would give rise to ϕˆht = pˆ
h
t and pˆ
f
t = qˆt + pˆ
f∗
t .
Considering the equilibrium conditions for wage-setting and vacancy posting in
the non-commodity sector, recall expressions (13) to (17) in the previous section.
In the next four propositions, I derive a log-linear approximation for the average
real wage and vacancy rate in the non-commodity sector. I start by deriving the
relationship between vacancy rates and wages for each wholesale ﬁrm:
Proposition 3: The vacancy rate in each wholesale ﬁrm j is given by
φˆhjt = φˆ
h
t −
βδwλhυh
(1− βδh)ψh (1 + ψh) %h
(
wˆhjt − wˆht
)
(34)
where %h ≡ ςh (φ¯h)1+ψh n¯h/ ((1 + ψh) c¯−σrgdp) is the total hiring costs in the
non-commodity sector υh ≡ whnh/rgdp is the share of non-commodity labour. 
Expression (34) shows that the relative vacancy rate posted by ﬁrm j is negat-
ively correlated with the relative wage it pays. In other words, ﬁrms post higher
vacancy rates when the wages they pay their workers is below the average wage.
In aggregate terms, the log-linear approximation of the job-creation condition,
expression (17) in the previous section, is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 4: The aggregate job-creation condition in the non-commodity sec-
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tor is given by
(
1 + ψh
)
%h
βλh
(
ψhφˆht +
(
1− h) θˆht ) = Et

(
υh − αh1Q1
)
σcˆt+1 − υhwˆht+1
+αh1Q1
(
ϕˆht+1 + yˆ
h
t+1 − nˆht+1
)
+
(
1 + ψh
)
ψh %
h
λh
φˆht+1
+
(
1 + ψh
) (
1− λh) (1− h) %h
λh
θˆht+1

(35)
where Q1 ≡ phY h/rgdp is the share of non-commodity gross value added to real
GDP. 
Expression (35) is similar to the log-linear approximation of the job-creation con-
dition for the commodity sector, except for the fact that wˆht+1 6= wˆh nasht+1 , as I
show below.8 Up to a ﬁrst-order approximation, wage stickiness distorts eﬃcient
job creation by introducing a gap between the average real wage and the eﬃcient
Nash real wage, as in Thomas (2008).
Before deriving an approximation for the average real wage in the non-commodity
sector, suppose that all renegotiating ﬁrms strike the same wage agreementW h∗it =
W h∗t . From (17), wage symmetry implies symmetry in vacancy rates φ
h
it, which
further implies symmetric wage targets wh tarit+s|t = w
h tar
t+s|t and veriﬁes my initial guess
that W h∗it = W
h∗
t . With this, and since renegotiating ﬁrms are chosen randomly,
the average nominal wage across ﬁrms evolves according to
W ht = (1− δw)W h∗t + δwW ht−1
(
piWt−1
)γw (36)
The similarity between the wage target wˆh tart and the ﬂexible Nash wage is easily
noticed in expression (16). Denoting by wh nasht the real wage that results from a
ﬂexible Nash equilibrium, the wage target is given in the next proposition:
Proposition 5: The target wage in the non-commodity sector is given by
wˆh tart = wˆ
hnash
t +
ι¯h (1 + Λ) β
(1− (1− λh) βδw)
δw
(1− δw)
(
γwpˆi
W
t − Etpˆiwht+1
)
(37)
where Λ ≡ (1− h) βδwλh/ (1− βδw) and wˆhnasht is the log-linear equivalent of
8The Nash wage in the non-commodity sector is analogous to the Nash wage in the commodity
sector, and would be obtained if wage bargaining in the non-commodity sector occurred every
period.
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expression (22) for the non-commodity sector. 
In expression (37), pˆiwht+1 denotes wage inﬂation, which is given by
pˆiwht+1 = wˆ
h
t+1 − wˆht + pˆit+1
where wˆht is the average wage in the non-commodity sector and pˆit+1 is the con-
sumer price inﬂation rate. As Proposition 5 demonstrates, the gap between wˆh tart
and wˆhnasht comes from the dispersion in wages, which arises in expression (16)
through the dispersion in vacancy rates. This is a crucial insight. Due to the dis-
persion in vacancy posting, the nominal wage ﬁrms negotiate with workers departs
from the eﬃcient wage rate that would otherwise arise if all ﬁrms could negotiate
wages every period. From (37), if δw −→ 0, both wages become equal. Moreover,
as shown in (37), the gap between wˆh tart and wˆ
hnash
t is due to two factors. On the
one hand, the dispersion in wages, which comes about through the expected nom-
inal wage inﬂation term Etpˆiwht+1. On the other hand, the indexation rule, which
shows up through expression γwpˆiWt .
Finally, using (36) and (37), the log-linear approximation of expression (15) is
given in the proposition below:
Proposition 6: The average wage in a staggered wage economy is given by
pˆiwht − γwpˆiWt−1 =
1− β (1− λh) (δw)
1 + Λ
1− δw
δw
(
wˆhnasht − wˆht
)− β (1− λh) δwγwpˆiWt
+β
(
1− λh
(
1− θ¯
h
φ¯h
))(
Etpˆi
wh
t+1 − γwpˆiWt
)
(38)

As all non-commodity ﬁrms would choose the Nash wage whnasht were they able
to renegotiate wages every period, the actual average wage in the non-commodity
sector can also be expressed as a deviation from the Nash wage whnasht . Note,
however, that this deviation is now not due to expected future wage inﬂation
only. As clearly shown in (38), the average wage in the non-commodity sector
depends on both current and future wage inﬂation, as well as past and present
indexation.
Nash-bargaining over wages implies that workers and ﬁrms share the combined
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surplus of the newly created match. As such, both parties will only agree to a
contract such that each receives a non-negative surplus. Otherwise, one of the
parties is better-oﬀ walking away. With ﬂexible wages, the sharing rule guaran-
tees positive surpluses to both parties, as the resulting ﬂexible wage is simply a
weighted average of both surpluses. However, this is not necessarily true when
wages are staggered. In order to have both surpluses non-negative, the real wage
in any given ﬁrm j at any given period t must lie between the reservation wages
of workers and ﬁrms whjt ∈
[
rwjt, r
f
jt
]
, with
 rwjt = whjt −Hhjtrfjt = Jhjt + whjt
If whjt is to fall outside the bargaining set, the economic rational for the employ-
ment contract in ﬁrm j is broken, distorting the equilibrium in the non-commodity
labour market. Following the approach in Thomas (2008), I inspect whether wages
fall outside the bargaining set by analysing a subset of ﬁrms that have not been
able to renegotiate wages for a relatively long period of time. In particular, I
focus on the 1% of ﬁrms that have the oldest wage contracts, which implies those
with wage contracts last negotiated at least 9 quarters ago.9 I then simulate
the model under the calibration discussed in the next section, and check whether
whjt|t−9 ∈
[
rwjt, r
f
jt
]
, where whjt|t−9 is the updated wage paid at time t to workers in
ﬁrms that last negotiated wages 9 periods ago.
Figure 2 plots whjt|t−9 and the respective reservation wages for the cases of zero
and full indexation, γw = 0, 1. When there is no wage indexation, employment
relationships are never broken for at least 99% of wholesale ﬁrms. However, with
full wage indexation, real wages fall short of the reservation wage of workers for
2% of the simulated quarters. Although the occurrence of negative surpluses in
continuing employment contracts represents a caveat of the model, the number
of times this occurs is relatively small and only for large enough values of γw .
The increase in the volatility of reservation and real wages for higher values of
γw, as shown in Figure 2, provides a good insight on the transmission of sectoral
shocks. As I explain below, when γw = 1 , wages in the non-commodity sector
9The share of ﬁrms that last bargained over wages k periods ago is given by (δw)
k
(1− δw).
The share of ﬁrms with wage contracts older than T periods is then given by 1 −∑T
k=0 (δ
w)
k
(1− δw). With δw = 0.60, the minimum T such that the share of ﬁrms with
contracts older than T is less than 1% is T = 9.
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are updated based on the wage inﬂation in the commodity sector. As a result,
sectoral relative wage rigidity raises the volatility of wages in the non-commodity
sector. Crucially, it also raises the deviations between average wages and their
eﬃcient level, resulting in ineﬃcient real output and unemployment volatilities.
Wage indexation is not the only link between the two sectoral labour markets. As
labour markets are segmented, workers need to consider the labour market tight-
ness and the future beneﬁt of being employed in a given sector when deciding
where to search for a job. As such, directed search implies a non-arbitrage condi-
tion, expression (11) derived above, for which Proposition 6 derives a ﬁrst-order
approximation:
Proposition 7: The no-arbitrage condition that results from directed search is
given by
θˆht + ψ
hφˆht − Ξ
δw
(1− δw)
(
Etpˆi
wh
t+1 − γwpˆiWt
)
= θˆxt + ψ
xφˆxt (39)
with Ξ = λhβ (1 + Λ) υh/
(
1− (1− λh) βδw) (1− ηh) (1 + ψh) %h. 
Expression (39) shows that the choice of where to search for a job depends on the
diﬀerence in sectoral labour market tightness, corrected by the respective vacancy
rates. In fact, when wages are fully ﬂexible (that is δw −→ 0) and the curvature
of hiring costs is symmetric (ψh = ψx), a relatively higher vacancy rate in one
sector implies a lower market tightness, with household members intensifying their
directed search in that sector. Importantly, wage stickiness also creates a wedge
in (39), distorting the allocation of labour between the two sectors.
3.4 Calibration and GMM
3.4.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model to a quarterly frequency and report the parameter values in
Table 2. I ﬁrst assign values to important steady state ratios to match Australian
long-run averages and pick carefully the parameters governing the labour market
based on previous studies for Australia. In some cases, this ﬁrst step pins down
important parameters. Finally, I base the calibration of the nominal rigidities on
previous literature.
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For simplicity, and without loss of generality, net foreign assets are set equal
to zero. This implies Q3 ≡ c/rgdp = 1. According to estimates by Rayner
and Bishop (2003), the resource sector accounted for 18% of total nominal gross
value added and 9.75% of employment in 2011/12, the year commodity prices
peaked. In terms of ﬁnal demand, they estimate that around 70% of production
of commodities was exported. However, this is net of commodity imports, which
are absent from the model. Based on these ﬁgures, I set Q1 ≡ phyh/rgdp = 0.85
and xf/x = 0.80, implying Q2 ≡ pxx/rgdp = 0.19. Moreover, I set rgdp = 1, and
obtain Z = 0.92 and A = 0.38, which are the scale parameters in each sector's
production function. The price of commodities is set to px = 1.2, the real exchange
rate is normalized to 1, and so is pf . From (31), it follows that ph = 1 as well.
I follow Jääskela and Nimark (2011) and set the share of domestically-produced
goods in consumption, αc, to 0.8, the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods, γc, to 1.3, and the price elasticity of exports, γh, to 1.4.
I consider an unemployment rate of 6% in steady state, which is broadly in line
with the Australian long-run trend since the adoption of inﬂation targeting in
1993. Moreover, I assume that employment in the commodity sector accounted
for 5% of total employment, which implies nh = 0.89. From the time series of
vacancies reported by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) since 2009, I
set the vacancy rate to φ
h
= 0.02 and φ
x
= 0.03. Also following evidence for
Australia, wages in the commodity sector are assumed to be 20% higher than in
the non-commodity sector. Having set the relative weight of both sectors and
the relative employment shares, the share of labour in production in the non-
commodity sector is obtained from (6) and equals αh1 = 0.96.
Following Thomas (2008) and assuming symmetry between sectors, I set the bar-
gaining power of ﬁrms to ηs = 0.60, the curvature parameter of hiring costs to
ψs = 1, for s = h, x, and set hiring costs to represent 1% of the gross value
added in each sector. As in Sheen and Wang (2012), the separation rate in the
non-commodity sector is λh = 0.1, implying an average job tenure of 2.5 years.
D'Arcy et al. (2012) calculate the average job tenure in Australia to be around 7
years. However, the distribution of job tenures has a very long tail, with the mode
being closer to 2.5 years. This number seems to be a more appropriate bench-
mark. D'Arcy et al. (2012) also show that the job turnover is signiﬁcantly higher
in the commodity sector compared to the rest of the economy. For that reason, I
assume λx = 0.25. Using the two wage equations and equation (11), evaluated at
the steady state, it follows that sectoral labour disutilities diﬀer, with κx = 0.82
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and κh = 0.66. Hence, wages are higher in the commodity sector not only because
job tenure there is shorter, but also because disutility is higher.10
Matching eﬃciencies are obtained from the two job-creation conditions, resulting
in χh = 3.33 and χx = 3.78. Using these values together with the aggregate law of
motion of employment in each sector, I obtain θ
h
= 0.36 and θ
x
= 0.14. Finally,
I rearrange the wage equation in the commodity sector and obtain αx1 = 0.30.
The marginal productivity of labour in each sector can then be computed from
αh1Q1/n
h and αx1Q2/n
x, resulting in 0.92 and 1.13, respectively. Although the
matching eﬃciency in the commodity sector is higher, the labour market is tighter,
with relatively less vacancies to job-seekers. In fact, commodity ﬁrms seem to
ﬁnd optimal to post less vacancies and hire less workers in order to sustain higher
productivities. By doing so, they can aﬀord paying higher wages compared to the
non-commodity sector.
In the context of the model, the high volatilities of some international variables,
namely the exchange rate and commodity prices, tend to contaminate the volat-
ility of domestic variables as well. The simplicity of the model is partly to blame.
In fact, Jääskela and Nimark (2011) and Sheen and Wang (2012) use habits in
consumption, capital accumulation and investment adjustment costs to slow down
the transmission of foreign shocks. As none of those real rigidities are included
here, I rely on stronger nominal rigidities to match domestic volatilities empir-
ically. For instance, regarding the parameter governing price stickiness in the
non-commodity sector, I assume that prices are updated once a year on average,
as opposed to 3 quarters as in Jääskela and Nimark (2011) and Sheen and Wang
(2012). Both studies also estimate import prices to be updated in less than a year
on average. However, to prevent the volatility of the exchange rate from spreading
to the domestic variables, I set δf = 0.9.11 Finally, I set δw = 0.65 so that wages
adjust around every 3 quarters.12
10Jobs in the mining industry are typically located in remote areas, require relatively long
periods of absence from home, include shift-work and can be physically and emotionally de-
manding.
11Matching the volatility of the exchange rate is important for the policy analysis preformed
in the next sections. With δf = 0.75, and keeping the volatility of consumption and domestic
inﬂation unchanged, the standard deviation of the exchange rate drops from 5.6 to 3.5.
12Adolfson et al. (2007) estimate wages to adjust every 10 months, while Thomas (2008)
assumes one year based on evidence for the US. On the other hand, Jääskela and Nimark (2011)
and Sheen and Wang (2012) estimate adjustments to take place every 5.5 to 7.5 months on
average. Hence, my calibration lies in between these values.
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3.4.2 Matching Second Moments
There are 6 exogenous shocks in the model: two sectoral technological shocks, a
risk premium shock, a monetary policy shock, an exogenous process for foreign
inﬂation and one for the foreign price of commodities. Except for monetary policy
shocks, which are i.i.d. innovations, all remaining shocks are assumed to follow an
AR (1) process. I follow Hevia and Nicolini (2013) and assume that the technology
shocks have the same persistence but are uncorrelated. Therefore, I set to ρz =
ρa = 0.96. For the persistence of the foreign shocks, I use the HP-ﬁlter on the
logarithm of the real commodity price index for Australia, demean the foreign
inﬂation series and run two univariate auto-regressions, obtaining ρx = 0.80 and
ρpi? = 0.38. For the persistence of the risk premium, I choose ρb = 0.75, which
falls within the rage of values used in the literature. Similarly to Adolfson et
al. (2007), I ﬁnd that ρb is determinant to control the impact of exchange rate
volatility on the volatility of consumption. The value chosen here allows me to
match both volatilities relatively well.
I pin down the values for the standard deviation of the shocks by matching the
theoretical standard deviations of important domestic variables to their empirical
counterpart. As the study of optimal monetary policy in the next section relies
on the impact of policy on the second moments of the model's variables, these
should compare reasonable well to actual ﬁgures. I use a GMM approach to
ﬁnd the values of the standard deviations of the shocks for which I obtain the
best match between model and data volatilities. I use quarterly employment and
national accounts series from the ABS, from 1993Q1 to 2014Q4. These series are
already seasonally adjusted. The inﬂation rate is from the RBA and excludes
the interest and tax changes of 1999. The real exchange rate is the real trade-
weighted index computed by the RBA. Foreign inﬂation is also obtained from
the RBA. For the international prices of Australian commodities, I use the RBA
commodity price index denominated in US dollars. Except for the inﬂation rates,
which were simply demeaned, I ﬁltered the logarithm of the remaining series using
the HP-ﬁlter.13
Table 2 presents the results.14 I use both the entire sample, which starts after
13The results do not change signiﬁcantly using a BP-ﬁlter or a one-sided HP-ﬁlter instead.
14The ﬁrst-order log-linear approximations to the equilibrium conditions of the model were
coded in Matlab. I used Klein's toolkit to obtain the model's solution. The GMM routine
has also been coded on Matlab, for which I have used parts of existing code developed by
Ruge-Murcia (2007).
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inﬂation targeting was oﬃcially announced in the ﬁrst quarter of 1993, and a
smaller sample truncated in 2003 to exclude the eﬀects of the recent mining boom.
Overall, the matches seem reasonably good. For each sample, I use two diﬀerent
weighting schemes.15 In general, using optimal weights allows me to obtain better
matches for the domestic variables. This is done at the expense of the volatility
of the exchange rate and of commodity prices, which are better matched when
I use equal weights. Clearly, since the mining boom increased the volatility of
the exchange rate and of commodity prices, the results for the longer sample are
more dependent on the weighting chosen. Although there are only 6 shocks in the
model, I choose to match 7 moments. In particular, I include both the foreign
price of commodities and the gross value added of the commodity sector. This is
done to improve the match of commodity price volatility, as including these two
variables induces a higher weight on commodity price shocks in the GMM.
In terms of the standard deviations of the shocks, using equal weights almost
mutes domestic shocks. Instead, optimal weighting reduces the volatility of the
foreign shocks while raising the volatility of the domestic shocks. In any case, the
volatility of the commodity-speciﬁc technology shock is consistently near zero due
to the high volatility of commodity price shocks. The volatility of non-commodity
technology shocks is used to match the volatility of non-commodity output. In
turn, the innovations in foreign inﬂation pin down the volatility of that variable
alone, whereas the volatility of the risk premium shock is used to match the
volatility of the exchange rate. The high volatility of the exchange rate tends
to raise the volatility of price inﬂation and consumption. On the one hand, a
stronger nominal rigidity in the domestic prices and a low volatility of monetary
policy shocks allow me to reduce the volatility of domestic inﬂation. On the other
hand, the calibrated value of ρb allows me to obtain a sensible match for the
standard deviation of consumption.
3.5 Monetary Policy
The institutional framework of the model is characterized by a monetary policy
rule and a wage indexation rule. Both are exogenous and convey diﬀerent object-
ives. Monetary policy is assumed to follow a feedback rule to the nominal interest
15The GMM procedure minimizes a weighted average of the diﬀerences between model and
data moments.
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rate of the form
iˆt = ρiiˆt−1 + (1− ρi)ωpipˆit + ξit (40)
where ξit is the i.i.d. monetary policy innovation, ρi is the interest rate smoothing
parameter, which I set to 0.85, and ωpi is the long-run response of the monetary
authority to inﬂation. One of the advantages of considering feedback rules such
as (40) is their simplicity and easiness of interpretation. In the remainder of this
paper, I will investigate what values of ωpi maximize a given loss function that
represents the objective of the monetary authority.
I interpret the wage indexation rule as an institutional feature of the labour mar-
ket, possibly part of the legal framework of the country. The rule is set independ-
ently of monetary policy. All else constant, higher values of γw in (12) imply a
stronger inﬂuence of the indexation rule. In this paper, I assume that piW equals
wage inﬂation in the commodity sector
pˆiWt = pˆi
wx
t (41)
For values of γw 6= 0, wage inﬂation in the commodity sector is passed on to
wages in the non-commodity sector. This creates a wedge between the average
wage in the non-commodity sector and the eﬃcient wage. As a result, vacancies
and employment in the non-commodity sector also deviate from their eﬃcient
levels. In the next subsections, I investigate the relevance of these ineﬃciencies in
terms of welfare.16
3.5.1 Commodity Price Shocks and Sectoral Relative Wage
Rigidity
Before moving to the analysis of optimal monetary policy, I study the propagation
of commodity price shocks through the economy and investigate the impact of
sectoral relative wage rigidity on the transmission of those shocks. Figure 3 plots
the impulse responses of key variables to a 1% increase in the foreign price of
16Expression (41) is clearly a reduce form approach to relative wage rigidities. Although not
predominantly the case in the literature, the study of wage bargaining centralization and of
sectoral wage setting should not neglect the potential interactions and game theoretical consid-
erations involved at the level of trade unions. Their bargaining power, scope for coordination,
individual interests and sectoral idiosyncrasies can have important implications in terms of wage
setting outcomes. In this paper, my objective is to understand the implication of sectoral rigid-
ities for monetary policy, rather than the rationale behind these rigidities per se. Nevertheless,
why these ineﬃciencies arise is an extremely relevant question for further research.
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Australian commodities. All responses are represented in terms of percentage
deviations from steady state.
Focusing ﬁrst on the thick black line, which assumes no sectoral relative wage
rigidity, an increase in the foreign price of domestically-produced commodities
triggers the expansion of the commodity sector. Since new hires only become
productive one quarter after being matched, an unexpected commodity price shock
has no immediate impact on commodity output. As commodity ﬁrms post more
vacancies and raise wages, more workers are encouraged to search for a job in
the resource sector. On the contrary, because the increase in commodity exports
is immediate, the appreciation of the real exchange rate is felt on impact. This
direct eﬀect of the increase in commodity prices induces a prompt contraction
in non-commodity output, which is magniﬁed in the quarters that follow. Two
reasons contribute to this. On the one hand, as workers are attracted to higher
wages in the commodity sector, non-commodity employment falls. Note, however,
that despite the fall in non-commodity employment, overall employment in the
economy increases.17 On the other hand, the appreciation of the exchange rate
makes domestically-produced tradeables relatively more expensive than foreign
tradeables, reducing aggregate demand. Finally, although the appreciation of
the exchange rate lowers the price of imported consumption goods, as domestic
retailers set prices as a mark-up over marginal costs, the shock raises consumer
price inﬂation.
The eﬀect of sectoral relative wage rigidity on the propagation of commodity price
shocks is better captured by the response of wage inﬂation in the non-commodity
sector. When γw = 0, wages in the non-commodity sector barely change. How-
ever, for γw > 0, the response is swift. As non-commodity ﬁrms internalise the
consequences of sectoral wage movements, they anticipate the eﬀects of a rise in
wages in the commodity sector. As such, those ﬁrms that are able to negotiate
wages, reduce them immediately. In addition, they cut vacancy posting further
in an attempt to mitigate the impact of pay rises in the future. After this anti-
cipation eﬀect, movements in average non-commodity wages become dictated by
the indexation rule. In turn, commodity ﬁrms also anticipate the eﬀect of relative
wage rigidity. Knowing that non-commodity ﬁrms attempt to cut wages and stop
hiring workers, commodity ﬁrms raise wages by less, hire more workers, and reach
17The responses of sectoral employment are led one period, since decisions about directed
search or vacancy posting only have an eﬀect one quarter later. On the contrary, the response
of total employment is contemporaneous and, as a result, does not move on impact.
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the peak of production earlier. Combined, the eﬀects on total employment are
two-fold. At ﬁrst, the abrupt reduction in non-commodity employment leads to
a timid increase in total employment, below the increase observed when γw = 0.
Two quarters later, the increase in employment in the commodity sector takes
the lead and push total employment northwards. Finally, the impact of sectoral
relative wage rigidity is also observed in the response of price inﬂation. With
non-commodity wages rising substantially one quarter after the shock, and since
retailers set prices as a mark-up over marginal costs, inﬂation jumps twice as high
as compared to when γw = 0.
3.5.2 Welfare criterion
Log-linearising the model around the eﬃcient steady state permits me to derive
a quadratic welfare measure directly from the equilibrium conditions. I follow
the LQ methodology pioneered by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and used in
Benigno and Woodford (2006) and de Paoli (2009), among others, and obtain a
quadratic measure of welfare by computing a second-order approximation to the
household lifetime utility criterion and to some equilibrium conditions. I use the
LQ methodology to study monetary policy for three reasons. The ﬁrst reason is
due to the fact that price and wage dispersion have an impact on the second mo-
ments of the model. Therefore, it is crucial to have a welfare approximation that
is accurate at least to second-order. Second, the LQ methodology only requires
ﬁrst-order approximations of the equilibrium conditions. Because of the history
dependence of non-commodity ﬁrm's wages and vacancy rates, I am only able to
obtain aggregate conditions by performing ﬁrst-order log-linear approximations.
Moreover, and for the same reason, the derivation of higher-order approximations
becomes infeasible. Third, a model-based welfare measure is attractive because
it serves as a benchmark to the study of ad hoc loss functions that stylise the
preferences of the monetary authority.
Proposition 8 provides the conditions under which I can derive an utility-based
quadratic welfare approximation. The complete derivation can be found in the
appendix.
Proposition 8: With Q3 = 1 and assuming αc = Q1 and perfect exchange rate
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pass-through, the welfare criterion can be approximated by
W˜ = − c¯
−σ
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and
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where t.i.p. + O3 stands for terms independent of policy and of third or higher
order. 
The terms in the welfare expression of Proposition 8 can be grouped into four
categories according to their source within the model. First, the term in pˆih comes
directly from the resource constraint of non-commodity goods. It accounts for
the detrimental eﬀects of price stickiness in terms of real output losses. Second,
the term in pˆiwh stems from the wage dispersion in the non-commodity sector. As
wholesalers are unable to set wages eﬃciently, vacancy posting, employment and
output also depart from their optimum levels. Third, last two lines of expression
(42) capture the eﬀects of the search-and-matching technology in the allocation
of labour across sectors. These terms are also present in Thomas (2008). On the
contrary, the fourth category, which includes most of the remaining terms, is due
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to the novel features of my model: the existence of two sectors in the economy,
together with the fact that the economy is open to trade.18 These two features
are also motivate the conditionality in Proposition 8. In particular, by imposing
no exports of non-commodity output (i.e., setting αc = Q1) and assuming perfect
exchange rate pass-through, I can eliminate the linear terms on the exchange rate
and derive a purely quadratic measure of welfare.
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 4 investigates the impact of sectoral relative wage rigidity
on welfare. I compare three monetary policy rules. One consists of strict inﬂation
targeting, which sets consumer price inﬂation to zero at all dates. The second
policy rule is based on Thomas (2008), and consists of setting a weighted average
of price and wage inﬂation to zero every period. Lastly, I implement rule (40),
choosing the value of ωpi that maximizes welfare measure (42) for a given value of
γw. As shown in the ﬁgure, regardless of the policy rule followed by the monetary
authority, sectoral relative wage rigidity is undoubtedly detrimental to welfare,
with full indexation causing a welfare loss of 60% when compared to no indexation.
However, this does not mean the monetary authority should be indiﬀerent to the
the degree of relative wage rigidity.
On the second panel of Figure 4, I explore the welfare implications of diﬀer-
ent policy rules against the optimized version of rule (40), for γw ∈ [0, 1]. A
zero-inﬂation policy is more detrimental to welfare regardless of the degree of in-
dexation. Moreover, zero inﬂation is worse for higher levels of indexation, with
a loss of 26% compared to the optimal feedback rule. Likewise, the optimized
feedback rule policy outperforms the rule studied by Thomas (2008), with the
latter implying a loss between 9% and 15%. In Figure 4, I also compare the op-
timal policy rule to one for which ωpi is held constant regardless of the degree of
indexation. In particular, I study two scenarios: ﬁrst, I consider a rule with a
constant ωpi set equal to the optimal ωpi when γw = 0 ; second, a rule for which
the optimal long-term response to inﬂation is always held equal to the optimal
ωpi when γw = 1. A mismatched value of ωpi can be detrimental to welfare, with
the worst case being a choice of ωpi consistent with no indexation in an economy
where non-commodity wages are fully responsive to the evolution of commodity
wages. Hence, non-optimal monetary policy tends to be more of a concern for
higher levels of relative wage rigidity.
The negative performance of strict inﬂation targeting when compared to the op-
timized version of (40) is particularly evident from Figure 4. Another way to
18The term in cˆt comes directly from the utility function and is standard in the literature.
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understand the diﬀerences between the two rules is to compare the impulse re-
sponses associated with each policy. Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to
a commodity price shock under the two rules and for no and full indexation,
γw = 0, 1.19 The most notorious diﬀerence between the two policies concerns
the response of total employment. Independently of the degree of indexation, a
zero-inﬂation policy reduces employment, whereas under the feedback rule total
employment increases. As shown in the ﬁgure, this eﬀect is more pronounced the
higher the value of γw is. Behind the drop in total employment is the accentuated
fall in non-commodity employment. In fact, the reaction of non-commodity em-
ployment is at the core of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. With
inﬂation equal to zero, nominal wages equal real wages and non-commodity ﬁrms
that are unable to renegotiate wages cannot enjoy the eﬀects of inﬂation in re-
ducing real wages over time. In other words, with zero inﬂation, ﬁrms can only
reduce their wage bill in real terms by reducing the number of hires. Moreover,
the eﬀects of indexation in real wage is also magniﬁed when pˆit = 0. With wages
in the commodity sector rising after a commodity price shock, non-commodity
ﬁrms face higher expected real costs, which can only be mitigated by contracting
vacancy posting further and reducing employment more.
The trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment faced by the monetary author-
ity is evident in Figure 5, with a policy of zero-inﬂation causing unemployment
when the economy is hit by a commodity price shock. Furthermore, the trade-oﬀ
becomes more stringent for higher values of γw. These results qualify the ﬁnd-
ings of Driﬃll and van der Ploeg (1993). For higher levels of indexation and
with a zero-inﬂation policy, real wages rise more and induce a bigger contraction
of employment. The hump-shaped hypothesis in the open economy context is,
therefore, preserved. However, with an optimized feedback rule, wage rises are
inﬂationary and it is not necessarily true that real wages and unemployment rise
more for higher degrees of sectoral relative wage rigidity. In fact, for higher values
of γw, wage rises following a commodity price shock cause more inﬂation and,
although delayed, generate a more pronounced increase in total employment.
Despite begin dependent on the type of monetary policy conducted, Figure 4
provides strong evidence of the detrimental eﬀects sectoral relative wage rigidity
has on welfare. However, interpreting these results under the hump-shaped hypo-
19For ease of comparison, all impulse responses in this paper are for the complete model, that
is, the model with imperfect exchange rate pass-through and with exports of non-commodity
goods.
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thesis framework might be misleading. First, the welfare criterion is an aggregate
measure which includes all household members, both employed and unemployed.
Hence, unlike trade unions who typically maximize worker's aggregate welfare,
here I also account for the eﬀects of relative wage rigidity on those left without a
labour contract. Second, mediation of wage bargaining rarely consists of a linear
process of dividing surpluses between the parties directly involved. A number of
other considerations are often involved in the bargaining process which escape the
particular nature and economic conditions of the labour contract under negoti-
ation. For instance, according to Pagan (1987), during the early 1980s, optimism
about the duration of a commodity boom allowed trade unions to obtain sizeable
real wage increases. Although the boom was a sectoral shock, potentially harm-
ful to other sectors exposed to foreign competition, real wages were increased
throughout the economy. One consideration that might be behind sectoral relat-
ive wage rigidity relates to equity. As Figure 6 reports, for high levels of relative
wage rigidity, the volatility of the diﬀerential between sectoral wages decreases
substantially. Hence, social preferences that prioritize greater equality in wages
can explain why sectoral relative wages are ﬁxed despite the detrimental eﬀects
caused to the aggregate welfare criterion I have considered.
3.6 Diﬀerent Policy Scenarios
The strong assumptions imposed in Proposition 8 constrain the model in two
important dimensions. On the one hand, excluding exports of non-commodity
goods is not only unrealistic, it also closes one important channel of the trans-
mission of commodity price shocks. If non-commodity goods are not exposed to
foreign competition, the appreciation of the exchange rate has little eﬀects on
proﬁt margins and on production. On the other hand, assuming perfect exchange
rate pass-through aﬀects the match of second moments, as discussed above. As
welfare analysis relies on second moments, a mismatch to their empirical counter-
part might generate important distortions. For these reasons, in this subsection I
propose simple loss functions to evaluate monetary policy and investigate diﬀerent
scenarios with respect to policy objectives and policy instruments.
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3.6.1 Policy Evaluation using Loss Functions
Loss functions are interpreted as representing the preferences of the monetary au-
thority. To the extent a given loss function behaves closely enough to the welfare
criterion, it can be argued that the preferences of the monetary authority are
aligned with aggregate welfare. Moreover, besides not requiring special assump-
tions to be imposed on the model, the use of simple loss functions also enables me
to explore the trade-oﬀs faced by the monetary authority and the impact sectoral
relative wage rigidity has on the conduct of monetary policy.
In the remainder of this section, I consider the following loss function
L1 = λpiσpi + (1− λpi)σyh (44)
where σpi and σy
h
are the standard deviations of consumer price inﬂation and non-
commodity output, respectively, and λpi is the relative importance the monetary
authority gives to inﬂation volatility. The functional form of (44) is standard in
the New-Keynesian literature.20 The value of λpi is calibrated such that the policy
predictions associated with minimizing (44) approximate those associated with
maximizing (42). In other words, I pin down λpi by minimizing the diﬀerence
between the optimal monetary policy's long-run reactions to inﬂation under L1,
for diﬀerent values of γw, and those under the welfare criterion. I proceed as
follows. First, I search for the values of ωpi that maximize the welfare criterion in
a model consistent with the conditions outlined in Proposition 8. As a result, I
obtain ωWpi
(
γw|MW
)
: the values of ωpi that maximize (42) for diﬀerent values of
γw, in the model consistent with Proposition 8, which I denote byMW . Second,
under the same welfare-consistent model, MW , I obtain ωL1pi
(
γw|MW , λpi
)
: the
values of ωpi that minimize (44) for diﬀerent values of γw. Finally, I obtain λpi by
minimizing the relative changes between ωWpi
(
γw|MW
)
and ωL
1
pi
(
γw|MW , λpi
)
.21
On the left panel of Figure 7, the dotted black line corresponds to the changes
of ωWpi
(
γw|MW
)
relative to ωWpi
(
γw = 0|MW
)
. The welfare-consistent policy re-
sponse to inﬂation is increasing with the degree of sectoral relative wage rigidity.
In comparison, the dotted grey line shows the relative changes of ωL
1
pi
(
γw|MW
)
for λpi = 1/3, which is the value of λpi that minimises the diﬀerences between the
20Refer to Woodford (2003).
21By relative changes I mean ωpi (γw) /ωpi (γw = 0). I match the relative changes because
the absolute values of the optimal ωpi under the two objectives are very diﬀerent. Moreover,
for policy evaluation, the relative changes in the conduct of policy are more relevant than the
absolute values of ωpi.
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two lines.22 Minimizing (44) for increasing degrees of relative wage rigidity also
requires a stronger response to inﬂation. However, the magnitude of the relat-
ive changes is diﬀerent. Under the welfare-consistent model, MW , maximizing
welfare requires a response to inﬂation 2.4 times higher when γw = 1 relative to
when γw = 0. Instead, the relative diﬀerence is about 1.6 when the objective is
to minimise the loss function. In other words, the relative importance of curbing
inﬂation volatility under L1 is lower for higher degrees of indexation when com-
pared to the welfare-maximizing policy. Hence, the eﬀects of relative wage rigidity
on inﬂation appears to be comparatively more detrimental to welfare than they
are for the loss function.
The changes of ωL
1
pi
(
γw|MC
)
relative to ωL
1
pi
(
γw = 0|MC
)
are also plotted on the
left panel of Figure 7. These are the relative values of ωpi obtained by minimising
(44) under modelMC and with λpi = 1/3. ModelMC is the complete model cal-
ibrated as reported in Table 2, i.e., not subject to the conditions of Proposition 8.
The relative change in the long-run response to inﬂation between no and full in-
dexation is around 1.3, as shown by the thick black line. The drop from the 1.6
obtained underMW is due to the conditions of Proposition 8. On the one hand,
with imperfect exchange rate pass-through, changes in the price of imported con-
sumption goods are less abrupt, implying lower inﬂation volatility. On the other
hand, allowing for exports of non-commodities exacerbates the volatility of non-
commodity output through the eﬀects of the exchange rate on foreign demand.
Together, these two eﬀects require a relatively more modest response to inﬂation.
Finally, the right panel of Figure 7 presents some sensitivity analysis of the policy
prescription under L1 for model MC. As expected, for higher values of λpi, the
required long-run response to inﬂation increases. I also investigate the eﬀects
of wage stickiness on monetary policy. As in Thomas (2008), the longer the
average duration of wage contracts is in the non-commodity sector, the more
important controlling wage inﬂation becomes.23 Consequently, the strength put
in responding to price inﬂation falls. These results are related to the discussion
of the impulse responses of Figure 5. As the probability of adjusting wages falls,
with more non-commodity ﬁrms unable to renegotiate wages each period, more
vacancy posts are cut and, consequently, the drop in employment and total output
22For instance, matching the values, rather than the relative changes, of both set of responses
yields λpi = 0.40, whereas matching both responses for γw = 0 yields λ
pi = 0.37. Besides the
diﬀerences in the values of the optimised ωpi, results do not change much. For the remainder of
this paper, I will consider λpi = 1/3.
23The average duration of wage contracts is given by 1/ (1− δw).
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increases.
3.6.2 Inﬂation Targeting under Diﬀerent Objectives
Producer price inﬂation: The previous sections emphasise the trade-oﬀ
between price and wage inﬂation for optimal monetary policy. In this subsec-
tion, I start by investigating the robustness of the results found earlier using
alternative policy scenarios. In particular, I modify the framework characterizing
monetary policy in the following of ways. First, I change the preferences of the
monetary authority. Instead of (44), I consider a loss function described by
L2 = λpiσpi
h
+ (1− λpi)σyh (45)
where consumer price inﬂation is replaced by non-commodity price inﬂation. In
this scenario, the rule describing monetary authority is given by (40) still. Second,
I change the policy rule. I consider L1 again to describe the preferences of the
monetary authority, but assume instead that policy targets pˆiht instead of pˆit. These
two scenarios explore the role of producer price inﬂation for monetary policy.
Figure 8 reports the optimal values of ωpi obtained under these new scenarios. As
with the benchmark case, optimal policy under the two new scenarios requires a
stronger response to inﬂation for higher degrees of relative wage rigidity, as shown
by the two dashed grey lines. However, for a given degree of indexation, the op-
timal magnitude of the response diﬀers. Holding the price of foreign tradeable
consumption goods constant, consumer price inﬂation is equal to a weighted sum
of non-commodity price inﬂation and changes in the nominal exchange rate.24 As
such, targeting pˆit in order to control pˆiht requires larger reactions of the policy
instrument. Instead, targeting movements in pˆiht directly aﬀects non-commodity
output and, consequently, the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, the optimal re-
sponse of the nominal interest rate becomes smaller. Table 4 presents a range of
comparisons across these policy scenarios. To the extent the monetary authority
responds correctly to the inﬂation measure being targeted, the question of which
inﬂation to use appears irrelevant, as the diﬀerences in terms of L1 of targeting
one or the other measure are insigniﬁcant.
Unemployment: The discussion in previous subsections identiﬁes a puzzle
24This is shown in condition (31).
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concerning the eﬀects of sectoral relative wage rigidity on monetary policy. On
the one hand, Figure 4 and Figure 5 seem to warrant a milder response to price
inﬂation for higher values of γw in order to mitigate the eﬀects of higher wage
volatility on unemployment and output. On the other hand, the policy prescrip-
tion in Figure 7 suggests a stronger response to inﬂation for higher degrees of
relative wage rigidity. In order to conciliate both claims, I construct a fourth
scenario where the preferences of the monetary authority are represented by
L3 = λpiσpi + (1− λpi)σu (46)
and policy targets pˆit as in (40). In L3, σu denotes the volatility of total unemploy-
ment.25 This change has a signiﬁcant impact in terms of policy prescription. In
contrast to the previous results, the dash blue line in Figure 8 shows a softening
of the response to inﬂation for higher values of γw. This result is a crucial insight
into the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in an economy with sectoral
relative wage rigidities.
As described before, a higher degree of indexation exacerbates the spillover eﬀects
of commodity price shocks into wages in the non-commodity sector. This induces
non-commodity ﬁrms to adjust their demand for labour more frequently. As a
result, total unemployment also becomes more volatile. These eﬀects are shown
on the left panel of Figure 9. Although sectoral relative wage rigidity increases
the volatility of inﬂation and non-commodity output, the eﬀects on unemployment
are overwhelming. On the contrary, on the right panel of Figure 9, unemployment
and non-commodity output volatilities are only marginally aﬀected by monetary
policy when compared to the eﬀects it has on inﬂation. Hence, due to the powerful
eﬀects relative wage rigidity has in raising unemployment volatility, the monetary
authority is forced to compromise its commitment to price stability. By allowing
some inﬂation, monetary policy is able to moderate the ﬂuctuation in real wages
and, as a consequence, to smooth unemployment volatility.
In a game-theoretic model, Cukierman and Lippi (1999) show that when trade
unions internalise the degree of inﬂation aversion of the monetary authority, they
claim higher nominal wage rises when the central bank is more inﬂation averse.
As real wages rise more, unemployment also tends to grow higher. Here, the
mechanism is similar in the sense that with a monetary authority less inﬂation
averse, nominal wage swings are mitigated by inﬂation. As a result, real wages
25Minimizing the volatility of non-commodity unemployment, uht , does not change the results.
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become less volatile and unemployment variability drops as well.
Targeting the nominal exchange rate: In a small commodity-exporting
economy with ﬂoating exchange rates, commodity price shocks induce an appre-
ciation. For consumers, the appreciation is positive, as imports become cheaper.
For workers, the change in the nominal exchange rate contributes to the contrac-
tion of the non-commodity tradeable sector and might dictate the loss of jobs.
These eﬀects question whether is justiﬁable to manage the exchange rate in order
to lessen the detrimental eﬀects of commodity price shocks. Hevia and Nicolini
(2013) investigate this possibility in a model where the only source of ineﬃciencies
comes from price stickiness in the non-commodity sector. They ﬁnd no support
against letting the exchange rate to ﬂoat freely.
With sectoral relative wage rigidity, the dire consequences of commodity price
shocks are exacerbated. In order to understand whether managing exchange rate
movements directly improves welfare, I extend the feedback rule as follows
iˆt = ρiiˆt−1 + (1− ρi) (ωpipˆit + ωq qˆt) + ξit (47)
Figure 10 reports the optimized values for both ωpi and ωq. The blue lines cor-
respond to a welfare maximizing policy, whereas the grey lines correspond to the
optimal policy consistent with L1. In terms of the optimal response to inﬂation,
the augmented rule implies little diﬀerences relative to (40) when the objective
is to maximize welfare. However, the magnitude of the response to inﬂation in-
crease 50% when the objective is to minimize L1. Regarding the response to the
real exchange rate, the monetary authority ﬁnds it optimal to raise the nominal
interest rate in face of an appreciation. Moreover, policy tightens more for higher
levels of sectoral relative wage rigidity.26 Therefore, it appears that the positive
eﬀects on consumption outweigh the negative impact of an appreciation on the
non-commodity tradeable sector. Nevertheless, the gains from augmenting the
feedback rule are very small, as reported in Table 4.
26As domestic inﬂation is restrained through ωw and foreign inﬂation is held constant, a real
appreciation implies the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
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3.7 Conclusion
Rigidity in the adjustment of relative wages is a feature of several economies.
As wages play a central role in the allocation of labour between diﬀerent sec-
tors and are a determinant component of households income, managing their
evolution has important consequences. In this paper, I study the implications
of sectoral relative wage rigidity for the conduct of monetary policy in a small
commodity-exporting economy. The study of relative wage rigidity in the con-
text of commodity-exporters is particularly relevant for at least three reasons.
First, shocks to commodity prices are highly volatile and unpredictable. For
resource-rich countries, they represent sectoral shocks to the commodity sector,
which spillover to the rest of the economy through changes in relative prices and
through the reallocation of factors of production. Second, the institutional char-
acteristics of labour markets in these countries vary according to geography and
over time. With diﬀerent degrees of sectoral relative wage rigidity, a one size-
ﬁts-all monetary policy prescription might be inappropriate. Third, as the price
of tradeables is ﬁxed in world markets, the impact commodity price shocks have
on these countries' exchange rate aﬀects directly their non-commodity tradeable
sector. As a result, the tradeable sector becomes especially sensitive to spillover
eﬀects of commodity price shocks, namely in terms of production costs.
In order to investigate the implications of relative wage rigidity, I propose a two-
sector model of an open economy subject to commodity price shocks. The two
sectors consist of a non-commodity and a commodity sector. Both use labour as
input for production. The non-commodity sector produces a tradeable good used
for consumption domestically and abroad, therefore being exposed to exchange
rate ﬂuctuations. It also uses a small share of the domestically-produced commod-
ity good as an intermediary for production. The remaining commodity output is
exported. Labour markets are assumed to be segmented, with every unemployed
household member directing his job-search to a speciﬁc sector. New hires occur
according to a matching function, which depends on the number of job-seekers
and of vacancies posted is each sector. Nominal wages in the non-commodity
sector are assumed to be sticky and can be indexed to the evolution of wages in
the commodity sector. This link creates sectoral relative wage rigidity.
Because every period a random share of non-commodity ﬁrms is unable to ne-
gotiate wages with workers, wages in each individual ﬁrm are history dependent.
As a result, vacancies also vary across ﬁrms. As I demonstrate in the paper,
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dispersion in wages and vacancy posting aﬀects resource allocation. To shed
light on the mechanisms behind relative wage rigidity, I analyse the impulse re-
sponse of a set of variables to a commodity price shock. I ﬁrst assume no sectoral
relative wage rigidity. The shock causes an appreciation of the exchange rate.
As domestically-produced goods become relatively more expensive than foreign
goods, the non-commodity sector contracts. This eﬀect is reinforced by the ex-
pansion of the commodity sector. In order to attract workers, commodity ﬁrms
raise wages, shifting job-seekers away from the non-commodity sector. As de-
mand for non-commodity goods is weaker, ﬁrms ﬁnd it diﬃcult to retain their
workers. Alternatively, if wages in the non-commodity sector are linked to the
evolution of wages in the commodity sector, non-commodity output drops fur-
ther. As non-commodity ﬁrms expect wages to increase following the expansion
of the commodity sector, they reduce vacancies more. The eﬀects on total em-
ployment are illustrative of the consequences of relative wage rigidity. With no
indexation, total employment increases pushed by the expansion of the commod-
ity sector. With full indexation, employment drops following the rapid reduction
in non-commodity vacancies.
I calibrate the model to Australia and use GMM to match the second moments
of a set of relevant variables to their empirical counterpart. I then study optimal
monetary policy for diﬀerent degrees of relative wage rigidity. I obtain two seem-
ingly opposing results. First, I ﬁnd that strict inﬂation targeting is detrimental to
welfare compared to a simple feedback rule to the nominal interest rate. Moreover,
the welfare losses are larger the higher the degree of indexation. Second, I ﬁnd
that optimal monetary policy has the monetary authority being more respons-
ive to inﬂation the higher the relative wage rigidity. In order to understand this
apparent puzzle, I use diﬀerent loss functions to describe the preferences of the
monetary authority. I ﬁnd that, for a higher degree of indexation, some inﬂation
is desirable in order to smooth real wage volatility. As wages are set in nominal
terms, inﬂation partially oﬀsets the eﬀects of indexation on real wages. Never-
theless, as indexation itself is inﬂationary, the response of monetary policy to
inﬂation needs to be stronger.
This paper unveils important policy implications. In particular, I show that policy
misspeciﬁcation is more problematic for higher degrees of relative wage rigidity,
as an excessive response to inﬂation when non-commodity wages are highly linked
to commodity wages leads to higher unemployment volatility. On the other hand,
the optimal policy prescription is highly sensitive to the type of loss function the
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monetary authority chooses to follow. For instance, if monetary policy cares about
price inﬂation and non-commodity output volatilities, the strength of the response
to inﬂation increases for higher degrees of indexation. However, if instead of non-
commodity output the monetary authority is interested in curbing unemployment
volatility, then the optimal response to inﬂation becomes milder for higher degrees
of indexation. All things considered, although monetary policy is found to be an
eﬀective macroeconomic policy instrument, its response needs to be calibrated
carefully.
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3.8 Tables
Table 1: Wage Bargaining
80's 90's 00's 80's 90's 00's
Australia Canada
coordination 3.5 2.4 2 coordination 1 1 1
level 4.4 2.4 2 level 1 1 1
articulation 4 4 4 articulation 0 0 0
σpi 0.6 0.26 0.15 σpi - 0.04 0.04
σu 1.84 2.01 0.72 σu - 1.67 0.52
New Zealand Norway
coordination 2.6 1 1 coordination 4 4.1 4.1
level 3.6 1.2 1 level 4.3 3.6 3.2
articulation 5 1 0 articulation 4.2 3.4 3
σpi 2.61 0.22 0.22 σpi - 0.1 0.48
σu 2.36 2.65 0.93 σu - 1.72 0.47
Source:average of annual labour market indicators from 1980 to 2009,
from Visser (2013), ICTWSS. Coordination refers to the degree of wage-
setting centralisation; Level refers to the predominant (> 2/3) level at
which bargaining occurs; Articulation refers to the existence of scope for
additional bargaining. Country data from national statistical agencies.
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Table 2: Parameter Values and Steady State Ratios
household foreign conditions
σ interterporal elast. subst. 1 γh export elasticity 1.40
β discount factor 0.99 Kh? scale exports 0.05
γc subst. home and foreign 1.3 ψb risk premium 0.001
αc home bias 0.80 persistence
κh labour disutility 0.66 ρz non-commodity technology 0.96
κx labour disutility 0.82 ρa commodity technology 0.96
production ρb risk premium 0.75
µh elasticity of substitution 1.5 ρx foreign commodity price 0.80
αh1 labour share 0.96 ρpi? foreign inﬂation 0.39
αx1 labour share 0.30 steady state
Z scale non-commodity 0.92 Q1 non-commodity to GDP 0.85
A scale commodity 0.38 Q2 commodity to GDP 0.1875
Calvo lottery Q3 consumption to GDP 1
δp non-commodity retailers 0.75 n¯ employment rate 0.94
δf import ﬁrms 0.90 n¯h - in non-commodity 0.89
δw non-commodity wage 0.65 n¯x - in commodity 0.05
labour market u¯ unemployment rate 0.06
λh separation rate 0.10 φ¯h vacancy rate 0.02
λx separation rate 0.25 φ¯x vacancy rate 0.03
ηh bargaining power 0.60 θ¯h labour market tightness 0.36
ηx bargaining power 0.60 θ¯x labour market tightness 0.14
ψh elasticity of hiring costs 1 %h hiring costs to GDP 0.01
ψx elasticity of hiring costs 1 %x hiring costs to GDP 0.00
χh matching eﬃciency 3.33 υh wage mass to GDP 0.80
χx matching eﬃciency 3.78 υx wage mass to GDP 0.05
baseline policy q¯ real exchange rate 1
ωi interest rate smoothing 0.85 p¯x? foreign commodity price 1.20
ωpi long-run inﬂation response 1.75 p¯f? price of imports 1
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Table 3: Maching Second Moments
1993Q1 - 2002Q4 1993Q1 - 2013Q4
σ I O σ I O
c 0.79 (0.09) 0.87 0.84 0.97 (0.15) 0.99 0.97
yh 0.85 (0.07) 0.81 0.85 0.77 (0.06) 0.76 0.77
x 1.99 (0.24) 1.99 1.93 1.83 (0.16) 2.14 1.83
q 3.96 (0.25) 3.95 3.15 5.57 (0.52) 5.53 5.16
pi 0.29 (0.03) 0.29 0.29 0.36 (0.03) 0.36 0.36
px? 3.88 (0.80) 3.88 4.87 8.10 (1.67) 8.04 6.62
pi? 0.35 (0.03) 0.35 0.35 0.32 (0.03) 0.32 0.32
nh 0.43 (0.05) 0.22 0.23 0.39 (0.04) 0.37 0.32
nx 0.14 (0.03) 4.16 4.34 0.15 (0.02) 7.13 6.13
Note: GMM approach described in Ruge-Murcia (2007).
For each sample, the ﬁrst column reports the empir-
ical standard deviations, with GMM-based standard er-
rors between brackets. The remaining columns report the
matched synthetic standard deviations, where I denotes
equal weighting and O denotes optimal weighting using the
Newey-West estimator with a Barlett kernel.
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Table 4: Policy Comparison
λpi = 1/3
γw = 0 γw = 1 %∆
Loss Function Target loss ωpi ωq loss ωpi ωq loss
λσpi + (1− λ)σy pi 0.41 3.63 - 0.45 4.77 - 10.36
λσpi + (1− λ)σy pih 0.41 3.27 - 0.45 4.31 - 10.19
%∆ relative to benchmark 0.05 -9.92 -0.11 -9.64
λσpi + (1− λ)σy pi and q 0.41 5.25 -0.07 0.45 7.59 -0.14 10.12
%∆ relative to benchmark -0.62 44.63 -0.84 59.12
λσpih + (1− λ)σy pi 0.41 4.27 - 0.45 5.47 - 10.06
λσpi + (1− λ)σu pi 0.29 12.34 - 0.85 2.99 - 192.91
λpi = 1/2
γw = 0 γw = 1 %∆
Loss Function Target loss ωpi ωq loss ωpi ωq loss
λσpi + (1− λ)σy pi 0.32 5.21 - 0.35 6.55 - 9.68
λσpi + (1− λ)σy pih 0.32 4.87 - 0.35 6.07 - 9.47
%∆ relative to benchmark 0.25 -6.53 0.06 -7.33
λσpi + (1− λ)σy pi and q 0.32 7.17 -0.07 0.35 8.71 -0.09 9.73
%∆ relative to benchmark -0.46 37.62 -0.41 32.98
λσpih + (1− λ)σy pi 0.32 6.13 - 0.35 7.41 - 9.59
λσpi + (1− λ)σu pi 0.22 12.48 - 0.66 3.13 - 197.48
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3.9 Figures
Figure 1: Commodity Price Shocks
Source: apart from Norway, for which I used the price of crude oil (Brent) alone,
for the remaining countries I used indices of commodity prices based on export
volumes for each country. Quarterly data in US dollars. Deviations from trend
using HP ﬁlter on the logarithm of the series. Data from RBA, Statistics Canada,
ANZ Commodities and Bloomberg.
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Figure 2: The bargaining set
Figure 3: IRFs for a range of γw
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Figure 4: Behind Inﬂation Targeting
Note: Thomas (2008) shows that setting a weighted average of price and wage in-
ﬂation to zero approximates relatively well optimal monetary policy in his model.
Here, simple feedback rules outperform his weighted average rule.
159
Figure 5: IRFs for a range of policies
Figure 6: Relative wage volatility
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Figure 7: Loss consistent ωpi under inﬂation targeting
Figure 8: Diﬀerent Policy Scenarios
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Figure 9: Volatilities
Figure 10: Monetary Policy and the Exchange rate
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3.10 Appendix
For all propositions, I consider a zero-inﬂation, eﬀcicent steady state, as discussed in the
main text. The derivation of Proposition 1 follows Woodford (2003). For the remaining
Propositions, similar derivations can be found in Thomas (2008). However, opening the
economy to foreign trade and introducing two production sectors and sectoral relative
wage indexation adds extra complexity to the algebra.
Propositions 1 and 2
As the derivations of expressions (31) and (32) are identical, I omit the latter for brevity.
The price index P ht is an average of the price charged by the fraction (1− δp) of ﬁrms
setting their prices in period t and the prices of the remaining fraction δp of ﬁrms that are
unable to change their price. Given that ajusting ﬁrms are selected randomly, the average
of the price of all ﬁrms not adjusting is P ht−1. Hence, from P ht =
[´ 1
0 P
h 1−µh
it di
]1/(1−µh)
I obtain
1 = (1− δp)
(
P ∗ht /P
h
t
)1−µh
+ δr
(
P ht−1/P
h
t
)1−µh
For ease of notation, I denote Qt = P
∗h
t /P
h
t . Note that, in the steady state, Q¯ = 1.
Log-linearizing the expression above yields
Qˆt =
δp
(1− δp) pˆi
h
t
Rearranging the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the nominal price, equation (5) in
the main text,
QtEt
∞∑
s=0
βsc−σt+s (δ
p)s Y ht+s
P ht+s
Pt+s
(
P ht
P ht+s
)1−µh
= Et
∞∑
s=0
βsc−σt+s (δ
p)s ϕht+sY
h
t+s
(
P ht
P ht+s
)−µh
The left side can be approximated by
c¯−σY¯ hp¯h
1− βδp +
c¯−σY¯ hp¯h
1− βδp Qˆt+c¯
−σY¯ hp¯hEt
∞∑
s=0
βs (δp)s
{
−σcˆt+s + Yˆ ht+s + pˆht+s +
(
µh − 1
)(
Pˆ ht+s − Pˆ ht
)}
whereas the right hand side can be approximated by
c¯−σϕ¯hY¯ h
1− βδp + c¯
−σϕ¯hY¯ hEt
∞∑
s=0
βs (δp)s
{
−σcˆt+s + ϕˆht+s + Yˆ ht+s + µh
(
Pˆ ht+s − Pˆ ht
)}
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Setting the two equal and cancelling the terms that appear on both sides
Qˆt + Pˆ
h
t = (1− βδp)Et
∞∑
s=0
βs (δp)s
{
ϕˆht+s − pˆht+s + Pˆ ht+s
}
and expanding forward
Qˆt + Pˆ
h
t = (1− βδp)
{
ϕˆht − pˆht + Pˆ ht
}
+ βδp
(
Qˆt+1 + Pˆ
h
t+1
)
and rearranging
Qˆt = (1− βδp)
{
ϕˆht − pˆht
}
+ βδp
(
Qˆt+1 + pˆi
h
t+1
)
Finally, using the approximation to Qt yields
pˆiht =
(1− βδp) (1− δp)
δp
{
ϕˆht − pˆht
}
+ βpˆiht+1

Propositions 3 and 4
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 are derived together.
Deﬁning mplht = α
h
1y
h
t /n
h
t and unsing φ
h
jt = v
h
jt/n
h
jt, ﬁrm j's job-creation condition can
be approximated by
ςh
θ¯h
1
β
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
ψhφˆhjt − θˆht
)
= Et

c¯−σσ
(
w¯h − ϕ¯hmplh
)
cˆt+1
+c¯−σϕ¯hmplh
(
ϕˆht+1 + mˆpl
h
t+1
)
−c¯−σw¯hwˆhjt+1 −
(
1− λh) ςh
θ¯h
(
φ¯h
)ψh
θˆht+1
+ψhςh
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
φ¯h +
(1−λh)
θ¯h
)
φˆhjt+1

Given that renegotiating ﬁrms are randomly chosen, the real wage in ﬁrm j next period
is given by
wˆhjt+1 = δ
wwˆhjt+1|t + (1− δw) wˆh∗t+1
and, equivalently,
φˆhjt+1 = δ
wφˆhjt+1|t + (1− δw) φˆh∗t+1
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Hence, I can rewrite the above approximation as
ςh
θ¯h
1
β
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
ψhφˆhjt − θˆht
)
= Et

c¯−σσ
(
w¯h − ϕ¯hmplh
)
cˆt+1
+c¯−σϕ¯hmplh
(
ϕˆht+1 + mˆpl
h
t+1
)
−c¯−σw¯h
(
δwwˆhjt+1|t + (1− δw) wˆh∗t+1
)
− (1− λh) ςh
θ¯h
(
φ¯h
)ψh
θˆht+1
+ψhςh
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
φ¯h +
(1−λh)
θ¯h
)
δwφˆhjt+1|t
+ψhςh
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
φ¯h +
(1−λh)
θ¯h
)
(1− δw) φˆh∗t+1

In order to obtain an aggregate job creation condition, I guess that the vacancy rate in
ﬁrm j depends negatively on its relative wage w˜hjt ≡ logW hjt− logW ht , that is, guess that
φˆhjt = φˆ
h
t − τzw˜hjt
which implies
φˆhjt+1|t = φˆ
h0
t+1 − τzw˜hjt
where φˆh0t+1 is the average vacancy rate across non-renegotiating ﬁrms. Moreover, note
that wˆhjt+1|t = wˆ
h0
t+1 + w˜
h
jt , where wˆ
h0
t+1 = wˆ
h
t + γwpˆi
W
t is the average real wage across
non-negotiating ﬁrms. As a result, I have
ςh
θ¯h
1
β
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
ψhφˆhjt − θˆht
)
= Et

c¯−σσ
(
w¯h − ϕ¯hmplh
)
cˆt+1
+c¯−σϕ¯hmplh
(
ϕˆht+1 + mˆpl
h
t+1
)
−c¯−σw¯h
(
δw
(
wˆh0t+1 + w˜
h
jt
)
+ (1− δw) wˆh∗t+1
)
− (1− λh) ςh
θ¯h
(
φ¯h
)ψh
θˆht+1
+ψhςh
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
φ¯h +
(1−λh)
θ¯h
)
δw
(
φˆh0t+1 − τzw˜hjt
)
+ψhςh
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
φ¯h +
(1−λh)
θ¯h
)
(1− δw) φˆh∗t+1

Finally, recall that φˆht+1 = δ
wφˆh0t+1 + (1− δw) φˆh∗t+1 and wˆht+1 = δwwˆh0t+1 + (1− δw) wˆh∗t+1.
Using these,
ςh
θ¯h
1
β
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
ψhφˆhjt − θˆht
)
= Et

c¯−σσ
(
w¯h − ϕ¯hmplh
)
cˆt+1 + c¯
−σϕ¯hmplh
(
ϕˆht+1 + mˆpl
h
t+1
)
−c¯−σw¯h
(
wˆht+1 + δ
ww˜hjt
)
− (1− λh) ςh
θ¯h
(
φ¯h
)ψh
θˆht+1
+ψhςh
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
φ¯h +
(1−λh)
θ¯h
)(
φˆht+1 − δwτzw˜hjt
)

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Averaging across ﬁrms and noting that Eiw˜
h
it = 0
ςh
θ¯h
1
β
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
ψhφˆht − θˆht
)
= Et

c¯−σσ
(
w¯h − ϕ¯hmplh
)
cˆt+1 + c¯
−σϕ¯hmplh
(
ϕˆht+1 + mˆpl
h
t+1
)
−c¯−σw¯hwˆht+1 −
(
1− λh) ςh
θ¯h
(
φ¯h
)ψh
θˆht+1
+ψhςh
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
φ¯h +
(1−λh)
θ¯h
)
φˆht+1

which, after rearranging, gives rise to expression (35) in Proposition 4. Subtracting this
expression from the ﬁrst-order approximation to ﬁrm's j job creation condition, and
using φˆhjt − φˆht = −τzw˜hjt, I obtain
τz =
βδww¯hλhc¯−σ
ψhςh
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
(1− βδw)
which is used in expression (34) of Proposition 3.
Proposition 5
I ﬁrst derive an approximation to Hˆht . With the deﬁnitions used in the demostrations
of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, the log-linear approximation to the worker surplus
can be expressed as
H¯hHˆhit = w¯
hwˆhit − w¯hwt ˆ¯whwt +
(
1− λh
)
βH¯hEt
{
σcˆt − σcˆt+1 + δwHˆh0it+1 + (1− δw) Hˆh∗t+1
}
As before, I guess that Hˆhit = Hˆ
h
t + τhww˜
h
it.
27 Hence,
H¯hHˆhit = w¯
h
(
wˆht + w˜
h
it
)
− w¯hwt ˆ¯whwt +
(
1− λh
)
βH¯hEt
{
σcˆt − σcˆt+1 + δwτhww˜hit + Hˆht+1
}
Averaging over all ﬁrms and subtracting, I obtain
H¯hτhww˜
h
it = w¯
hw˜hit +
(
1− λh
)
βH¯hδwτhww˜
h
it
with
τhw =
w¯h
(1− (1− λh)βδw) H¯h
By the same token, log-linearizing the ﬁrm surplus yields
J¯hJˆhit = w¯
fw ˆ¯wfwit − w¯hwˆhit +
(
1− λh
)
βJ¯hEt
{
σcˆt − σcˆt+1 + δwJˆh0it+1 + (1− δw) Jˆh∗t+1
}
27This implies Hˆh0it = Hˆ
h0
t + τhww˜
h
it−1 and Hˆ
h
t+1 = δ
wHˆh0t+1 + (1− δw) Hˆh∗t+1. Note that
wˆhit = wˆ
h
t + w˜
h
it.
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while the log-linearized the expression for w¯fwit is
w¯fw ˆ¯wfwit = ϕ¯
hm¯pl
h
t
(
ϕˆht + mˆpl
h
t
)
+
ψhςh
1 + ψh
1
c¯−σ
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh (
σcˆt +
(
1 + ψh
)
φˆhit
)
which I can write as
w¯fw ˆ¯wfwit = w¯
fw ˆ¯wfwt −
ψhςh
c¯−σ
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
τzw˜
h
it
Again, guessing that Jˆhit = Jˆ
h
t − τfww˜hit,28 I obtain
J¯hJˆhit = w¯
fw ˆ¯wfwt −
ψhςh
c¯−σ
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
τzw˜
h
it − w¯h
(
wˆht + w˜
h
it
)
+
(
1− λh
)
βJ¯hEt
{
σcˆt − σcˆt+1 − δwτhf w˜hit + Jˆht+1
}
Averaging over all ﬁrms and subtracting, I obtain
−J¯hτfww˜hit = −
ψhςh
c¯−σ
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
τzw˜
h
it − w¯hw˜hit −
(
1− λh
)
βJ¯hδwτfww˜
h
it
with
τfw =
ψhςh
c¯−σ
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
τz + w¯
h
(1− (1− λh)βδw) J¯h
The log-linear approximation of the bargaining rule ηhHh∗t =
(
1− ηh) Jh∗t writes Hˆh∗t =
Jˆh∗t . Moreover, in steady state, ηhH¯h =
(
1− ηh) J¯h. Using the guesses from above, I
obtain
Hˆht+1 = Jˆ
h
t+1 − (τhf + τhw)
(
logW h∗t+1 − logW ht+1
)
On the other hand, the log-linear approximation of the ﬁrst-order condition with respect
to vacancies writes (
1− h
)
θˆht + ψ
hφˆhit = Et
{
−σcˆt+1 + Jˆhit+1
}
Using Jˆhit = Jˆ
h
t − τhf w˜hit and averaging yields(
1− h
)
θˆht + ψ
hφˆht = Et
{
−σcˆt+1 + Jˆht+1
}
28This implies Jˆh0it = Jˆ
h0
t − τfww˜hit−1 and Jˆht+1 = δwJˆh0t+1 + (1− δw) Jˆh∗t+1.
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Using these expresions and logW h∗t+1 − logW ht+1 derived above, I write
Et
{
−σcˆt+1 + Hˆht+1
}
=
(
1− h
)
θˆht + ψ
hφˆht − (τfw + τhw)
δw
(1− δw)
(
pˆiwht+1 − γwpˆiWt
)
Finally, expression (16) for the target wage can be approximated by
w¯hwˆh tarjt =
ηhκhσ
c¯−σ
cˆt + η
hβι¯hH¯h
(
hθˆht + σcˆt − σcˆt+1 + Hˆht+1
)
+
(
1− ηh
)(
ϕ¯hmpl
h
(
ϕˆht + mˆpl
h
t
)
+
ψhςh
1 + ψh
1
c¯−σ
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh (
σcˆt +
(
1 + ψh
)
φˆhjt
))
Averaging and replacing Hˆt+1, I obtain
29
w¯hwˆh tart =
(
1− ηh
)

((
θ¯h
φ¯h
+ ψ
h
1+ψh
)
ςh
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
+ η
hκh
(1−ηh)
)
σ
c¯−σ cˆt
+ϕ¯hmpl
h
(
ϕˆht + mˆpl
h
t
)
+
(
1 + θ¯
h
φ¯h
)
ψhςh
c¯−σ
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
φˆht
+ ς
h
c¯−σ θ¯
h
(
φ¯h
)ψh (
θˆht − (τfw + τhw) δ
w
(1−δw)
(
pˆiwht+1 − γhpˆiWt
))

Lastly, using a ﬁrst-order approximation to the Nash wage, I can write30
wˆh tart = wˆ
hnash
t −
(
1− βδw (1 + (1− ηh)λh)) ι¯hβ
(1− βδw) (1− (1− λh)βδw)
δw
(1− δw)
(
pˆiwht+1 − γwpˆiWt
)
which is equivalent to expression (37) in Proposition 5
Proposition 6
A log-linear approximation to the wage equation (15) can be expressed by
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(
1− λh
)s
(δw)s
logW h∗it − logPt+s − logw¯h − wˆh tarit+s|t + γhlog
 s∏
j=1
(
piWt+j−1
)
29And using H¯h = J¯h
(
1− ηh) /ηh and J¯h = ςh (φ¯h)ψh /βq¯hc¯−σ.
30The Nash wage is given by
whnasht = η
h
(
κh
c−σt
+ b
)
+
(
1− ηh)(ϕhtmplht + ψhςh1 + ψh 1c−σt (φht )1+ψ
h
+
ςh
c−σt
θht
(
φht
)ψh)
which to a ﬁrst-order log-linear approximation writes
wˆhnasht =
(
1− ηh)
w¯h

((
θ¯h
φ¯h
+ ψ
h
1+ψh
)
ςh
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
+ η
hκh
(1−ηh)
)
σ
c¯−σ cˆt
+ϕ¯hm¯pl
h
(
ϕˆht + mˆpl
h
t
)
+
(
1 + θ¯
h
φ¯h
)
ψhςh
c¯−σ
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
φˆht
+ ς
h
c¯−σ θ¯
h
(
φ¯h
)ψh
θˆht

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From the wage target equation (16), the only term which is not common to all ﬁrms
is the vacancy rate φhit. Using the derivations in Proposition 5, for a ﬁrm that has not
changed its nominal wage since period t, wˆh tarit+s|t is given by
w¯hwˆh tarit+s|t = w¯
hwˆh tart+s +
(
1− ηh
)
ψhςh
1
c¯−σ
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh (
φˆhit+s|t − φˆht+s
)
By the deﬁnition of φˆhit = φˆ
h
t − τz
(
logW hit − logW ht
)
, I can write
φˆhit+s|t = φˆ
h
t+s − τz
logW h∗it + γwlog
 s∏
j=1
(
piWt+j−1
)− logW ht+s

and hence
wˆh tarit+s|t = wˆ
h tar
t+s − φ
logW h∗it + γwlog
 s∏
j=1
(
piWt+j−1
)− logW ht+s

where φ =
(
1− ηh)ψhςh (φ¯h)1+ψh τz/w¯hc¯−σ. Inserting this expression in the log-linear
wage equation yields
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(
1− λh
)s
(δw)s
 (1 + φ) (logW h∗it − logW ht+s)+ wˆht+s − wˆh tart+s
+ (1 + φ) γwlog
(∏s
j=1
(
piWt+j−1
)) 
As all ﬁrms negotiating a new contract strike the same nominal wage, solving for W h∗t
and expading forward
(
logW h∗t − logW ht
)
=
1− β (1− λh) (δw)
1 + φ
(
wˆh tart − wˆht
)
−β
(
1− λh
)
(δw) γwpˆi
W
t + β
(
1− λh
)
(δw)
(
logW h∗t+1 − logW ht
)
The ﬁnal step consists of log-linearizing expression (36) and replacing logW h∗t − logW ht ,
which gives
pˆiwht − γwpˆiWt−1 =
1− β (1− λh) (δw)
1 + φ
1− δw
δw
(
wˆh tart − wˆht
)
−β
(
1− λh
)
(1 + δw) γwpˆi
W
t + β (1− λw) pˆiwht+1
To obtain expression (38), I replace wˆh tart using Proposition 5. 
Proposition 7
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A ﬁrst-order approximation of expression (11) yields
hθˆht + Et
{
−σcˆt+1 + Hˆht+1
}
= xθˆxt + Et
{
−σcˆt+1 + Hˆxt+1
}
From before, the left-hand side of this expression is equal to
Et
{
−σcˆt+1 + Hˆht+1
}
=
(
1− h
)
θˆht + ψ
hφˆht − (τfw + τhw)
δw
(1− δw)
(
pˆiwht+1 − γwpˆiWt
)
Using the fact that Et
{
βc−σt+1H
x
t+1
}
= ςx (θxt )
1−x (φxt )
ψx ςx (1− ηx) /ηx, the right-hand
side of (11) can be approximated by
Et
{
−σcˆt+1 + Hˆxt+1
}
= (1− x) θˆxt + ψxφˆxt
Using these expressions and replacing (τfw + τhw) , I obtain
θˆht + ψ
hφˆht −
χh
(
θh
)h−1
βc¯−σ (1 + Λ) w¯h
(1− (1− λh)βδw) (1− ηh) ςh (φ¯h)ψh δ
h
(1− δh)
(
pˆiwht+1 − γwpˆiWt
)
= θˆxt + ψ
xφˆxt

Proposition 8
Welfare criterion: The welfare criterion is given by
W˜ =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
c1−σt
1− σ − κ
hnht − κxnxt −
ςh
1 + ψh
ˆ 1
0
(
φhit
)1+ψh
nhitdi−
ςx
1 + ψx
(φxt )
1+ψx nxt
}
Second order approximations: The second-order log-linear approximation to the
ﬁrst term of W˜ can be expressed by
c1−σt
1− σ = c¯
1−σ
(
cˆt +
1− σ
2
cˆ2t
)
+ t.i.p.+O3
whereas for labour disutility I write
κhnht + κ
xnxt = κ
hn¯h
(
nˆht +
1
2
(
nˆht
)2)
+ κxn¯x
(
nˆxt +
1
2
(nˆxt )
2
)
+ t.i.p.+O3
For the aggregate costs of vacancy posting, I ﬁrst write
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ςh
1 + ψh
(
φhit
)1+ψh
nhit =
ςh
1 + ψh
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
n¯h

(
1 + ψh
)
φˆhit + nˆ
h
it
+
(
1 + ψh
)
nˆhitφˆ
h
it
+12
((
1 + ψh
)2 (
φˆhit
)2
+
(
nˆhit
)2)
+ t.i.p.+O3
Moreover, I deﬁne nht ≡
´ 1
0 n
h
itdi, which can be approximated by
31
nˆht = Einˆ
h
it +
1
2
Varinˆ
h
it +O3
as well as φht ≡
´ 1
0
nhit
nht
φhitdi, for which I write
32
φˆht = Eiφˆ
h
it +
1
2
Variφˆ
h
it − nˆht φˆht + Einˆhitφˆhit +O3
Finally, note that φˆht = vˆ
h
t − nˆht . Combining these expressions, I obtain
ςh
1 + ψh
ˆ 1
0
(
φhit
)1+ψh
nhitdi =
ςh
1 + ψh
(
φ¯h
)1+ψh
n¯h

(
1 + ψh
)
vˆht − ψhnˆht
+12
[(
1 + ψh
)
vˆht + ψ
hnˆht
]2
+12ψ
h
(
1 + ψh
)
Variφˆ
h
it
+ t.i.p.+O3
The last term in W˜ can be approximated by
ςx
1 + ψx
(φxt )
1+ψx nxt =
ςx
1 + ψx
(
φ¯x
)1+ψx
n¯x
(
(1 + ψx) vˆxt − ψxnˆxt
+12 [(1 + ψ
x) vˆxt − ψxnˆxt ]2
)
+ t.i.p.+O3
Inserting all the above derivations into the period welfare ﬂow and normalizing by rgdp
yields
W˜
rgdpc¯−σ
=
∞∑
t=0
βt

Q3cˆt +
(
ψh%h − ζh) nˆht − (1 + ψh) %hvˆht
+ (ψx%x − ζx) nˆxt − (1 + ψx) %xvˆxt
−12

ζh
(
nˆht
)2
+ ζx (nˆxt )
2 −Q3 (1− σ) cˆ2t
+%h
([(
1 + ψh
)
vˆht + ψ
hnˆht
]2
+ ψh
(
1 + ψh
)
Variφˆ
h
it
)
+%x [(1 + ψx) vˆxt − ψxnˆxt ]2


+t.i.p.+O3
To replace the linear terms in the above expression for quadratic terms, I use second-
order approximations of some of the equilibrium conditions.
31With Einˆ
h
it =
´ 1
0
nˆhitdi,
(
Einˆ
h
it
)2
=
(
nˆht
)2
+O3 and Varinˆhit = Ei
(
nˆhit
)2 − (Einˆhit)2.
32With Eiφˆ
h
it =
´ 1
0
φˆhitdi,
(
Eiφˆ
h
it
)2
=
(
φˆhit
)2
+O3 and Variφˆhit = Ei
(
φˆhit
)2
−
(
Eiφˆ
h
it
)2
.
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Labour market: A second-order approximation to the law of motion of sectoral
employment writes
nˆst+1 +
1
2
(
nˆst+1
)2
= λssvˆst + λ
s (1− s) uˆst +
λs
2
[svˆst + (1− s) uˆst ]2
+ (1− λs)
(
nˆst +
1
2
(nˆst )
2
)
+O3
for s = h, x. Multiplying by βt, summing across t, and noting that nˆ0 is independent
of policy
∑∞
t=0 β
t
[(
1
β − (1− λs)
)
nˆst − λssvˆst − λs (1− s) uˆst
]
=∑∞
t=0 β
t 1
2
[
λs [svˆst + (1− s) uˆst ]2 −
(
1
β − (1− λs)
)
(nˆst )
2
]
+ t.i.p.+O3
A second-order approximation of the labour market aggregate constraint, 1 = nst +n
−s
t +
ust + u
−s
t , writes
uˆst = −
n¯s
u¯s
nˆst −
n¯−s
u¯s
nˆ−st −
u¯−s
u¯s
uˆ−st
−1
2
[
n¯s
u¯s
(nˆst )
2 +
n¯−s
u¯s
(
nˆ−st
)2
+ (uˆst )
2 +
u¯−s
u¯s
(
uˆ−st
)2]
I use these three approximations, the Hoisos condition, ηs = s, the exact conditions
θˆst = vˆ
s
t − uˆst and φˆst = vˆst − nˆst , the sectoral job-creation conditions in the steady state
1
β
− (1− λs) + (1− ηs)λs θ¯
s
φ¯s
=
ηsλs
(1 + ψs)
(%s)−1 [αs1Q2 + ψ
s%s − ζs]
and the no-arbitrage condition in the steady state
1− ηh
ηh
(
1 + ψh
) %h
u¯h
=
1− ηx
ηx
(1 + ψx)
%x
u¯x
to obtain
W˜
rgdpc¯−σ
=
∞∑
t=0
βt

Q3cˆt − αh1Q1nˆht − αx1Q2nˆxt
−12

αh1Q1
(
nˆht
)2
+ αx1Q2 (nˆ
x
t )
2 −Q3 (1− σ) cˆ2t
+%h
(
1 + ψh
)((
1− h) (θˆht )2 + ψh (φˆht )2 + ψhVariφˆhit)
+%x (1 + ψx)
((
1− i) (θˆit)2 + ψx (φˆxt )2)


+t.i.p.+O3
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Resource Constraints: Combining the aggregate resource constraint and the deﬁni-
tion of trade-balance, I have
Υht
(
tbt − pxt xft + ct
)
= pht α
hZt
(
nht
)αh1 (
xht
)1−αh1
with Υht the index of price dispersion. Deﬁning ∆t = tbt − pxt xft + ct, the following
approximation
Q1Υˆ
h
t +Q1∆ˆt = Q1pˆ
h
t + α
h
1Q1nˆ
h
t +
(
1− αh1
)
Q1xˆ
h
t + t.i.p.
is exact. In turn, a second-order approximation of ∆t yields
Q1∆ˆt = tˆb
h
t − (1−Q1)
(
pˆxt + xˆ
f
t
)
+Q3cˆt
+
1
2
[(
tˆb
h
t
)2
− (1−Q1)
(
pˆxt + xˆ
f
t
)2
+Q3 (cˆt)
2 − (Q1)3
(
yˆht
)2]
+O3
where I used the fact that Q1yˆ
h
t = Q1pˆ
h
t +α
h
1Q1nˆ
h
t +
(
1− αh1
)
Q1xˆ
h
t is an exact approx-
imation.
The resource constraint in the commodity sector, At (n
x
t )
αx1 = xht + x
f
t , admits the
following approximation
αx1Q2nˆ
x
t +
1
2
[
Q2 (α
x
1)
2 (nˆxt )
2 + 2αx1Q2Aˆtnˆ
x
t
]
=
(Q2 +Q1 − 1) xˆht + (1−Q1) xˆft + 12
[
(Q2 +Q1 − 1)
(
xˆht
)2
+ (1−Q1)
(
xˆft
)2]
+ t.i.p.+O3
In the steady state
(
1− αh1
)
Q1 = Q2 + Q1 − 1. Combining these expressions, the
approximation to the aggregate resource constraint can be written as
Q3cˆt − αh1Q1nˆht − αx1Q2nˆxt = Q1pˆht + (1−Q1) pˆxt − tˆb
h
t −Q1Υˆht
+
1
2

Q2 (α
x
1)
2 (nˆxt )
2 + 2αx1Q2Aˆtnˆ
x
t
− (Q2 +Q1 − 1)
(
xˆht
)2 −Q3 (cˆt)2
+ (Q1)
3 (yˆht )2 − (tˆbht )2
+ (1−Q1)
((
pˆxt + xˆ
f
t
)2 − (xˆft )2)
+ t.i.p.+O
3
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Therefore I can write
W˜
rgdpc¯−σ
=
∞∑
t=0
βt

Q1pˆ
h
t + (1−Q1) pˆxt − tˆb
h
t −Q1Υˆht
−12

αh1Q1
(
nˆht
)2
+ αx1 (1− αx1)Q2 (nˆxt )2 − 2αx1Q2nˆxt Aˆt
+σQ3cˆ
2
t +
(
tˆb
h
t
)2
− (1−Q1)
((
pˆxt + xˆ
f
t
)2 − (xˆft )2)
− (Q1)3
(
yˆht
)2
+ (Q2 +Q1 − 1)
(
xˆht
)2
+%h
(
1 + ψh
)((
1− h) (θˆht )2 + ψh (φˆht )2 + ψhVariφˆhit)
+%x (1 + ψx)
((
1− i) (θˆit)2 + ψx (φˆxt )2)


+t.i.p.+O3
NFA and exchange rate: Using the law of motion of net foreign assents, stbt−1 =
−tbt + stbtpi∗t+1/i∗t , and the UIP condition, I obtain stc−σt bt−1 = −tbtc−σt + βst+1c−σt+1bt.
Integrating in time and performing a second-order approximation yields
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
−tˆbt
]
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
−σ (1−Q3) cˆt + 1
2
[
σ2 (1−Q3) (cˆt)2 − 2σcˆttˆbt +
(
tˆbt
)2]]
+ t.i.p.+O3
Assuming complete exchange rate pass-through, and given that open economy is small,
I deﬁne P f∗t = P ∗t . This allows me to use the deﬁnition of the CPI index to express pht as
a function of the real exchange rate, which has the following second-order approximation
pˆht = −
1− αc
αc
sˆt − (1− γc) 1
2
[
1− αc
αc
(sˆt)
2 +
(
pˆht
)2]
+O3
Note also that pˆxt = pˆ
x∗
t + sˆt is an exact approximation to the price of commodities in
domestic currency. Replacing tˆbt, pˆ
h
t and pˆ
x
t in the approximation to the welfare criteria
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yields
W˜
rgdpc¯−σ
=
∞∑
t=0
βt

(
1− (1 + 1−αcαc )Q1) sˆt − σ (1−Q3) cˆt −Q1Υˆht
−12

(1− γc) 1−αcαc Q1 (sˆt)2
− (σ − (1 + σ)Q3)σcˆ2t + 2σcˆttˆbt + (1− γc)Q1
(
pˆht
)2
+αh1Q1
(
nˆht
)2
+ αx1 (1− αx1)Q2 (nˆxt )2 − 2αx1Q2nˆxt Aˆt
− (1−Q1)
((
pˆxt + xˆ
f
t
)2 − (xˆft )2)
− (Q1)3
(
yˆht
)2
+ (Q2 +Q1 − 1)
(
xˆht
)2
+%h
(
1 + ψh
)((
1− h) (θˆht )2 + ψh (φˆht )2 + ψhVariφˆhit)
+%x (1 + ψx)
((
1− i) (θˆit)2 + ψx (φˆxt )2)


+t.i.p.+O3
Furthermore, assuming Q3 = 1 and α
c = Q1, I obtain expression (42) in Proposition 8,
except for the quadratic terms in price and wage inﬂation. These are derived next.
Quadratic terms in price and wage inﬂation: These derivations follow Woodford
(2003) and Thomas (2008). As deﬁned in the main text,Υht =
´ 1
0
(
P hit/P
h
t
)−µ
di. Up to
a second order of approximation, I can write
Υˆht = −µ
(
Eip˜
h
it −
µ
2
Ei
(
p˜hit
)2)
+O3
where p˜hit = log
(
P hit/P
h
t
)
and noting that
(
Υˆht
)2
isO4. In turn, approximating (P ht )1−µ =´ 1
0
(
P hit
)1−µ
di up to second order yields
Eip˜
h
it = −
1− µ
2
Ei
(
p˜hit
)2
+O3
and therefore
Υˆht =
µ
2
Ei
(
p˜hit
)2
+O3
Moreover, from
(
P ht
)1−µ
=
´ 1
0
(
P hit
)1−µ
di, and Pˆ ht = Eilog
(
P hit
)
, it holds true that
Pˆ ht − Pˆ ht−1 = (1− δp)
(
log
(
P h∗t
)
− Pˆ ht−1
)
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and hence33
Ei
(
p˜hit
)2
= Vari
[
log
(
P hit
)
− Pˆ ht−1
]
+O3
= δpEi
(
p˜hit−1
)2
+
δp
(1− δp)
(
Pˆ ht − Pˆ ht−1
)2
+O3
Multiplying both side by µ/2 and inserting the expression for Υˆht yields
Υˆht = δ
pΥˆht−1 +
µ
2
δp
(1− δp)
(
pˆiht
)2
+O3
Finally, multiplying by βt, integrating across t, and noting that Υˆh−1 is independent of
policy at time 0 yields
∞∑
t=0
βtΥˆht =
µ
2
δp
(1− δp) (1− δpβ)
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
pˆiht
)2
+ t.i.p.+O3
Regarding the term Variφˆ
h
it, from the deﬁnition of φˆ
h
it = φˆ
h
t − τzw˜hit it follows that
Variφˆ
h
it = (τz)
2 Variw˜
h
it, where w˜
h
it = log
(
W hit/W
h
t
)
. Hence, I can write
Variw˜
h
it = Vari
[
log
(
W hit
)
− Wˆ ht−1
]
+O3
= δwVariw˜
h
it−1 +
δw
(1− δw)
(
Wˆ ht − Wˆ ht−1
)2
+O3
Multiplying by βt and interating forward yields
∞∑
t=0
βtVariφˆ
h
it =
δw (τz)
2
(1− δw) (1− βδw)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[(
pˆiwht
)2]
+ t.i.p.+O3
33I used the fact that as p˜hit is O2, Ei
(
p˜hit
)2
= varilog
(
Phit
)
+O4.
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